A prominent 51 year old anesthesiologist pled guilty to falsifying research on the analgesic medications Celebrex and Vioxx for post-op pain managment. He was sentenced in Massachusetts federal court to 6 months in prison and given hefty fines to be paid to the pharmaceutical companies who financed his research and paid him to promote their drugs.
Dr. Scott Reuben just plain faked the results.
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
How Can a $101 Million a Year CEO Help "People Get the Care They Need at an Affordable Price?"
In 2005, we entitled a post, "How Can a $124.8 Million a Year CEO Make Health Care More Affordable?" At that time, we contrasted the enormous compensation given to the then CEO of UnitedHealth, Dr William McGuire, with the stated mission of his corporation. Since then, we have traced the travails of UnitedHealth and its leadership. Dr McGuire was eventually accused of receiving backdated stock options (which at one time raised his personal fortune to over $1 billion), and was pushed into retirement. UnitedHealth was accused of a variety of management and ethical lapses. The rather sorry story as of April, 2010 was summarized here.
The more things change, the more they stay the same. The Minneapolis Star-Tribune just reported:
The attempts company officials made to minimize Hemsley's outsized compensation were almost funny:
But Hemsley did exercise the options, so he did receive the additional $98.6 million.
Hemsley also seems on target to get gargantuan compensation this year too:
The cringe-inducing contrast is with UnitedHealth's high-minded mission statement:
Hemsley's compensation could have provided "care they need" to quite a few people at an affordable price.
More to the point, it is hard to imagine that a company that feels the need to pay so much to its CEO, and a CEO that can accept such riches, have the slightest understanding or interest in providing people "the care they need at an affordable price."
In this cynical age, I doubt many people credit the UnitedHealth mission statement with being more than advertising fluff. Nonetheless, I suspect most people believe that our society should try to provide as many people as possible with "the care they need at an affordable price," but realize that we are far from doing so. Health care insurance companies/ managed care organizations that see fit to make their hired leaders extremely rich seem to be part of the problem, not the solution.
The more things change, the more they stay the same. The Minneapolis Star-Tribune just reported:
Stephen Hemsley, a serious and studious man, is known for his marathon-like work schedule, which regularly includes Saturdays and Sundays, in his role as chief executive of Minnetonka-based UnitedHealth Group.
Now, he also is known as the highest-paid CEO in Minnesota with a 2009 pay package totaling $101.96 million, six times the amount paid to the next CEO in the Star Tribune's annual survey of the state's 100 highest-paid chief executives at publicly traded companies.
But Hemsley's big pay package is also a vestige of the company's former practice of loading executive compensation heavily with stock options, a practice that changed in the wake of a crippling backdating scandal four years ago.
Those options, granted under a different regime of board directors, accounted for $98.6 million of Hemsley's income in 2009.
The attempts company officials made to minimize Hemsley's outsized compensation were almost funny:
UnitedHealth officials assert that Hemsley's 2009 pay package minus the 10-year-old options was $8.9 million, far less than the compensation paid to CEOs in other health insurance organizations.
But Hemsley did exercise the options, so he did receive the additional $98.6 million.
Hemsley also seems on target to get gargantuan compensation this year too:
Nonetheless, Hemsley has already put up good compensation numbers for 2010 with the exercising of additional options granted after 1999 worth $21 million. He also controls 6 million exercisable and unexercisable options, half of which are underwater or below the stock's current value.
The cringe-inducing contrast is with UnitedHealth's high-minded mission statement:
Our mission is to help people live healthier lives.
* We seek to enhance the performance of the health system and improve the overall health and well-being of the people we serve and their communities.
* We work with health care professionals and other key partners to expand access to quality health care so people get the care they need at an affordable price.
* We support the physician/patient relationship and empower people with the information, guidance and tools they need to make personal health choices and decisions.
Hemsley's compensation could have provided "care they need" to quite a few people at an affordable price.
More to the point, it is hard to imagine that a company that feels the need to pay so much to its CEO, and a CEO that can accept such riches, have the slightest understanding or interest in providing people "the care they need at an affordable price."
In this cynical age, I doubt many people credit the UnitedHealth mission statement with being more than advertising fluff. Nonetheless, I suspect most people believe that our society should try to provide as many people as possible with "the care they need at an affordable price," but realize that we are far from doing so. Health care insurance companies/ managed care organizations that see fit to make their hired leaders extremely rich seem to be part of the problem, not the solution.
How Can a $101 Million a Year CEO Help "People Get the Care They Need at an Affordable Price?"
In 2005, we entitled a post, "How Can a $124.8 Million a Year CEO Make Health Care More Affordable?" At that time, we contrasted the enormous compensation given to the then CEO of UnitedHealth, Dr William McGuire, with the stated mission of his corporation. Since then, we have traced the travails of UnitedHealth and its leadership. Dr McGuire was eventually accused of receiving backdated stock options (which at one time raised his personal fortune to over $1 billion), and was pushed into retirement. UnitedHealth was accused of a variety of management and ethical lapses. The rather sorry story as of April, 2010 was summarized here.
The more things change, the more they stay the same. The Minneapolis Star-Tribune just reported:
The attempts company officials made to minimize Hemsley's outsized compensation were almost funny:
But Hemsley did exercise the options, so he did receive the additional $98.6 million.
Hemsley also seems on target to get gargantuan compensation this year too:
The cringe-inducing contrast is with UnitedHealth's high-minded mission statement:
Hemsley's compensation could have provided "care they need" to quite a few people at an affordable price.
More to the point, it is hard to imagine that a company that feels the need to pay so much to its CEO, and a CEO that can accept such riches, have the slightest understanding or interest in providing people "the care they need at an affordable price."
In this cynical age, I doubt many people credit the UnitedHealth mission statement with being more than advertising fluff. Nonetheless, I suspect most people believe that our society should try to provide as many people as possible with "the care they need at an affordable price," but realize that we are far from doing so. Health care insurance companies/ managed care organizations that see fit to make their hired leaders extremely rich seem to be part of the problem, not the solution.
The more things change, the more they stay the same. The Minneapolis Star-Tribune just reported:
Stephen Hemsley, a serious and studious man, is known for his marathon-like work schedule, which regularly includes Saturdays and Sundays, in his role as chief executive of Minnetonka-based UnitedHealth Group.
Now, he also is known as the highest-paid CEO in Minnesota with a 2009 pay package totaling $101.96 million, six times the amount paid to the next CEO in the Star Tribune's annual survey of the state's 100 highest-paid chief executives at publicly traded companies.
But Hemsley's big pay package is also a vestige of the company's former practice of loading executive compensation heavily with stock options, a practice that changed in the wake of a crippling backdating scandal four years ago.
Those options, granted under a different regime of board directors, accounted for $98.6 million of Hemsley's income in 2009.
The attempts company officials made to minimize Hemsley's outsized compensation were almost funny:
UnitedHealth officials assert that Hemsley's 2009 pay package minus the 10-year-old options was $8.9 million, far less than the compensation paid to CEOs in other health insurance organizations.
But Hemsley did exercise the options, so he did receive the additional $98.6 million.
Hemsley also seems on target to get gargantuan compensation this year too:
Nonetheless, Hemsley has already put up good compensation numbers for 2010 with the exercising of additional options granted after 1999 worth $21 million. He also controls 6 million exercisable and unexercisable options, half of which are underwater or below the stock's current value.
The cringe-inducing contrast is with UnitedHealth's high-minded mission statement:
Our mission is to help people live healthier lives.
* We seek to enhance the performance of the health system and improve the overall health and well-being of the people we serve and their communities.
* We work with health care professionals and other key partners to expand access to quality health care so people get the care they need at an affordable price.
* We support the physician/patient relationship and empower people with the information, guidance and tools they need to make personal health choices and decisions.
Hemsley's compensation could have provided "care they need" to quite a few people at an affordable price.
More to the point, it is hard to imagine that a company that feels the need to pay so much to its CEO, and a CEO that can accept such riches, have the slightest understanding or interest in providing people "the care they need at an affordable price."
In this cynical age, I doubt many people credit the UnitedHealth mission statement with being more than advertising fluff. Nonetheless, I suspect most people believe that our society should try to provide as many people as possible with "the care they need at an affordable price," but realize that we are far from doing so. Health care insurance companies/ managed care organizations that see fit to make their hired leaders extremely rich seem to be part of the problem, not the solution.
"Smoke Detector" - Medical Center Leader (and Former Biotech CEO) Outed as Tobacco Investor
Last year we posted about the seemingly incongruous choice of a wealthy biotechnology executive with little academic or practice experience to run the prestigious University of California - San Francisco, a health oriented university housing a respected medical school. We wondered whether her corporate background would make it difficult to uphold the university's academic and patient care missions.
In line with our concerns, Duff Wilson, writing in the New York Times, reported:
Experts on tobacco control were aghast:
We should give Dr Desmond-Hellmann credit for selling her Altria stock as soon as its connotations were made plain to her. (And at least she was not on the board of a tobacco company, to our knowledge, as was one former president of a university and large health sciences center.)
However, this little incident underlines the clash between the culture that dominates large health care corporations and the mission of medical schools and academic medical centers. In the last 30 years, academic medicine has rushed to embrace the reigning corporate culture, not to mention corporate money. I submit that this embrace has been at the peril of the fundamental academic and patient care missions.
Academic medical leaders need to promote better patient care, and honest, responsible teaching and research. To do so, they may have to give up some of the glitz, glamor, and cash proffered by industry. If they do not make this sacrifice, they risk losing the trust of an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical public.
In line with our concerns, Duff Wilson, writing in the New York Times, reported:
When Dr. Susan Desmond-Hellmann was named chancellor of the University of California, San Francisco, last summer, she took over a medical institution focused on world health generally and tobacco control in particular.
But she forgot one thing in adjusting to her new role: personal stock holdings listed last year in the range of $100,000 to $1 million in Altria, owner of Philip Morris USA, the maker of Marlboro cigarettes. Altria has been blamed for thousands of deaths and repeatedly criticized by the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the university.
Last week, a day after The New York Times inquired about the Altria stock, Dr. Desmond-Hellmann and her husband, also a doctor, ordered it to be immediately sold and imposed 'values screening' on their personal investments.
Experts on tobacco control were aghast:
Dr. Stanton A. Glantz, director of the university’s tobacco control center, said he was unaware of Dr. Desmond-Hellmann’s Altria stock, which was contained in a university filing but not made public until now, after a public records request by a former student who passed it on to The Times.
“I do find that kind of shocking, but at least she got rid of it,” Dr. Glantz said on Monday, adding that Dr. Desmond-Hellmann had been very supportive of the center.
Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, dean of the school of public health at the University of Michigan and a national antitobacco leader, said, “I find it frankly a bit appalling that the chancellor of a major medical center would have held such stock. It strikes me as unthinking, frankly.”
We should give Dr Desmond-Hellmann credit for selling her Altria stock as soon as its connotations were made plain to her. (And at least she was not on the board of a tobacco company, to our knowledge, as was one former president of a university and large health sciences center.)
