Once More with Feeling: Another Defense of Conflicts of Interest Based on Logical Fallacies

Despite increasing recognition of the adverse effects of health care professionals' and health care institutions' conflicts of interest on health care, such financial relationships continue to have their prominent defenders.  The latest example was an article in Medscape General Surgery by Frank J Veith MD, entitled "Physicians and Industry: Fix the Relationships, but Keep Them Going."  Dr Veith is a prominent vascular surgeon who "received numerous awards and honors as a leader, outstanding teacher, and innovator in vascular surgery," according to New York University

We have noted before how defenders of conflicted professionals and professional societies often employ logical fallacies to support their arguments.  Some recent examples were discussed here, by a prominent ostensibly libertarian attorney and law professor; here, published in a well-known medical journal by the former director of "medical communications" for a large pharmaceutical firm; and here, by the president of a large medical society, published again in a well-known medical journal.

Dr Veith seems to be continuing that tradition. His approach emphasized frequent repetition of the same fallacious argument.

Straw Man: "Totally Interrupt All Doctor-Industry Relationships"

Dr Veith's main argument seemed to be with attempts to prevent physicians from having any relationships with industry, presumably including not just financial relationships, but professional collaborations or even personal friendships.  For example, he wrote about

a recent initiative to completely sever the relationship between industry and doctors has gained traction. This initiative has been supported by several states, including Massachusetts and Vermont, and universities, such as Harvard, Stanford, the University of Massachusetts, and the University of Michigan, which have enacted draconian laws or policies designed to separate doctors and industry and to interrupt any relationship between them.

Furthermore,

Even many individual physicians have sanctimoniously jumped on the bandwagon and written articles or opinion pieces attacking the evils of any relationship between industry and doctors, suggesting the severance of any such relationships.

Then later, Dr Veith wrote,

We should establish rules to prevent or minimize the abuses, but we should not totally interrupt all doctor-industry relationships. To do so is wrong-headed and would eliminate the many beneficial effects that accrue to medical care and society from these relationships. It would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Finally, he concluded thus,

These will be far better solutions than completely eliminating all industry-doctor relationships.... Such safeguards will be better than the present trend for institutions and governments to enact strict measures to separate physicians from industry.

Despite making this argument at least four times, the problem is that Dr Veith provided no citations, much less evidence that such "draconian" policies have been enacted or even advocated.

There have been new policies on conflicts of interest suggested or adopted by some organizations. None, to my knowledge have been exactly "draconian."

For example, Harvard University does have a new policy on conflicts of interest. Maybe Dr Veith was referring to it above when he mentioned Harvard. However, in an interview about the new policy involving university leaders published in the Harvard Gazette, the Vice Provost of the University said,

The University is not designed to be an ivory tower isolated from the world. So the trick is to be able to have a robust system for affording faculty opportunities to engage with the commercial world and at the same time not threaten in any way their own fundamental integrity or that of Harvard.

That hardly sounds like a policy that completely severs all relationships between faculty and industry.
So Dr Veith's main premise seems to be based on a multiply repeated straw-man argument. He argued again and again against a policy that no one seems to be advocating. (And even I, as a hard-liner about conflicts of interest, have never advocated a complete interruption of all relationships of any kind between all physicians and all of industry.)

Appeal to Fear: You Will be "Blighted"

Perhaps just to spice things up, Dr Veith warned of the dire consequences of the "draconian" policies that no one was advocating:

Those institutions that choose such inquisitional approaches will be blighted and suffer competitive disadvantages.

Dr Veith had asserted multiple benefits of continuing relationships among physicians, health care institutions, and commercial firm. He presented no evidence to support his assertions, most of which can be questioned (see below). His warning that institutions will be "blighted" was based on his assertion that the stringent policy no one advocated would eliminate these unproven benefits, hence his warning of  something so severe as "blight" seemed to be an appeal to fear.

Ad Hominem: "Sanctimonious" Physicians Leading a "Witch Hunt"

As noted above, Dr Veith referred to anonymous physicians who "sanctimoniously jumped on the bandwagon," thus leading to

The initiative to separate industry from physicians and surgeons [which] has taken on the trappings of a witch hunt.

And again,

Their leaders should recognize this and resist the temptation to join the separation witch hunt....