However, this little incident underlines the clash between the culture that dominates large health care corporations and the mission of medical schools and academic medical centers. In the last 30 years, academic medicine has rushed to embrace the reigning corporate culture, not to mention corporate money. I submit that this embrace has been at the peril of the fundamental academic and patient care missions.
Academic medical leaders need to promote better patient care, and honest, responsible teaching and research. To do so, they may have to give up some of the glitz, glamor, and cash proffered by industry. If they do not make this sacrifice, they risk losing the trust of an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical public.
"Smoke Detector" - Medical Center Leader (and Former Biotech CEO) Outed as Tobacco Investor
Last year we posted about the seemingly incongruous choice of a wealthy biotechnology executive with little academic or practice experience to run the prestigious University of California - San Francisco, a health oriented university housing a respected medical school. We wondered whether her corporate background would make it difficult to uphold the university's academic and patient care missions.
In line with our concerns, Duff Wilson, writing in the New York Times, reported:
Experts on tobacco control were aghast:
We should give Dr Desmond-Hellmann credit for selling her Altria stock as soon as its connotations were made plain to her. (And at least she was not on the board of a tobacco company, to our knowledge, as was one former president of a university and large health sciences center.)
However, this little incident underlines the clash between the culture that dominates large health care corporations and the mission of medical schools and academic medical centers. In the last 30 years, academic medicine has rushed to embrace the reigning corporate culture, not to mention corporate money. I submit that this embrace has been at the peril of the fundamental academic and patient care missions.
Academic medical leaders need to promote better patient care, and honest, responsible teaching and research. To do so, they may have to give up some of the glitz, glamor, and cash proffered by industry. If they do not make this sacrifice, they risk losing the trust of an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical public.
In line with our concerns, Duff Wilson, writing in the New York Times, reported:
When Dr. Susan Desmond-Hellmann was named chancellor of the University of California, San Francisco, last summer, she took over a medical institution focused on world health generally and tobacco control in particular.
But she forgot one thing in adjusting to her new role: personal stock holdings listed last year in the range of $100,000 to $1 million in Altria, owner of Philip Morris USA, the maker of Marlboro cigarettes. Altria has been blamed for thousands of deaths and repeatedly criticized by the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the university.
Last week, a day after The New York Times inquired about the Altria stock, Dr. Desmond-Hellmann and her husband, also a doctor, ordered it to be immediately sold and imposed 'values screening' on their personal investments.
Experts on tobacco control were aghast:
Dr. Stanton A. Glantz, director of the university’s tobacco control center, said he was unaware of Dr. Desmond-Hellmann’s Altria stock, which was contained in a university filing but not made public until now, after a public records request by a former student who passed it on to The Times.
“I do find that kind of shocking, but at least she got rid of it,” Dr. Glantz said on Monday, adding that Dr. Desmond-Hellmann had been very supportive of the center.
Dr. Kenneth E. Warner, dean of the school of public health at the University of Michigan and a national antitobacco leader, said, “I find it frankly a bit appalling that the chancellor of a major medical center would have held such stock. It strikes me as unthinking, frankly.”
We should give Dr Desmond-Hellmann credit for selling her Altria stock as soon as its connotations were made plain to her. (And at least she was not on the board of a tobacco company, to our knowledge, as was one former president of a university and large health sciences center.)
However, this little incident underlines the clash between the culture that dominates large health care corporations and the mission of medical schools and academic medical centers. In the last 30 years, academic medicine has rushed to embrace the reigning corporate culture, not to mention corporate money. I submit that this embrace has been at the peril of the fundamental academic and patient care missions.
Academic medical leaders need to promote better patient care, and honest, responsible teaching and research. To do so, they may have to give up some of the glitz, glamor, and cash proffered by industry. If they do not make this sacrifice, they risk losing the trust of an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical public.
Insel Admits His Statements "May be Viewed as Misleading"
Dr Bernard Carroll has posted several times, most recently here, about shenanigans by "key opinion leaders" in psychiatry whose apparently academic writing and speeches have conveyed messages in line with the marketing agendas of drug and device companies, while they downplayed or concealed their financial ties to these companies. Lately, Dr Carroll noted how the current director of the US National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH), Dr Thomas Insel, has defended Dr Charles Nemeroff, whose recent move to the University of Miami let him shed sanctions imposed by Emory University for his failure to disclose conflicts of interest while he was there. Dr Carroll wrote, "For the past three months, Insel has been trying to put some distance between himself and Nemeroff, but the public isn’t buying it. I have called his statements disingenuous...."
Dr Carroll is on vacation, so in his absence, I note the following from a brief article in the Chronicle of Higher Education:
This seems to corroborate Dr Carroll's skepticism. I wonder what other statements by Dr Insel, or Dr Nemeroff for that matter, ought to be "viewed as misleading?"
We have said repeatedly that commercially sponsored "key opinion leaders" are really part-time drug marketers disguising themselves as academics or distinguished practitioners. The deceptions inherent in these roles seem to lead to a certain habitually elastic approach to the truth.
Medical academics and practitioners will need a renewed commitment to honesty and transparency if they want to regain the respect of an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical public.
Dr Carroll is on vacation, so in his absence, I note the following from a brief article in the Chronicle of Higher Education:
The director of the National Institute of Mental Health, Thomas R. Insel, has softened his denial of a mutually helpful relationship with Charles B. Nemeroff, a university researcher found to have repeatedly collected undisclosed corporate payments. In an update to his official blog posting, Dr. Insel said his initial denial of job assistance from Dr. Nemeroff 'may be viewed as misleading,' and acknowledged that Dr. Nemeroff served in key positions related to Dr. Insel's hiring by Emory University.
This seems to corroborate Dr Carroll's skepticism. I wonder what other statements by Dr Insel, or Dr Nemeroff for that matter, ought to be "viewed as misleading?"
We have said repeatedly that commercially sponsored "key opinion leaders" are really part-time drug marketers disguising themselves as academics or distinguished practitioners. The deceptions inherent in these roles seem to lead to a certain habitually elastic approach to the truth.
Medical academics and practitioners will need a renewed commitment to honesty and transparency if they want to regain the respect of an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical public.
Insel Admits His Statements "May be Viewed as Misleading"
Dr Bernard Carroll has posted several times, most recently here, about shenanigans by "key opinion leaders" in psychiatry whose apparently academic writing and speeches have conveyed messages in line with the marketing agendas of drug and device companies, while they downplayed or concealed their financial ties to these companies. Lately, Dr Carroll noted how the current director of the US National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH), Dr Thomas Insel, has defended Dr Charles Nemeroff, whose recent move to the University of Miami let him shed sanctions imposed by Emory University for his failure to disclose conflicts of interest while he was there. Dr Carroll wrote, "For the past three months, Insel has been trying to put some distance between himself and Nemeroff, but the public isn’t buying it. I have called his statements disingenuous...."
Dr Carroll is on vacation, so in his absence, I note the following from a brief article in the Chronicle of Higher Education:
This seems to corroborate Dr Carroll's skepticism. I wonder what other statements by Dr Insel, or Dr Nemeroff for that matter, ought to be "viewed as misleading?"
We have said repeatedly that commercially sponsored "key opinion leaders" are really part-time drug marketers disguising themselves as academics or distinguished practitioners. The deceptions inherent in these roles seem to lead to a certain habitually elastic approach to the truth.
Medical academics and practitioners will need a renewed commitment to honesty and transparency if they want to regain the respect of an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical public.
Dr Carroll is on vacation, so in his absence, I note the following from a brief article in the Chronicle of Higher Education:
The director of the National Institute of Mental Health, Thomas R. Insel, has softened his denial of a mutually helpful relationship with Charles B. Nemeroff, a university researcher found to have repeatedly collected undisclosed corporate payments. In an update to his official blog posting, Dr. Insel said his initial denial of job assistance from Dr. Nemeroff 'may be viewed as misleading,' and acknowledged that Dr. Nemeroff served in key positions related to Dr. Insel's hiring by Emory University.
This seems to corroborate Dr Carroll's skepticism. I wonder what other statements by Dr Insel, or Dr Nemeroff for that matter, ought to be "viewed as misleading?"
We have said repeatedly that commercially sponsored "key opinion leaders" are really part-time drug marketers disguising themselves as academics or distinguished practitioners. The deceptions inherent in these roles seem to lead to a certain habitually elastic approach to the truth.
Medical academics and practitioners will need a renewed commitment to honesty and transparency if they want to regain the respect of an increasingly skeptical, if not cynical public.
BLOGSCAN - Deceptive Pharmaceutical Marketing
Perhaps in honor of the recently concluded meeting organized by Dr Adriene Fugh-Berman and her colleagues at PharmedOut.org on the pharmaceutical industry and its influence on continuing medical education, three significant posts appeared this week about deceptive pharmaceutical marketing practices.
On the Health Business Blog, David Williams analyzed how a former pharmaceutical and biotechnology executive spun the Vioxx case, blaming it all on the public's risk aversion.
On the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma Blog, Dr Howard Brody summarized two significant articles by Kalman Applbaum on complex psychological campaigns, really versions of disinformation campaigns, used to to market pharmaceuticals.
On the Carlat Psychiatry Blog, Dr Daniel Carlat published a letter about life at a medical school department lead by Dr Charles Nemeroff, one of the "key opinion leaders" most lavishly paid by pharmaceutical companies to help them market questionable drugs for questionable reasons, and giving observations on Dr Nemeroff's new career.
On the Health Business Blog, David Williams analyzed how a former pharmaceutical and biotechnology executive spun the Vioxx case, blaming it all on the public's risk aversion.
On the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma Blog, Dr Howard Brody summarized two significant articles by Kalman Applbaum on complex psychological campaigns, really versions of disinformation campaigns, used to to market pharmaceuticals.
On the Carlat Psychiatry Blog, Dr Daniel Carlat published a letter about life at a medical school department lead by Dr Charles Nemeroff, one of the "key opinion leaders" most lavishly paid by pharmaceutical companies to help them market questionable drugs for questionable reasons, and giving observations on Dr Nemeroff's new career.
BLOGSCAN - Deceptive Pharmaceutical Marketing
Perhaps in honor of the recently concluded meeting organized by Dr Adriene Fugh-Berman and her colleagues at PharmedOut.org on the pharmaceutical industry and its influence on continuing medical education, three significant posts appeared this week about deceptive pharmaceutical marketing practices.
On the Health Business Blog, David Williams analyzed how a former pharmaceutical and biotechnology executive spun the Vioxx case, blaming it all on the public's risk aversion.
On the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma Blog, Dr Howard Brody summarized two significant articles by Kalman Applbaum on complex psychological campaigns, really versions of disinformation campaigns, used to to market pharmaceuticals.
On the Carlat Psychiatry Blog, Dr Daniel Carlat published a letter about life at a medical school department lead by Dr Charles Nemeroff, one of the "key opinion leaders" most lavishly paid by pharmaceutical companies to help them market questionable drugs for questionable reasons, and giving observations on Dr Nemeroff's new career.
On the Health Business Blog, David Williams analyzed how a former pharmaceutical and biotechnology executive spun the Vioxx case, blaming it all on the public's risk aversion.
On the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma Blog, Dr Howard Brody summarized two significant articles by Kalman Applbaum on complex psychological campaigns, really versions of disinformation campaigns, used to to market pharmaceuticals.
On the Carlat Psychiatry Blog, Dr Daniel Carlat published a letter about life at a medical school department lead by Dr Charles Nemeroff, one of the "key opinion leaders" most lavishly paid by pharmaceutical companies to help them market questionable drugs for questionable reasons, and giving observations on Dr Nemeroff's new career.
6 Ways To Help Simplify Your Life
I like to pass on good tips and these six ways to simplify your life make a lot of sense. The constant stress we feel because life is so complicated is not good for our health. Here are six ways you can have a simpler lifestyle:
1. De-Clutter Your Home
Look around. If you have piles of paper, too many "things" and nic-nacs laying around it is hard to think clearly and function. An open,
1. De-Clutter Your Home
Look around. If you have piles of paper, too many "things" and nic-nacs laying around it is hard to think clearly and function. An open,
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
WellPoint: Don't Know Much About Computer Programming; Aetna: Don't Know Much About Mathematics
Big US based health care insurance companies have not been covering themselves in glory in the last week.
Aetna's Math Errors
First, there was the case of Aetna's mathematical prowess, e.g., as reported by the Los Angeles Times:
Of course, Aetna tried to minimize the story:
However,
Of course, somehow the errors all were in Aetna's favor:
WellPoint's Computer Errors
A few minutes ago, the Associated Press reported:
Note that this security breach was potentially serious:
This is not the first time WellPoint's computers and software have violated the privacy of its applicants or customers:
Summary
Of course, everyone makes mistakes. However, one would expect that at least health insurance companies/ managed care organizations ought to be able to do the math necessary to support their rate proposals correctly, and keep their policy-holders' and applicants' personal information confidential. These would seem to be fundamental competencies that such organizations ought to display. Of course, one can find other examples of lack the lack of competency (and worse) displayed by both Aetna and WellPoint.
Furthermore, anyone can make mistakes, but in the real world, those who preside over such mistake-prone enterprises often do not do too well. However, in the bizarre world of large health care organizations, the executives who preside over the ongoing bumbling just make more and more money, under the pretense that their continuing brilliant leadership just leads to one triumph after another.
As we noted here, WellPoint CEO Angela Braly's total compensation increased in 2009 to an outsized $13.1 million, with the executives just underneath her paid proportionately well. Per its 2010 proxy statement, WellPoint's
I suspect that WellPoint's members' expectations did not include the three computer security breaches noted above.
Similarly, according to its 2010 proxy statement, Aetna CEO Ronald A Williams' total compensation in 2009 was a mere $18,058,162. Other top executives made proportionate amounts, from more than $1 million to more than $12 million. The rationale underlying executive compensation includes:
To me, avoiding mathematical errors in calculating policy premiums ought to be part of the company's goals linked to its business strategy.
An old rock song that starts with "don't know much about history," may have a certain charm. Health insurance companies that cannot accurately calculate premiums or protect the confidentiality of policy-holders' computerized data has none.
As long as "imperial CEOs" can continue to get extremely rich while presiding over incompetence and stupidity, if not worse (see here), we can expect the foolishness to continue. Meanwhile, the foolishness drives up costs and drives down quality of health care for the poor suffering patients, let alone the physicians and other health care professionals who must deal with it.
To really reform health care, we need to provide incentives for competent, honest leadership, and make that leadership accountable for its shortcomings.
Aetna's Math Errors
First, there was the case of Aetna's mathematical prowess, e.g., as reported by the Los Angeles Times:
A second insurance company in California has killed plans for double-digit rate hikes for individual policyholders because of errors in its filing that would have inflated premiums, state regulators said Thursday.
Connecticut-based Aetna Inc. had sought an average 19% increase in rates for its 65,000 individual customers, but pulled back after multiple math errors in its paperwork were found by its own staff and by an independent consultant working for the state.
Aetna's decision follows a similar move by Anthem Blue Cross, which canceled a rate increase of as much as 39% for many of its 800,000 California policyholders in April after the state consultant found calculation errors in its filing with the California Insurance Department.
Of course, Aetna tried to minimize the story:
An Aetna spokeswoman said the company found 'a miscalculation not previously detected' when it conducted a third round of internal reviews.
'This was a simple human error,' said spokeswoman Anjanette Coplin, who did not elaborate.
However,
'There were multiple errors … in the way [Aetna] annualized premiums and in the compounding of the rate increase,' said state Insurance Department spokesman Darrel Ng.
Of course, somehow the errors all were in Aetna's favor:
Even with the new disclosure requirements, regulators have limited authority to block rate increases. They can do so only if insurers fail to spend at least 70% of their premiums on medical claims.
In Aetna's recent rate filing, the insurer said its plan met the 70% minimum. But once the errors were identified, medical-claim spending fell below the 70% requirement. The proposed rates were higher than they should have been, officials said.
WellPoint's Computer Errors
A few minutes ago, the Associated Press reported:
WellPoint Inc. has notified 470,000 individual insurance customers that medical records, credit card numbers and other sensitive information may have been exposed in the latest security breach of the health insurer's records.
The Indianapolis company said the problem stemmed from an online program customers can use to track the progress of their application for coverage. It was fixed in March.
Spokeswoman Cynthia Sanders said an outside vendor had upgraded the insurer's application tracker last October and told the insurer all security measures were back in place.
But a California customer discovered that she could call up confidential information of other customers by manipulating Web addresses used in the program. Customers use a Web site and password to track their applications.
Note that this security breach was potentially serious:
WellPoint's security breach doesn't crack the top 10 in terms of number of people who may have had information exposed, said Paul Stephens, the [Privacy Rights Clearinghouse]organization's director of policy and advocacy. Even so, he labeled the breach 'very serious' because it possibly involved both financial and medical information.
This is not the first time WellPoint's computers and software have violated the privacy of its applicants or customers:
Two years ago, WellPoint offered free credit monitoring after it said personal information for about 128,000 customers in several states had been exposed online. In 2006, backup computer tapes containing the personal information of 200,000 of its members were stolen from a Massachusetts vendor's office.
Summary
Of course, everyone makes mistakes. However, one would expect that at least health insurance companies/ managed care organizations ought to be able to do the math necessary to support their rate proposals correctly, and keep their policy-holders' and applicants' personal information confidential. These would seem to be fundamental competencies that such organizations ought to display. Of course, one can find other examples of lack the lack of competency (and worse) displayed by both Aetna and WellPoint.
Furthermore, anyone can make mistakes, but in the real world, those who preside over such mistake-prone enterprises often do not do too well. However, in the bizarre world of large health care organizations, the executives who preside over the ongoing bumbling just make more and more money, under the pretense that their continuing brilliant leadership just leads to one triumph after another.
As we noted here, WellPoint CEO Angela Braly's total compensation increased in 2009 to an outsized $13.1 million, with the executives just underneath her paid proportionately well. Per its 2010 proxy statement, WellPoint's
Total Rewards compensation program is designed to attract, engage, motivate and retain a talented team of executive officers and to appropriately reward those executive officers for their contributions to our business and our members. We seek to accomplish this goal in a way that is closely aligned with the long-term interests of our shareholders and the expectations of our members and health care providers.
I suspect that WellPoint's members' expectations did not include the three computer security breaches noted above.
Similarly, according to its 2010 proxy statement, Aetna CEO Ronald A Williams' total compensation in 2009 was a mere $18,058,162. Other top executives made proportionate amounts, from more than $1 million to more than $12 million. The rationale underlying executive compensation includes:
We seek to implement a pay-for-performance philosophy by tying a significant portion of our executives’ compensation to their achievement of financial and other goals that are linked to the Company’s business strategy and each executive’s contributions towards the achievement of those goals.
To me, avoiding mathematical errors in calculating policy premiums ought to be part of the company's goals linked to its business strategy.
An old rock song that starts with "don't know much about history," may have a certain charm. Health insurance companies that cannot accurately calculate premiums or protect the confidentiality of policy-holders' computerized data has none.
As long as "imperial CEOs" can continue to get extremely rich while presiding over incompetence and stupidity, if not worse (see here), we can expect the foolishness to continue. Meanwhile, the foolishness drives up costs and drives down quality of health care for the poor suffering patients, let alone the physicians and other health care professionals who must deal with it.
To really reform health care, we need to provide incentives for competent, honest leadership, and make that leadership accountable for its shortcomings.
WellPoint: Don't Know Much About Computer Programming; Aetna: Don't Know Much About Mathematics
Big US based health care insurance companies have not been covering themselves in glory in the last week.
Aetna's Math Errors
First, there was the case of Aetna's mathematical prowess, e.g., as reported by the Los Angeles Times:
Of course, Aetna tried to minimize the story:
However,
Of course, somehow the errors all were in Aetna's favor:
WellPoint's Computer Errors
A few minutes ago, the Associated Press reported:
Note that this security breach was potentially serious:
This is not the first time WellPoint's computers and software have violated the privacy of its applicants or customers:
Summary
Of course, everyone makes mistakes. However, one would expect that at least health insurance companies/ managed care organizations ought to be able to do the math necessary to support their rate proposals correctly, and keep their policy-holders' and applicants' personal information confidential. These would seem to be fundamental competencies that such organizations ought to display. Of course, one can find other examples of lack the lack of competency (and worse) displayed by both Aetna and WellPoint.
Furthermore, anyone can make mistakes, but in the real world, those who preside over such mistake-prone enterprises often do not do too well. However, in the bizarre world of large health care organizations, the executives who preside over the ongoing bumbling just make more and more money, under the pretense that their continuing brilliant leadership just leads to one triumph after another.
As we noted here, WellPoint CEO Angela Braly's total compensation increased in 2009 to an outsized $13.1 million, with the executives just underneath her paid proportionately well. Per its 2010 proxy statement, WellPoint's
I suspect that WellPoint's members' expectations did not include the three computer security breaches noted above.
Similarly, according to its 2010 proxy statement, Aetna CEO Ronald A Williams' total compensation in 2009 was a mere $18,058,162. Other top executives made proportionate amounts, from more than $1 million to more than $12 million. The rationale underlying executive compensation includes:
To me, avoiding mathematical errors in calculating policy premiums ought to be part of the company's goals linked to its business strategy.
An old rock song that starts with "don't know much about history," may have a certain charm. Health insurance companies that cannot accurately calculate premiums or protect the confidentiality of policy-holders' computerized data has none.
As long as "imperial CEOs" can continue to get extremely rich while presiding over incompetence and stupidity, if not worse (see here), we can expect the foolishness to continue. Meanwhile, the foolishness drives up costs and drives down quality of health care for the poor suffering patients, let alone the physicians and other health care professionals who must deal with it.