My interpretation is that this was an implied set of ad hominems. Those who supposedly advocated the "draconian" policy were made out to be "sanctimonious" witch hunters. After just having seen "The Crucible," I could also argue that the use of the term "witch hunt," with its current extreme emotional references (apparently to a case in which presumably innocent people were hanged), amounted to an appeal to emotion and an appeal to fear.

Summary

I must admit Dr Veith's entire set of arguments was not completely based on logical fallacies.  However, the rest of his arguments hardly appeared even-handed.  He presented a series of assertions about the benefits of such relationships, including that they "foster innovation and development," that "industry-sponsored medical education helps to keep physicians informed about new developments," that industry sponsored education about devices prevents "difficult and dangerous" practices, and helps physicians use devices "better and more safely."  He provided no evidence in favor of these claims, and seemed to ignore arguments about the hazards of payments to physicians biasing their clinical practice, teaching and research.

I should also note that these arguments were made by a physician who appears to have his own personal financial relationships with industry.  In the Medscape article, Dr Veith "disclosed no relevant financial relationships."   However, as a member of the editorial board of Medscape General Surgery, Dr Veith "disclosed the following relevant financial relationships: Owns stock, stock options, or bonds from: Vascular Innovations, Inc."  Furthermore, the disclosure summary for the iCON2011 conference includes the following for Dr Veith, "Honorarium/Expenses: Cook Medical, Cordis, WL Gore, Medtronic." Finally, Dr Veith apparently runs the Veith Symposium, which in 2010 acknowledged the following commercial sponsors: Aastrom, Abbott Vascular, Aptus Endosystems Inc, Atrium, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Boston Scientific, Cook Medical, Cordis Cardiac and Vascular Institute, Delcath Systems Inc, Gore, Hansen Medical, Lombard Medical Technologies, Maquet, Medtronic, Organogenesis Inc, Sanofi-Aventis, St. Jude Medical, Tenaxis Medical, Triavascular, Vascutek Terumo.

So Dr Veith's article continues the tradition of defenses of physicians' and health care institutions' conflicts of interest based on logical fallacies and unbalanced and unsupported assertions.  Also, note that all the examples of such defenses we have discussed were made by people with their own financial relationships with drug, device, and/or biotechnology companies, although some of them disclosed these relationships.  I have yet to see a defense of such conflicts based on logic and evidence, or a defense of such conflicts made by someone who has absolutely no conflicts of his or her own. 

The currently prevalent relationships with health care corporations among academic physicians, researchers, and other decision makers and influencers in health care have been lucrative for them.  I have yet to see a coherent, logical argument that these relationships are good for patients, medical education, biomedical or clinical science, or public health made by anyone, much less someone who does not have such relationships.

I will note that the defenses of conflicts of interest begin to seem drearily similar.  Not only do they often use the same logical fallacies, but they repeat the same stale and unsupported arguments about the benefits of financial relationships with industry: that they foster "innovation," and that they provide better educational opportunities than unconflicted programs and educators.  We now know that the managed care industry has engineered stealth health policy advocacy campaigns that furnish talking points to "third parties" which may get caught up in the larger policy discourse (see posts here and here).  I wonder whether some such stealth health policy advocacy campaign by pharmaceutical, device and/or biotechnology companies seeded the discourse about conflicts of interest with some of the logical fallacies and unproven assertions that have become so familiar. 

We need to elevate our discourse about health care policy.  People involved in health policy discussions should at least disclose their conflicts of interest when making their points.  We should be very skeptical of  arguments and look carefully for the evidence and logic that supports them.  When we find that evidence and logic is lacking, be even more skeptical about who benefits from them. 

Once More with Feeling: Another Defense of Conflicts of Interest Based on Logical Fallacies

Despite increasing recognition of the adverse effects of health care professionals' and health care institutions' conflicts of interest on health care, such financial relationships continue to have their prominent defenders.  The latest example was an article in Medscape General Surgery by Frank J Veith MD, entitled "Physicians and Industry: Fix the Relationships, but Keep Them Going."  Dr Veith is a prominent vascular surgeon who "received numerous awards and honors as a leader, outstanding teacher, and innovator in vascular surgery," according to New York University

We have noted before how defenders of conflicted professionals and professional societies often employ logical fallacies to support their arguments.  Some recent examples were discussed here, by a prominent ostensibly libertarian attorney and law professor; here, published in a well-known medical journal by the former director of "medical communications" for a large pharmaceutical firm; and here, by the president of a large medical society, published again in a well-known medical journal.

Dr Veith seems to be continuing that tradition. His approach emphasized frequent repetition of the same fallacious argument.