To really reform health care, we need to provide incentives for competent, honest leadership, and make that leadership accountable for its shortcomings.
Aetna's Math Errors
First, there was the case of Aetna's mathematical prowess, e.g., as reported by the Los Angeles Times:
A second insurance company in California has killed plans for double-digit rate hikes for individual policyholders because of errors in its filing that would have inflated premiums, state regulators said Thursday.
Connecticut-based Aetna Inc. had sought an average 19% increase in rates for its 65,000 individual customers, but pulled back after multiple math errors in its paperwork were found by its own staff and by an independent consultant working for the state.
Aetna's decision follows a similar move by Anthem Blue Cross, which canceled a rate increase of as much as 39% for many of its 800,000 California policyholders in April after the state consultant found calculation errors in its filing with the California Insurance Department.
Of course, Aetna tried to minimize the story:
An Aetna spokeswoman said the company found 'a miscalculation not previously detected' when it conducted a third round of internal reviews.
'This was a simple human error,' said spokeswoman Anjanette Coplin, who did not elaborate.
However,
'There were multiple errors … in the way [Aetna] annualized premiums and in the compounding of the rate increase,' said state Insurance Department spokesman Darrel Ng.
Of course, somehow the errors all were in Aetna's favor:
Even with the new disclosure requirements, regulators have limited authority to block rate increases. They can do so only if insurers fail to spend at least 70% of their premiums on medical claims.
In Aetna's recent rate filing, the insurer said its plan met the 70% minimum. But once the errors were identified, medical-claim spending fell below the 70% requirement. The proposed rates were higher than they should have been, officials said.
WellPoint's Computer Errors
A few minutes ago, the Associated Press reported:
WellPoint Inc. has notified 470,000 individual insurance customers that medical records, credit card numbers and other sensitive information may have been exposed in the latest security breach of the health insurer's records.
The Indianapolis company said the problem stemmed from an online program customers can use to track the progress of their application for coverage. It was fixed in March.
Spokeswoman Cynthia Sanders said an outside vendor had upgraded the insurer's application tracker last October and told the insurer all security measures were back in place.
But a California customer discovered that she could call up confidential information of other customers by manipulating Web addresses used in the program. Customers use a Web site and password to track their applications.
Note that this security breach was potentially serious:
WellPoint's security breach doesn't crack the top 10 in terms of number of people who may have had information exposed, said Paul Stephens, the [Privacy Rights Clearinghouse]organization's director of policy and advocacy. Even so, he labeled the breach 'very serious' because it possibly involved both financial and medical information.
This is not the first time WellPoint's computers and software have violated the privacy of its applicants or customers:
Two years ago, WellPoint offered free credit monitoring after it said personal information for about 128,000 customers in several states had been exposed online. In 2006, backup computer tapes containing the personal information of 200,000 of its members were stolen from a Massachusetts vendor's office.
Summary
Of course, everyone makes mistakes. However, one would expect that at least health insurance companies/ managed care organizations ought to be able to do the math necessary to support their rate proposals correctly, and keep their policy-holders' and applicants' personal information confidential. These would seem to be fundamental competencies that such organizations ought to display. Of course, one can find other examples of lack the lack of competency (and worse) displayed by both Aetna and WellPoint.
Furthermore, anyone can make mistakes, but in the real world, those who preside over such mistake-prone enterprises often do not do too well. However, in the bizarre world of large health care organizations, the executives who preside over the ongoing bumbling just make more and more money, under the pretense that their continuing brilliant leadership just leads to one triumph after another.
As we noted here, WellPoint CEO Angela Braly's total compensation increased in 2009 to an outsized $13.1 million, with the executives just underneath her paid proportionately well. Per its 2010 proxy statement, WellPoint's
Total Rewards compensation program is designed to attract, engage, motivate and retain a talented team of executive officers and to appropriately reward those executive officers for their contributions to our business and our members. We seek to accomplish this goal in a way that is closely aligned with the long-term interests of our shareholders and the expectations of our members and health care providers.
I suspect that WellPoint's members' expectations did not include the three computer security breaches noted above.
Similarly, according to its 2010 proxy statement, Aetna CEO Ronald A Williams' total compensation in 2009 was a mere $18,058,162. Other top executives made proportionate amounts, from more than $1 million to more than $12 million. The rationale underlying executive compensation includes:
We seek to implement a pay-for-performance philosophy by tying a significant portion of our executives’ compensation to their achievement of financial and other goals that are linked to the Company’s business strategy and each executive’s contributions towards the achievement of those goals.
To me, avoiding mathematical errors in calculating policy premiums ought to be part of the company's goals linked to its business strategy.
An old rock song that starts with "don't know much about history," may have a certain charm. Health insurance companies that cannot accurately calculate premiums or protect the confidentiality of policy-holders' computerized data has none.
As long as "imperial CEOs" can continue to get extremely rich while presiding over incompetence and stupidity, if not worse (see here), we can expect the foolishness to continue. Meanwhile, the foolishness drives up costs and drives down quality of health care for the poor suffering patients, let alone the physicians and other health care professionals who must deal with it.
To really reform health care, we need to provide incentives for competent, honest leadership, and make that leadership accountable for its shortcomings.
Sunday, June 27, 2010
Good Lessons Come from McChrystal Debacle
General Stanley McChrystal's loose lips and ultimate downfall can teach us all some valuable lessons. He was a career military man (West Point Graduate) who rose to the top of the heap as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force and Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. People are scratching their heads about how a man who was in such an esteemed position could be so stupid
Friday, June 25, 2010
Omega 3 FFA for Depression
A study published in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry has shown that supplementing Omega-3 fatty acids (FFA) can significantly reduce symptoms for patients with major depression. This study looked at 432 adult patients (mean age 46 years, 68.5% female) and randomized them to receive either 8 weeks of omega 3 FFA or placebo. 40% of the patients were also taking antidepressants when they
Professional Integrity for Sale? “Sure,” Says Medscape!
Some chiropractors also practice homeopathy. According to Frank King, D.C., many more should be doing just that:
But that’s not all:
This is no surprise. Most chiropractors relinquished whatever ethical integrity they might have had when they bought into the “subluxation” myth, and the field as a whole has a fine tradition of “practice building.”
Naturopaths, likewise, don’t mind winking at practice ethics in order to make an extra buck. Nor do MD quacks, of course. Hey, it’s getting harder and harder to make a living just by slogging through the morass of needy patients, onerous third-party billing requirements, diminishing payments, increasingly cumbersome practice guidelines, next-to-impossible-to-keep-up-with (nothing to say of tedious and technical!) medical literature, and all the rest. Why not sprinkle your practice with a little ‘diagnostic’ sugar that will appease those clingy patients—for a while, anyway—and that you won’t have to find billing codes for (because there aren’t any)? Heck, why not check out this offering from “bio-pro, inc. Amazing Anti-Aging Solutions (Healthier Patients, More Patients)”:
What may have come as a surprise to beleaguered physicians who still play by the rules was this offering, just a few days ago, from Medscape Business of Medicine:
Homeopathy is an energetic form of natural medicine that corrects nerve interferences, absent nerve reflexes, and pathological nerve response patterns that the chiropractic adjustment alone does not correct. The appropriate homeopathic remedies will eliminate aberrant nerve reflexes and pathological nerve responses which cause recurrent subluxation complexes.
Not only does homeopathy correct nerve interferences, it empowers the doctor of chiropractic to reach the entire nervous system. What this means is that we can now better affect the whole person, and all of the maladies that affect us. Homeopathy’s energetic approach reaches deep within the nervous system, correcting nerve interferences where the hands of chiropractic alone cannot reach. Homeopathy is the missing link that enables the chiropractor to truly affect the whole nervous system!
But that’s not all:
Financial Rewards
Homeopathy means a multiple increase in business. Personally, I have been able to see and effectively help more patients in less time. The additional cash flow from broadening your scope of practice, increasing your patient volume and selling the homeopathic remedies is a wonderful adjunct. Better yet are the secondary financial benefits:You can be the doctor people will seek out, travel long distances to see, and pay cash for your valuable services. Take it from someone who has experienced it first hand, it’s a great position to be in.
- Homeopathy is like an extension of you that the patient can take with them to apply throughout each day in between visits. The actual therapeutic benefits of homeopathy along with the inner comforts of the patient as they connect you with each dose they take.
- The dynamic broadening of your effective scope of practice multiplies the number of patients you can help and the multiple problems that each patient usually has. As you correct one set of problems, there are commonly other problems most patients don’t even tell their chiropractors. This doesn’t have to be the case anymore. Homeopathy empowers the chiropractor to correct conditions ranging from allergies to warts with incredible effectiveness!
- Obviously, the rule of multiples will exponentially increase when a homeopathic procedure is properly implemented into your practice. Many of the conditions people are suffering with have no viable solution without the dynamic duo of chiropractic and homeopathy.
This is no surprise. Most chiropractors relinquished whatever ethical integrity they might have had when they bought into the “subluxation” myth, and the field as a whole has a fine tradition of “practice building.”
Naturopaths, likewise, don’t mind winking at practice ethics in order to make an extra buck. Nor do MD quacks, of course. Hey, it’s getting harder and harder to make a living just by slogging through the morass of needy patients, onerous third-party billing requirements, diminishing payments, increasingly cumbersome practice guidelines, next-to-impossible-to-keep-up-with (nothing to say of tedious and technical!) medical literature, and all the rest. Why not sprinkle your practice with a little ‘diagnostic’ sugar that will appease those clingy patients—for a while, anyway—and that you won’t have to find billing codes for (because there aren’t any)? Heck, why not check out this offering from “bio-pro, inc. Amazing Anti-Aging Solutions (Healthier Patients, More Patients)”:
Bio-pro was founded in 1978 by the late Charles H. Farr, MD, PhD, the self-styled “father of oxidative medicine,” who was also a founder of the American College for Advancement in Medicine, the Mother of All Pseudomedical Pseudoprofessional Organizations (PPO). But none of this is surprising, right? After all, quacks quack.HOWW TOOOO ….
The “must do” seminars for those who own or are managing a Complimentary [sic]Medicine Practice.
Three day course teaches you:How to relate to the patient, evaluate, test and diagnose
How to use solutions, mixtures, methods, supplies and equipment
How to protocol administration for Chelation, Oxidation, Chelox, TriOx, Ascorbates, UVBI
How to design and organize your office
How to hire and fire staff and to computerize
How to use public relations and marketing
How to manage compliance with Medicare, State Medical Boards and governmental regulatory agencies
Manuals included…
Each attendee receives one set of training materials, including:
Protocol Manual
Physicians Manual
Office Procedure Manual
Forms Book
Marketing Manual
Patient Results Manual
Employee Manual
Audio tapes
and other related material.
What may have come as a surprise to beleaguered physicians who still play by the rules was this offering, just a few days ago, from Medscape Business of Medicine:
Six Ways to Earn Extra Income From Medical
Activities
You’re chasing after claims but watching reimbursement sink.
It’s a common story, and primary care doctors and even specialists are keeping their ears to the ground for other ways to boost their bottom line. Luckily, doctors have some fairly lucrative options that can help them maintain their income — and perhaps even increase it.
We looked at 6 avenues that physicians have taken to earn extra revenue. None of these activities require a tremendous amount of time. Participating in just 1 or 2 activities can put enough money in your pocket to allow you to breathe a little easier when the bills come in.
So what are those ‘6 avenues’? Let’s see:
- Work with Attorneys
- See Nursing Home Patients
- Serve as a Medical Director
So far, so not necessarily bad…
- Team Up with Pharmaceutical Companies
What??! Team up with pharmaceutical companies? Couldn’t that mean, like, just doing legitimate research and trying like hell to do it right? Uh, nope:
Drug and device companies spend billions of dollars each year to discover and promote new medicines and treatments, and they rely heavily on doctors to participate in these endeavors whether through clinical trials or serving as a speaker or consultant. It’s not uncommon for physicians to earn a minimum of 5 figures a year either speaking or doing clinical studies within their medical practice. Some doctors make in excess of $100,000 annually — on top of their income from seeing patients.
O’course, you gotta watch out for those pesky ethics killjoys, warns Medscape:
Although some extra money is nice, too much can turn heads — and not in a good way. In late January, The Boston Globe reported on an allergy and asthma specialist who was issued an ultimatum by his hospital, the prestigious Brigham and Women’s Hospital (Boston, Massachusetts): Stop moonlighting on behalf of pharmaceutical companies or resign from your staff position.
What it all comes down to is this:
Pros: With typical payments running about $1500-$2500 for a single talk, there’s substantial opportunity to supplement your regular income…
Cons: These arrangements are coming under increasing scrutiny from hospitals, legislators, regulators, and the media. In fact, some of the doctors whom we contacted for this article declined to talk about their involvement with drug companies.
Uh, no kiddin’. Funny that the “increasing scrutiny” doesn’t seem to come from organized medicine, medical schools, mainstream medical journals, state medical boards, or doctors in general. A couple of years ago I lamented the publication of a couple of book reviews, in the lofty New England Journal of Medicine, that celebrated trendy pseudomedicine. Shortly thereafter I received this from an emeritus editor:
I think the incursion into the bastions of medicine has to do with the fact that everything nowadays—absolutely everything—has become a market. If quackery appeals to the readers of the NEJM, it will be there. ”Is it true?” is no longer the question anyone asks, but “Will it sell?” And I think that applies to the editors of most major journals, as well.
True, dat. As for Medscape, this isn’t its first ethical gaff, and I agree with Bernard Carroll that it seems to have “a right hand – left hand problem.”
Oh yeah: what were the other 2 “avenues”? Those would be:
- Become a Media Personality
- Consult for Wall Street
Professional Integrity for Sale? “Sure,” Says Medscape!
Some chiropractors also practice homeopathy. According to Frank King, D.C., many more should be doing just that:
But that’s not all:
This is no surprise. Most chiropractors relinquished whatever ethical integrity they might have had when they bought into the “subluxation” myth, and the field as a whole has a fine tradition of “practice building.”
Naturopaths, likewise, don’t mind winking at practice ethics in order to make an extra buck. Nor do MD quacks, of course. Hey, it’s getting harder and harder to make a living just by slogging through the morass of needy patients, onerous third-party billing requirements, diminishing payments, increasingly cumbersome practice guidelines, next-to-impossible-to-keep-up-with (nothing to say of tedious and technical!) medical literature, and all the rest. Why not sprinkle your practice with a little ‘diagnostic’ sugar that will appease those clingy patients—for a while, anyway—and that you won’t have to find billing codes for (because there aren’t any)? Heck, why not check out this offering from “bio-pro, inc. Amazing Anti-Aging Solutions (Healthier Patients, More Patients)”:
What may have come as a surprise to beleaguered physicians who still play by the rules was this offering, just a few days ago, from Medscape Business of Medicine:
Homeopathy is an energetic form of natural medicine that corrects nerve interferences, absent nerve reflexes, and pathological nerve response patterns that the chiropractic adjustment alone does not correct. The appropriate homeopathic remedies will eliminate aberrant nerve reflexes and pathological nerve responses which cause recurrent subluxation complexes.
Not only does homeopathy correct nerve interferences, it empowers the doctor of chiropractic to reach the entire nervous system. What this means is that we can now better affect the whole person, and all of the maladies that affect us. Homeopathy’s energetic approach reaches deep within the nervous system, correcting nerve interferences where the hands of chiropractic alone cannot reach. Homeopathy is the missing link that enables the chiropractor to truly affect the whole nervous system!
But that’s not all:
Financial Rewards
Homeopathy means a multiple increase in business. Personally, I have been able to see and effectively help more patients in less time. The additional cash flow from broadening your scope of practice, increasing your patient volume and selling the homeopathic remedies is a wonderful adjunct. Better yet are the secondary financial benefits:You can be the doctor people will seek out, travel long distances to see, and pay cash for your valuable services. Take it from someone who has experienced it first hand, it’s a great position to be in.
- Homeopathy is like an extension of you that the patient can take with them to apply throughout each day in between visits. The actual therapeutic benefits of homeopathy along with the inner comforts of the patient as they connect you with each dose they take.
- The dynamic broadening of your effective scope of practice multiplies the number of patients you can help and the multiple problems that each patient usually has. As you correct one set of problems, there are commonly other problems most patients don’t even tell their chiropractors. This doesn’t have to be the case anymore. Homeopathy empowers the chiropractor to correct conditions ranging from allergies to warts with incredible effectiveness!
- Obviously, the rule of multiples will exponentially increase when a homeopathic procedure is properly implemented into your practice. Many of the conditions people are suffering with have no viable solution without the dynamic duo of chiropractic and homeopathy.
This is no surprise. Most chiropractors relinquished whatever ethical integrity they might have had when they bought into the “subluxation” myth, and the field as a whole has a fine tradition of “practice building.”
Naturopaths, likewise, don’t mind winking at practice ethics in order to make an extra buck. Nor do MD quacks, of course. Hey, it’s getting harder and harder to make a living just by slogging through the morass of needy patients, onerous third-party billing requirements, diminishing payments, increasingly cumbersome practice guidelines, next-to-impossible-to-keep-up-with (nothing to say of tedious and technical!) medical literature, and all the rest. Why not sprinkle your practice with a little ‘diagnostic’ sugar that will appease those clingy patients—for a while, anyway—and that you won’t have to find billing codes for (because there aren’t any)? Heck, why not check out this offering from “bio-pro, inc. Amazing Anti-Aging Solutions (Healthier Patients, More Patients)”:
Bio-pro was founded in 1978 by the late Charles H. Farr, MD, PhD, the self-styled “father of oxidative medicine,” who was also a founder of the American College for Advancement in Medicine, the Mother of All Pseudomedical Pseudoprofessional Organizations (PPO). But none of this is surprising, right? After all, quacks quack.HOWW TOOOO ….
The “must do” seminars for those who own or are managing a Complimentary [sic]Medicine Practice.
Three day course teaches you:How to relate to the patient, evaluate, test and diagnose
How to use solutions, mixtures, methods, supplies and equipment
How to protocol administration for Chelation, Oxidation, Chelox, TriOx, Ascorbates, UVBI
How to design and organize your office
How to hire and fire staff and to computerize
How to use public relations and marketing
How to manage compliance with Medicare, State Medical Boards and governmental regulatory agencies
Manuals included…
Each attendee receives one set of training materials, including:
Protocol Manual
Physicians Manual
Office Procedure Manual
Forms Book
Marketing Manual
Patient Results Manual
Employee Manual
Audio tapes
and other related material.
What may have come as a surprise to beleaguered physicians who still play by the rules was this offering, just a few days ago, from Medscape Business of Medicine:
Six Ways to Earn Extra Income From Medical
Activities
You’re chasing after claims but watching reimbursement sink.
It’s a common story, and primary care doctors and even specialists are keeping their ears to the ground for other ways to boost their bottom line. Luckily, doctors have some fairly lucrative options that can help them maintain their income — and perhaps even increase it.
We looked at 6 avenues that physicians have taken to earn extra revenue. None of these activities require a tremendous amount of time. Participating in just 1 or 2 activities can put enough money in your pocket to allow you to breathe a little easier when the bills come in.
So what are those ‘6 avenues’? Let’s see:
- Work with Attorneys
- See Nursing Home Patients
- Serve as a Medical Director
So far, so not necessarily bad…
- Team Up with Pharmaceutical Companies
What??! Team up with pharmaceutical companies? Couldn’t that mean, like, just doing legitimate research and trying like hell to do it right? Uh, nope:
Drug and device companies spend billions of dollars each year to discover and promote new medicines and treatments, and they rely heavily on doctors to participate in these endeavors whether through clinical trials or serving as a speaker or consultant. It’s not uncommon for physicians to earn a minimum of 5 figures a year either speaking or doing clinical studies within their medical practice. Some doctors make in excess of $100,000 annually — on top of their income from seeing patients.
O’course, you gotta watch out for those pesky ethics killjoys, warns Medscape:
Although some extra money is nice, too much can turn heads — and not in a good way. In late January, The Boston Globe reported on an allergy and asthma specialist who was issued an ultimatum by his hospital, the prestigious Brigham and Women’s Hospital (Boston, Massachusetts): Stop moonlighting on behalf of pharmaceutical companies or resign from your staff position.
What it all comes down to is this:
Pros: With typical payments running about $1500-$2500 for a single talk, there’s substantial opportunity to supplement your regular income…
Cons: These arrangements are coming under increasing scrutiny from hospitals, legislators, regulators, and the media. In fact, some of the doctors whom we contacted for this article declined to talk about their involvement with drug companies.
Uh, no kiddin’. Funny that the “increasing scrutiny” doesn’t seem to come from organized medicine, medical schools, mainstream medical journals, state medical boards, or doctors in general. A couple of years ago I lamented the publication of a couple of book reviews, in the lofty New England Journal of Medicine, that celebrated trendy pseudomedicine. Shortly thereafter I received this from an emeritus editor:
I think the incursion into the bastions of medicine has to do with the fact that everything nowadays—absolutely everything—has become a market. If quackery appeals to the readers of the NEJM, it will be there. ”Is it true?” is no longer the question anyone asks, but “Will it sell?” And I think that applies to the editors of most major journals, as well.
True, dat. As for Medscape, this isn’t its first ethical gaff, and I agree with Bernard Carroll that it seems to have “a right hand – left hand problem.”
Oh yeah: what were the other 2 “avenues”? Those would be:
- Become a Media Personality
- Consult for Wall Street
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Slouching, or "Moving Towards ... Oligopoly"
A report by Bloomberg on a prediction that the US attempt at health care reform will lead to more concentration of power among health insurance companies.