Straw Man: "Totally Interrupt All Doctor-Industry Relationships"

Dr Veith's main argument seemed to be with attempts to prevent physicians from having any relationships with industry, presumably including not just financial relationships, but professional collaborations or even personal friendships.  For example, he wrote about

a recent initiative to completely sever the relationship between industry and doctors has gained traction. This initiative has been supported by several states, including Massachusetts and Vermont, and universities, such as Harvard, Stanford, the University of Massachusetts, and the University of Michigan, which have enacted draconian laws or policies designed to separate doctors and industry and to interrupt any relationship between them.

Furthermore,

Even many individual physicians have sanctimoniously jumped on the bandwagon and written articles or opinion pieces attacking the evils of any relationship between industry and doctors, suggesting the severance of any such relationships.

Then later, Dr Veith wrote,

We should establish rules to prevent or minimize the abuses, but we should not totally interrupt all doctor-industry relationships. To do so is wrong-headed and would eliminate the many beneficial effects that accrue to medical care and society from these relationships. It would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Finally, he concluded thus,

These will be far better solutions than completely eliminating all industry-doctor relationships.... Such safeguards will be better than the present trend for institutions and governments to enact strict measures to separate physicians from industry.

Despite making this argument at least four times, the problem is that Dr Veith provided no citations, much less evidence that such "draconian" policies have been enacted or even advocated.

There have been new policies on conflicts of interest suggested or adopted by some organizations. None, to my knowledge have been exactly "draconian."

For example, Harvard University does have a new policy on conflicts of interest. Maybe Dr Veith was referring to it above when he mentioned Harvard. However, in an interview about the new policy involving university leaders published in the Harvard Gazette, the Vice Provost of the University said,

The University is not designed to be an ivory tower isolated from the world. So the trick is to be able to have a robust system for affording faculty opportunities to engage with the commercial world and at the same time not threaten in any way their own fundamental integrity or that of Harvard.

That hardly sounds like a policy that completely severs all relationships between faculty and industry.
So Dr Veith's main premise seems to be based on a multiply repeated straw-man argument. He argued again and again against a policy that no one seems to be advocating. (And even I, as a hard-liner about conflicts of interest, have never advocated a complete interruption of all relationships of any kind between all physicians and all of industry.)

Appeal to Fear: You Will be "Blighted"

Perhaps just to spice things up, Dr Veith warned of the dire consequences of the "draconian" policies that no one was advocating:

Those institutions that choose such inquisitional approaches will be blighted and suffer competitive disadvantages.

Dr Veith had asserted multiple benefits of continuing relationships among physicians, health care institutions, and commercial firm. He presented no evidence to support his assertions, most of which can be questioned (see below). His warning that institutions will be "blighted" was based on his assertion that the stringent policy no one advocated would eliminate these unproven benefits, hence his warning of  something so severe as "blight" seemed to be an appeal to fear.

Ad Hominem: "Sanctimonious" Physicians Leading a "Witch Hunt"

As noted above, Dr Veith referred to anonymous physicians who "sanctimoniously jumped on the bandwagon," thus leading to

The initiative to separate industry from physicians and surgeons [which] has taken on the trappings of a witch hunt.

And again,

Their leaders should recognize this and resist the temptation to join the separation witch hunt....

My interpretation is that this was an implied set of ad hominems. Those who supposedly advocated the "draconian" policy were made out to be "sanctimonious" witch hunters. After just having seen "The Crucible," I could also argue that the use of the term "witch hunt," with its current extreme emotional references (apparently to a case in which presumably innocent people were hanged), amounted to an appeal to emotion and an appeal to fear.

Summary

I must admit Dr Veith's entire set of arguments was not completely based on logical fallacies.  However, the rest of his arguments hardly appeared even-handed.  He presented a series of assertions about the benefits of such relationships, including that they "foster innovation and development," that "industry-sponsored medical education helps to keep physicians informed about new developments," that industry sponsored education about devices prevents "difficult and dangerous" practices, and helps physicians use devices "better and more safely."  He provided no evidence in favor of these claims, and seemed to ignore arguments about the hazards of payments to physicians biasing their clinical practice, teaching and research.