In addition,
Wellpoint is not likely to suffer from a move to fewer, larger insurance companies:
So, it is not that Mr Kleinman has any regrets about this. Far from it:
Mr Kleinman might argue that WellPoint's increasing size and prospects for market domination are good for society as well as the company, and its top executives. We have heard endless arguments in the last 30 years that larger hospital systems and larger insurance companies lead to more efficiency and lower costs. However, the evidence is in the other direction. There is plenty of reason to worry that increasingly dominant companies will extract higher prices, and the money they make will benefit their top leaders first, maybe their stockholders second, and patients and ordinary employees a very distant third, if at all. So look for WellPoint CEO Angela Braly to make even more than $13 million a year in the future.
So it would have been more reassuring if the response from the US executive branch included some opposition to the notion of a more concentrated market. Instead,
And rather than worrying about the government's response,
If the increasing concentration of power in health insurance does not meet a more effective challenge, we will need a lot more than rhetoric, good or bad, to save health care.
The Second Coming (Slouching Towards Bethlehem), by W B Yeats
U.S. health insurers are 'moving towards an oligopoly,' a process that this year’s health-care overhaul will accelerate, the investor-relations chief at WellPoint Inc. said today.
New regulations on administrative spending and premium increases will push some independent insurers out of business or into deals with bigger rivals, said Michael Kleinman, vice president for investor relations, at a Wells Fargo & Co. conference in Boston.
In addition,
The insurance market is becoming an oligopoly, a market where supply and pricing are dominated by a few companies, 'and health-care reform is going to move us in that direction more quickly,' Kleinman said. 'There are going to be smaller insurers that are not going to be able to survive in this marketplace.'
Wellpoint is not likely to suffer from a move to fewer, larger insurance companies:
Led by WellPoint, 12 health plans cover two-thirds of the enrollment in the U.S. commercial-insurance market, said Ana Gupte, a Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. analyst....
So, it is not that Mr Kleinman has any regrets about this. Far from it:
Indianapolis-based WellPoint, the country’s biggest health plan with 33.8 million members, has the scale to prosper from the overhaul, which is expected to add another 34 million to the ranks of the insured, he said.
Mr Kleinman might argue that WellPoint's increasing size and prospects for market domination are good for society as well as the company, and its top executives. We have heard endless arguments in the last 30 years that larger hospital systems and larger insurance companies lead to more efficiency and lower costs. However, the evidence is in the other direction. There is plenty of reason to worry that increasingly dominant companies will extract higher prices, and the money they make will benefit their top leaders first, maybe their stockholders second, and patients and ordinary employees a very distant third, if at all. So look for WellPoint CEO Angela Braly to make even more than $13 million a year in the future.
So it would have been more reassuring if the response from the US executive branch included some opposition to the notion of a more concentrated market. Instead,
Asked to comment today, Nicholas Papas, a spokesman for President Barack Obama, referred in an e-mail to the president’s remarks on June 22 touting the health-care overhaul.
The law 'will put an end to some of the worst practices in the insurance industry,' such as canceling policies when patients get sick or imposing lifetime limits on coverage, Obama, a Democrat, said at a White House ceremony.
The changes 'will make America’s health-care system more consumer-driven and more cost-effective and give Americans the peace of mind that their insurance will be there when they need it,' Obama said. 'Insurance companies should see this reform as an opportunity to improve care and increase competition.'
And rather than worrying about the government's response,
Angela Braly, WellPoint’s chairman and chief executive officer, was among a group of insurance chiefs who met Obama June 22. While Democrats have attacked the company for its premium increases, the relationship is improving, Kleinman said.
'The Obama administration understands that we need to work in partnership, that in order to make health-care reform work, the carriers need to be able to charge appropriate rates and make an appropriate margin,' he said. 'Hopefully, a lot of that bad rhetoric is behind us.'
If the increasing concentration of power in health insurance does not meet a more effective challenge, we will need a lot more than rhetoric, good or bad, to save health care.
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
The Second Coming (Slouching Towards Bethlehem), by W B Yeats
Slouching, or "Moving Towards ... Oligopoly"
A report by Bloomberg on a prediction that the US attempt at health care reform will lead to more concentration of power among health insurance companies.
In addition,
Wellpoint is not likely to suffer from a move to fewer, larger insurance companies:
So, it is not that Mr Kleinman has any regrets about this. Far from it:
Mr Kleinman might argue that WellPoint's increasing size and prospects for market domination are good for society as well as the company, and its top executives. We have heard endless arguments in the last 30 years that larger hospital systems and larger insurance companies lead to more efficiency and lower costs. However, the evidence is in the other direction. There is plenty of reason to worry that increasingly dominant companies will extract higher prices, and the money they make will benefit their top leaders first, maybe their stockholders second, and patients and ordinary employees a very distant third, if at all. So look for WellPoint CEO Angela Braly to make even more than $13 million a year in the future.
So it would have been more reassuring if the response from the US executive branch included some opposition to the notion of a more concentrated market. Instead,
And rather than worrying about the government's response,
If the increasing concentration of power in health insurance does not meet a more effective challenge, we will need a lot more than rhetoric, good or bad, to save health care.
The Second Coming (Slouching Towards Bethlehem), by W B Yeats
U.S. health insurers are 'moving towards an oligopoly,' a process that this year’s health-care overhaul will accelerate, the investor-relations chief at WellPoint Inc. said today.
New regulations on administrative spending and premium increases will push some independent insurers out of business or into deals with bigger rivals, said Michael Kleinman, vice president for investor relations, at a Wells Fargo & Co. conference in Boston.
In addition,
The insurance market is becoming an oligopoly, a market where supply and pricing are dominated by a few companies, 'and health-care reform is going to move us in that direction more quickly,' Kleinman said. 'There are going to be smaller insurers that are not going to be able to survive in this marketplace.'
Wellpoint is not likely to suffer from a move to fewer, larger insurance companies:
Led by WellPoint, 12 health plans cover two-thirds of the enrollment in the U.S. commercial-insurance market, said Ana Gupte, a Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. analyst....
So, it is not that Mr Kleinman has any regrets about this. Far from it:
Indianapolis-based WellPoint, the country’s biggest health plan with 33.8 million members, has the scale to prosper from the overhaul, which is expected to add another 34 million to the ranks of the insured, he said.
Mr Kleinman might argue that WellPoint's increasing size and prospects for market domination are good for society as well as the company, and its top executives. We have heard endless arguments in the last 30 years that larger hospital systems and larger insurance companies lead to more efficiency and lower costs. However, the evidence is in the other direction. There is plenty of reason to worry that increasingly dominant companies will extract higher prices, and the money they make will benefit their top leaders first, maybe their stockholders second, and patients and ordinary employees a very distant third, if at all. So look for WellPoint CEO Angela Braly to make even more than $13 million a year in the future.
So it would have been more reassuring if the response from the US executive branch included some opposition to the notion of a more concentrated market. Instead,
Asked to comment today, Nicholas Papas, a spokesman for President Barack Obama, referred in an e-mail to the president’s remarks on June 22 touting the health-care overhaul.
The law 'will put an end to some of the worst practices in the insurance industry,' such as canceling policies when patients get sick or imposing lifetime limits on coverage, Obama, a Democrat, said at a White House ceremony.
The changes 'will make America’s health-care system more consumer-driven and more cost-effective and give Americans the peace of mind that their insurance will be there when they need it,' Obama said. 'Insurance companies should see this reform as an opportunity to improve care and increase competition.'
And rather than worrying about the government's response,
Angela Braly, WellPoint’s chairman and chief executive officer, was among a group of insurance chiefs who met Obama June 22. While Democrats have attacked the company for its premium increases, the relationship is improving, Kleinman said.
'The Obama administration understands that we need to work in partnership, that in order to make health-care reform work, the carriers need to be able to charge appropriate rates and make an appropriate margin,' he said. 'Hopefully, a lot of that bad rhetoric is behind us.'
If the increasing concentration of power in health insurance does not meet a more effective challenge, we will need a lot more than rhetoric, good or bad, to save health care.
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
The Second Coming (Slouching Towards Bethlehem), by W B Yeats
Edwin Lee on the Tiger We Are Now Riding
Some insights about why the leadership of large health care organizations has gone so wrong may be found on a blog I just discovered entitled "Dismounting Our Tiger," written by entrepreneur Edwin Lee. In particular, this post, triggered by the miserable results produced by BP in response to the gulf oil spill, posits the series of steps by which people become leaders of most big organizations, presumably including health care organizations:
And here are the outlooks and capabilities they share:
Does it all sound familiar? Does it sound like a description of many health care leaders we have discussed?
As Edwin Lee summed it up:
But in health care, we have been relying on our imperial CEOs, and woe unto us when the disasters start to occur.
1.They always followed orders and met the cultural expectations of their organization. They went along to get along. Early in their careers they were faced with a choice: they could make a difference or get promoted; they chose to get promoted. (Those who attempt to make a difference make waves for senior management and fellow workers who then deal with them as disloyal; troublemakers, heretics, or whistle blowers)
2.They were tapped for greatness (fast-tracked) by more senior persons early in their careers.
3.They carefully accumulated 'status' symbols like degrees, awards, medals, etc.
4.They avoided collecting demerits by taking risks and failing.
And here are the outlooks and capabilities they share:
1.They are culturally conditioned to administer their organizations as they are, not to deal with major changes either inside the organization or in the outside world. Their sole power structure comes from those who report to them and their boards of directors, who expect behavior consistent with past behavior. Should top executives initiate major changes, control of their companies becomes less certain and more difficult. (More importantly it risks their personal compensations). Leaders can’t operate in isolation, they need loyal power bases.
2.They see the world from the tribal perspective of their organizations. (Even after they go elsewhere as in the case of Larry Summers and Robert Rubin whose pro Goldman Sachs tribalism has helped to undermine real financial reform)
3.They rightly understand that relative size a marketplace is the dominant factor for survival and for growing profits. They focus almost entirely on that aspect of their business. (Much as a beautiful woman might rely solely on her beauty rather than develop her mind or personality)
4.They consider their leadership positions to be appropriate rewards for years of loyal service.
5.Their first order of business (as CEOs) is to gain control of their Boards of Directors.
6.They manipulate their Boards into paying inflated salaries, providing expensive perks, agreeing to golden parachutes and rewarding them with extravagant bonuses for last year’s performance.. (Over the last 50 years entire industries have been thus manipulated so that Boards now justify such parasitic compensation as 'competitive').
Does it all sound familiar? Does it sound like a description of many health care leaders we have discussed?
As Edwin Lee summed it up:
We, the public, are foolish for relying on these executives to plan for disasters or to care about the 'little people' either inside or outside their organizations, or to expect their boards of directors or stockholders to make essential corrections.
But in health care, we have been relying on our imperial CEOs, and woe unto us when the disasters start to occur.
Edwin Lee on the Tiger We Are Now Riding
Some insights about why the leadership of large health care organizations has gone so wrong may be found on a blog I just discovered entitled "Dismounting Our Tiger," written by entrepreneur Edwin Lee. In particular, this post, triggered by the miserable results produced by BP in response to the gulf oil spill, posits the series of steps by which people become leaders of most big organizations, presumably including health care organizations:
And here are the outlooks and capabilities they share:
Does it all sound familiar? Does it sound like a description of many health care leaders we have discussed?
As Edwin Lee summed it up:
But in health care, we have been relying on our imperial CEOs, and woe unto us when the disasters start to occur.
1.They always followed orders and met the cultural expectations of their organization. They went along to get along. Early in their careers they were faced with a choice: they could make a difference or get promoted; they chose to get promoted. (Those who attempt to make a difference make waves for senior management and fellow workers who then deal with them as disloyal; troublemakers, heretics, or whistle blowers)
2.They were tapped for greatness (fast-tracked) by more senior persons early in their careers.
3.They carefully accumulated 'status' symbols like degrees, awards, medals, etc.
4.They avoided collecting demerits by taking risks and failing.
And here are the outlooks and capabilities they share:
1.They are culturally conditioned to administer their organizations as they are, not to deal with major changes either inside the organization or in the outside world. Their sole power structure comes from those who report to them and their boards of directors, who expect behavior consistent with past behavior. Should top executives initiate major changes, control of their companies becomes less certain and more difficult. (More importantly it risks their personal compensations). Leaders can’t operate in isolation, they need loyal power bases.
2.They see the world from the tribal perspective of their organizations. (Even after they go elsewhere as in the case of Larry Summers and Robert Rubin whose pro Goldman Sachs tribalism has helped to undermine real financial reform)
3.They rightly understand that relative size a marketplace is the dominant factor for survival and for growing profits. They focus almost entirely on that aspect of their business. (Much as a beautiful woman might rely solely on her beauty rather than develop her mind or personality)
4.They consider their leadership positions to be appropriate rewards for years of loyal service.
5.Their first order of business (as CEOs) is to gain control of their Boards of Directors.
6.They manipulate their Boards into paying inflated salaries, providing expensive perks, agreeing to golden parachutes and rewarding them with extravagant bonuses for last year’s performance.. (Over the last 50 years entire industries have been thus manipulated so that Boards now justify such parasitic compensation as 'competitive').
Does it all sound familiar? Does it sound like a description of many health care leaders we have discussed?
As Edwin Lee summed it up:
We, the public, are foolish for relying on these executives to plan for disasters or to care about the 'little people' either inside or outside their organizations, or to expect their boards of directors or stockholders to make essential corrections.
But in health care, we have been relying on our imperial CEOs, and woe unto us when the disasters start to occur.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Black Spot Poison Ivy
I love learning something new in medicine and this was a new one for me...black spot poison ivy. Poison ivy (also known as rhus dermatitis) is a common contact allergic dermatitis. Like poison oak and poison sumac, the chemical that causes a reaction is called urushiol. When this plant sap touches the skin a pruritic (itchy) red rash appears with little blisters that are often in a line.
Monday, June 21, 2010
Weight Loss from Activity Only Works in Thin Middle Age Women
Talk about a cruel trick of nature! A study funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and published in JAMA shows that physical activity prevents weight gain in middle-aged and older women ONLY IF THEY ARE ALREADY AT IDEAL WEIGHT. Did you read that? It means that the recommended guidelines advocating 150 minutes of exercise a week isn't sufficient to prevent weight gain in most middle
Sunday, June 20, 2010
SpaghettiOs Recalled
I know the readers of EverythingHealth would never eat Campbells SpaghettiOs but in case you know someone who does, you should know that the USDA has recalled 15,000,000 pounds of SpaghettiOs because of under processing. The recall includes 14.75-ounce cans with a use-by date between June 2010 and December 2011 of three varieties of the product: "SpaghettiOs with Meatballs," "SpaghettiOs A to Z
When a Key Opinion Leader Questions the Hand That Fed Him: from "Master Teacher to Someone Who Didn't Know What He Was Doing"
We just posted an update on the ongoing cozy relationship with medical device companies, in particular, those that make prosthetic hip and knee joints, and some orthopedic surgeons. Some surgeons, including many prominent academic leaders and practitioners, have been paid huge amounts, and have often failed to make more than the most minimal disclosure to their patients, or to the audiences of their talks or the readers of their ostensibly scholarly articles. Deferred prosecution agreements with device companies shed light on these payments, but did not curtail them. Yet the surgeons and the companies who paid them defended the payments as legitimate consulting agreements, and royalties for worthy innovations.
Now the New York Times has reported on a dispute between a well-paid consultant and an artificial joint manufacturer that provides new insights into these financial relationships. To summarize,
In more detail, here is how Dr Berger's relationship with Zimmer began:
And in more detail, here is how things went wrong:
The most striking lesson of this case is that Dr Berger was only valued as a consultant as long as his work completely followed the marketing party line. As soon as he questioned the company's product, or the executives who were promoting it, he became "someone who didn't know what he was doing." Of course, a truly valued consultant should be respected, if not sought for honest advice, whether or not it fit preconceived notions or marketing strategies. Thus, how Dr Berger was finally treated suggested he really was hired to market product. "Consultant" was just a pretty title..
We (and many others) have discussed (e.g., here) how pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies cultivate "key opinion leaders" who really are nothing more than salespeople with fancy academic titles or well-known practices. The case of Dr Berger suggests that apparently distinguished academics and practitioners hired as "consultants" by such companies ought to be regarded as salespeople until proven otherwise. Physicians who are wooed by company marketers to take on such consulting roles, often with praise for their ability to "innovate," "excite," or become a "master teacher," may want to consider whether those flattering them merely want to hire another high-profile part-time salesperson. They may further may want to think about how they would look should this relationship be revealed for what it really is. If something goes wrong, they should think about what it would be like to deal with "dissembling, out-of-touch bureaucrats." Sometimes there is a price to pay for taking all that money.
I hope that Dr Berger will consider donating the $8 million he made to the cause of more honest teaching and research about orthopedic devices.
Meanwhile, patients and physicians should be extremely skeptical about the pronouncements of paid consultants and key opinion leaders who work for corporations marketing health care goods and services. We all should demand at least that those paid by such vested interests reveal such financial arrangements in detail if they expect us to listen to their spiels, take their advice, and particularly be subject to their decisions.
Now the New York Times has reported on a dispute between a well-paid consultant and an artificial joint manufacturer that provides new insights into these financial relationships. To summarize,
IT was a long, fruitful medical marriage that is fast becoming an angry public divorce, one that offers a rare look at a clash between a top-shelf consultant and his corporate patron over patient safety.
For years, Dr. Richard A. Berger designed surgical tools and artificial joints for Zimmer Holdings, trained hundreds of doctors to use its products and talked it up wherever he went. In return, Zimmer, an orthopedic implant maker, helped enrich Dr. Berger, portraying him as a master surgeon and paying him more than $8 million over a decade.
Those days are gone. Dr. Berger started complaining to Zimmer a while back that one of its artificial-knee models was failing prematurely, and he went public recently with a study that he says proves it. Zimmer told him that the problem was not the artificial knee, but his technique, and pointed to data overseas indicating that the knee was safe.
Last year, Zimmer did not give Dr. Berger a new contract. The company says it routinely rotates consultants.
'I trained hundreds of doctors for them and made them tens of millions,' Dr. Berger said in interview here, in which he also lambasted Zimmer executives as dissembling, out-of-touch bureaucrats. 'So was this just a coincidence? Maybe it was. Maybe it wasn’t.'
In more detail, here is how Dr Berger's relationship with Zimmer began:
The surgeon, a tall, balding man with a boyish manner, was finishing his fellowship at the Rush University Medical Center in Chicago at the time, one of the country’s top centers for joint replacement. The center has had long ties to Zimmer, whose headquarters is about two hours away, in Warsaw, Ind., and the young surgeon quickly came to the company’s attention.
'Rich has a very clever set of hands, and because of that he is enabled with the ability to innovate surgical techniques,' said Roy Crowninshield, who was Zimmer’s chief scientific officer.
Dr. Berger’s skills matched Zimmer’s marketing strategy. To distinguish itself from competitors, the device maker had started promoting minimally invasive surgery, a technique that uses smaller incisions than traditional surgery. Zimmer trained doctors in the procedure, using its device.
Soon, Dr. Berger, who was then pioneering a type of small-incision surgery that allowed patients to leave the hospital on the day of surgery, became a linchpin of Zimmer’s efforts. In 2002, he was prominently featured in a press release about Zimmer’s plans to build a training facility for minimally invasive surgery.
'We are clearly excited about Dr. Berger’s data,' J. Raymond Elliott, the company’s chairman and chief executive at the time, stated in the release.
Over the next few years, the physician estimates, he helped train hundreds of surgeons on Zimmer’s behalf.
And in more detail, here is how things went wrong:
As he tells it, his relationship with Zimmer frayed over a version of a widely used Zimmer knee, known as the NexGen. The model at issue, called the NexGen CR-Flex, is designed to provide a greater range of motion than the standard NexGen.
Most surgeons implant an artificial knee using a cement-like adhesive to bond the thigh bone to the portion of the device that bends. But some specialists, like Dr. Berger, try to avoid adhesives because the cement can break down and cause device failure. So Zimmer also sells an uncemented version of the CR-Flex that relies instead on the bone naturally fusing with the implant.
Dr. Berger says that he gave the device, which is supposed to last about 15 years, to about 125 patients in 2005, the first full year he used it. But by early 2006, some X-rays showed lines where the implant met the thigh bone, an indication that the device was loose and had not fused completely. Patients could walk, but they were reporting pain, apparently a result of the loose joint.
He says he soon brought the problem to the attention of Zimmer officials, including the company’s new top scientist, Cheryl R. Blanchard. Zimmer executives pointed to the success of the NexGen, but the company did not have separate test data on the uncemented flexible model because the F.D.A. had not required the company to study it in patients before selling it.
Later, as more patients complained about the device and Dr. Berger had to replace some of them, he spoke to Ms. Blanchard again, he said. This time, he said, she and other Zimmer officials suggested that his technique was the problem because no other surgeon had complained.
'Suddenly, I went from someone who was their master teacher to someone who didn’t know what he was doing,' he said.
BY 2007, Dr. Berger, although still a Zimmer consultant, had stopped using the device and had learned, he said, that several other surgeons had also experienced problems with it. But unlike Dr. Dorr, the physician who sent out the alert about Zimmer, Dr. Berger said he initially had hoped to avoid a public showdown with the company. So he followed a more traditional route by performing a study with another Rush surgeon, Dr. Craig J. Della Valle, who was also having to replace the Zimmer knee.
Dr. Berger and Dr. Della Valle first presented their study at a medical meeting last fall and again this year at a national meeting of the American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons. They found that the uncemented Zimmer knee failed early in about 9 percent of some 100 patients studied. Also, the knee exhibited signs of looseness in about half of all patients and has since been replaced in some of them, Dr. Berger said.
But Zimmer was unswayed. In a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Zimmer made note of the study but also pointed to the knee’s very positive results in a large database of orthopedic patients in Australia. Officials there confirmed the low failure rate. The company also said that the cement-free CR Flex accounted for only a small fraction — about 2 percent — of its overall knee sales.
The most striking lesson of this case is that Dr Berger was only valued as a consultant as long as his work completely followed the marketing party line. As soon as he questioned the company's product, or the executives who were promoting it, he became "someone who didn't know what he was doing." Of course, a truly valued consultant should be respected, if not sought for honest advice, whether or not it fit preconceived notions or marketing strategies. Thus, how Dr Berger was finally treated suggested he really was hired to market product. "Consultant" was just a pretty title..
We (and many others) have discussed (e.g., here) how pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies cultivate "key opinion leaders" who really are nothing more than salespeople with fancy academic titles or well-known practices. The case of Dr Berger suggests that apparently distinguished academics and practitioners hired as "consultants" by such companies ought to be regarded as salespeople until proven otherwise. Physicians who are wooed by company marketers to take on such consulting roles, often with praise for their ability to "innovate," "excite," or become a "master teacher," may want to consider whether those flattering them merely want to hire another high-profile part-time salesperson. They may further may want to think about how they would look should this relationship be revealed for what it really is. If something goes wrong, they should think about what it would be like to deal with "dissembling, out-of-touch bureaucrats." Sometimes there is a price to pay for taking all that money.
I hope that Dr Berger will consider donating the $8 million he made to the cause of more honest teaching and research about orthopedic devices.
Meanwhile, patients and physicians should be extremely skeptical about the pronouncements of paid consultants and key opinion leaders who work for corporations marketing health care goods and services. We all should demand at least that those paid by such vested interests reveal such financial arrangements in detail if they expect us to listen to their spiels, take their advice, and particularly be subject to their decisions.
When a Key Opinion Leader Questions the Hand That Fed Him: from "Master Teacher to Someone Who Didn't Know What He Was Doing"
We just posted an update on the ongoing cozy relationship with medical device companies, in particular, those that make prosthetic hip and knee joints, and some orthopedic surgeons. Some surgeons, including many prominent academic leaders and practitioners, have been paid huge amounts, and have often failed to make more than the most minimal disclosure to their patients, or to the audiences of their talks or the readers of their ostensibly scholarly articles. Deferred prosecution agreements with device companies shed light on these payments, but did not curtail them. Yet the surgeons and the companies who paid them defended the payments as legitimate consulting agreements, and royalties for worthy innovations.
Now the New York Times has reported on a dispute between a well-paid consultant and an artificial joint manufacturer that provides new insights into these financial relationships. To summarize,
In more detail, here is how Dr Berger's relationship with Zimmer began:
And in more detail, here is how things went wrong:
The most striking lesson of this case is that Dr Berger was only valued as a consultant as long as his work completely followed the marketing party line. As soon as he questioned the company's product, or the executives who were promoting it, he became "someone who didn't know what he was doing." Of course, a truly valued consultant should be respected, if not sought for honest advice, whether or not it fit preconceived notions or marketing strategies. Thus, how Dr Berger was finally treated suggested he really was hired to market product. "Consultant" was just a pretty title..
We (and many others) have discussed (e.g., here) how pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies cultivate "key opinion leaders" who really are nothing more than salespeople with fancy academic titles or well-known practices. The case of Dr Berger suggests that apparently distinguished academics and practitioners hired as "consultants" by such companies ought to be regarded as salespeople until proven otherwise. Physicians who are wooed by company marketers to take on such consulting roles, often with praise for their ability to "innovate," "excite," or become a "master teacher," may want to consider whether those flattering them merely want to hire another high-profile part-time salesperson. They may further may want to think about how they would look should this relationship be revealed for what it really is. If something goes wrong, they should think about what it would be like to deal with "dissembling, out-of-touch bureaucrats." Sometimes there is a price to pay for taking all that money.
I hope that Dr Berger will consider donating the $8 million he made to the cause of more honest teaching and research about orthopedic devices.
Meanwhile, patients and physicians should be extremely skeptical about the pronouncements of paid consultants and key opinion leaders who work for corporations marketing health care goods and services. We all should demand at least that those paid by such vested interests reveal such financial arrangements in detail if they expect us to listen to their spiels, take their advice, and particularly be subject to their decisions.
Now the New York Times has reported on a dispute between a well-paid consultant and an artificial joint manufacturer that provides new insights into these financial relationships. To summarize,
IT was a long, fruitful medical marriage that is fast becoming an angry public divorce, one that offers a rare look at a clash between a top-shelf consultant and his corporate patron over patient safety.
For years, Dr. Richard A. Berger designed surgical tools and artificial joints for Zimmer Holdings, trained hundreds of doctors to use its products and talked it up wherever he went. In return, Zimmer, an orthopedic implant maker, helped enrich Dr. Berger, portraying him as a master surgeon and paying him more than $8 million over a decade.
Those days are gone. Dr. Berger started complaining to Zimmer a while back that one of its artificial-knee models was failing prematurely, and he went public recently with a study that he says proves it. Zimmer told him that the problem was not the artificial knee, but his technique, and pointed to data overseas indicating that the knee was safe.
Last year, Zimmer did not give Dr. Berger a new contract. The company says it routinely rotates consultants.
'I trained hundreds of doctors for them and made them tens of millions,' Dr. Berger said in interview here, in which he also lambasted Zimmer executives as dissembling, out-of-touch bureaucrats. 'So was this just a coincidence? Maybe it was. Maybe it wasn’t.'
In more detail, here is how Dr Berger's relationship with Zimmer began:
The surgeon, a tall, balding man with a boyish manner, was finishing his fellowship at the Rush University Medical Center in Chicago at the time, one of the country’s top centers for joint replacement. The center has had long ties to Zimmer, whose headquarters is about two hours away, in Warsaw, Ind., and the young surgeon quickly came to the company’s attention.
'Rich has a very clever set of hands, and because of that he is enabled with the ability to innovate surgical techniques,' said Roy Crowninshield, who was Zimmer’s chief scientific officer.
Dr. Berger’s skills matched Zimmer’s marketing strategy. To distinguish itself from competitors, the device maker had started promoting minimally invasive surgery, a technique that uses smaller incisions than traditional surgery. Zimmer trained doctors in the procedure, using its device.
Soon, Dr. Berger, who was then pioneering a type of small-incision surgery that allowed patients to leave the hospital on the day of surgery, became a linchpin of Zimmer’s efforts. In 2002, he was prominently featured in a press release about Zimmer’s plans to build a training facility for minimally invasive surgery.
'We are clearly excited about Dr. Berger’s data,' J. Raymond Elliott, the company’s chairman and chief executive at the time, stated in the release.
Over the next few years, the physician estimates, he helped train hundreds of surgeons on Zimmer’s behalf.
And in more detail, here is how things went wrong:
As he tells it, his relationship with Zimmer frayed over a version of a widely used Zimmer knee, known as the NexGen. The model at issue, called the NexGen CR-Flex, is designed to provide a greater range of motion than the standard NexGen.
Most surgeons implant an artificial knee using a cement-like adhesive to bond the thigh bone to the portion of the device that bends. But some specialists, like Dr. Berger, try to avoid adhesives because the cement can break down and cause device failure. So Zimmer also sells an uncemented version of the CR-Flex that relies instead on the bone naturally fusing with the implant.
Dr. Berger says that he gave the device, which is supposed to last about 15 years, to about 125 patients in 2005, the first full year he used it. But by early 2006, some X-rays showed lines where the implant met the thigh bone, an indication that the device was loose and had not fused completely. Patients could walk, but they were reporting pain, apparently a result of the loose joint.
He says he soon brought the problem to the attention of Zimmer officials, including the company’s new top scientist, Cheryl R. Blanchard. Zimmer executives pointed to the success of the NexGen, but the company did not have separate test data on the uncemented flexible model because the F.D.A. had not required the company to study it in patients before selling it.
Later, as more patients complained about the device and Dr. Berger had to replace some of them, he spoke to Ms. Blanchard again, he said. This time, he said, she and other Zimmer officials suggested that his technique was the problem because no other surgeon had complained.
'Suddenly, I went from someone who was their master teacher to someone who didn’t know what he was doing,' he said.
BY 2007, Dr. Berger, although still a Zimmer consultant, had stopped using the device and had learned, he said, that several other surgeons had also experienced problems with it. But unlike Dr. Dorr, the physician who sent out the alert about Zimmer, Dr. Berger said he initially had hoped to avoid a public showdown with the company. So he followed a more traditional route by performing a study with another Rush surgeon, Dr. Craig J. Della Valle, who was also having to replace the Zimmer knee.
Dr. Berger and Dr. Della Valle first presented their study at a medical meeting last fall and again this year at a national meeting of the American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons. They found that the uncemented Zimmer knee failed early in about 9 percent of some 100 patients studied. Also, the knee exhibited signs of looseness in about half of all patients and has since been replaced in some of them, Dr. Berger said.
But Zimmer was unswayed. In a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Zimmer made note of the study but also pointed to the knee’s very positive results in a large database of orthopedic patients in Australia. Officials there confirmed the low failure rate. The company also said that the cement-free CR Flex accounted for only a small fraction — about 2 percent — of its overall knee sales.
The most striking lesson of this case is that Dr Berger was only valued as a consultant as long as his work completely followed the marketing party line. As soon as he questioned the company's product, or the executives who were promoting it, he became "someone who didn't know what he was doing." Of course, a truly valued consultant should be respected, if not sought for honest advice, whether or not it fit preconceived notions or marketing strategies. Thus, how Dr Berger was finally treated suggested he really was hired to market product. "Consultant" was just a pretty title..
We (and many others) have discussed (e.g., here) how pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies cultivate "key opinion leaders" who really are nothing more than salespeople with fancy academic titles or well-known practices. The case of Dr Berger suggests that apparently distinguished academics and practitioners hired as "consultants" by such companies ought to be regarded as salespeople until proven otherwise. Physicians who are wooed by company marketers to take on such consulting roles, often with praise for their ability to "innovate," "excite," or become a "master teacher," may want to consider whether those flattering them merely want to hire another high-profile part-time salesperson. They may further may want to think about how they would look should this relationship be revealed for what it really is. If something goes wrong, they should think about what it would be like to deal with "dissembling, out-of-touch bureaucrats." Sometimes there is a price to pay for taking all that money.
I hope that Dr Berger will consider donating the $8 million he made to the cause of more honest teaching and research about orthopedic devices.
Meanwhile, patients and physicians should be extremely skeptical about the pronouncements of paid consultants and key opinion leaders who work for corporations marketing health care goods and services. We all should demand at least that those paid by such vested interests reveal such financial arrangements in detail if they expect us to listen to their spiels, take their advice, and particularly be subject to their decisions.
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