I should also note that these arguments were made by a physician who appears to have his own personal financial relationships with industry.  In the Medscape article, Dr Veith "disclosed no relevant financial relationships."   However, as a member of the editorial board of Medscape General Surgery, Dr Veith "disclosed the following relevant financial relationships: Owns stock, stock options, or bonds from: Vascular Innovations, Inc."  Furthermore, the disclosure summary for the iCON2011 conference includes the following for Dr Veith, "Honorarium/Expenses: Cook Medical, Cordis, WL Gore, Medtronic." Finally, Dr Veith apparently runs the Veith Symposium, which in 2010 acknowledged the following commercial sponsors: Aastrom, Abbott Vascular, Aptus Endosystems Inc, Atrium, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Boston Scientific, Cook Medical, Cordis Cardiac and Vascular Institute, Delcath Systems Inc, Gore, Hansen Medical, Lombard Medical Technologies, Maquet, Medtronic, Organogenesis Inc, Sanofi-Aventis, St. Jude Medical, Tenaxis Medical, Triavascular, Vascutek Terumo.

So Dr Veith's article continues the tradition of defenses of physicians' and health care institutions' conflicts of interest based on logical fallacies and unbalanced and unsupported assertions.  Also, note that all the examples of such defenses we have discussed were made by people with their own financial relationships with drug, device, and/or biotechnology companies, although some of them disclosed these relationships.  I have yet to see a defense of such conflicts based on logic and evidence, or a defense of such conflicts made by someone who has absolutely no conflicts of his or her own. 

The currently prevalent relationships with health care corporations among academic physicians, researchers, and other decision makers and influencers in health care have been lucrative for them.  I have yet to see a coherent, logical argument that these relationships are good for patients, medical education, biomedical or clinical science, or public health made by anyone, much less someone who does not have such relationships.

I will note that the defenses of conflicts of interest begin to seem drearily similar.  Not only do they often use the same logical fallacies, but they repeat the same stale and unsupported arguments about the benefits of financial relationships with industry: that they foster "innovation," and that they provide better educational opportunities than unconflicted programs and educators.  We now know that the managed care industry has engineered stealth health policy advocacy campaigns that furnish talking points to "third parties" which may get caught up in the larger policy discourse (see posts here and here).  I wonder whether some such stealth health policy advocacy campaign by pharmaceutical, device and/or biotechnology companies seeded the discourse about conflicts of interest with some of the logical fallacies and unproven assertions that have become so familiar. 

We need to elevate our discourse about health care policy.  People involved in health policy discussions should at least disclose their conflicts of interest when making their points.  We should be very skeptical of  arguments and look carefully for the evidence and logic that supports them.  When we find that evidence and logic is lacking, be even more skeptical about who benefits from them. 

The University of Minnesota, Where Nothing Can Go Wrong, Go Wrong, Go Wrong...

As noted on the Periodic Table blog, the administration of the University of Minnesota continues to believe all is well with its clinical research activities.  A recent internal review said there was nothing more to investigate about the unfortunate death of a psychiatric patient years before. So should we all be relieved?

It will take an extensive review of the case to ultimately suggest we should not at all be relieved.  The case raised important concerns about the validity of clinical research, and whether it violates the trust of its patient-subjects.  These concerns had not been addressed before the university's most recent review, and thus seem even more pointed after its recent non-investigation.

Background: the Untimely Death of Dan Markingson

In May, 2008, the (Minnesota) Pioneer Press ran a series of articles about the untimely death of Dan Markingson which occurred while he was enrolled in a randomized trial sponsored by AstraZeneca (the CAFE study) at a site at the University of Minnesota.  The first article in the series made the following major points:

Mr Markingson had given his consent to be enrolled despite evidence that he was actively psychotic

He started having visions of killing his mother in the storm. Markingson was taken Nov. 12, 2003, to Regions Hospital in St. Paul, but it had no open psychiatric beds. He was then transferred to the University of Minnesota Medical Center, Fairview.

Weiss said discussions about research started right away at the hospital. Markingson was placed in Fairview's Station 12, a new unit at the time created to treat psychotic patients and screen them for research. Olson and Dr. Charles Schulz, head of the U's psychiatry department, helped launch the unit in part to enhance the hospital's startup schizophrenia program and meet the U's mandate to bring in more research dollars.

Olson first recommended on Nov. 14 that a Dakota County District Court commit Markingson to the state treatment center in Anoka because he was not fit to make decisions about his care. He wrote to the court that Markingson was convinced his delusions were real and that he wasn't mentally ill.

The doctor changed his opinion about the commitment in less than a week, telling the court Markingson had started to acknowledge the need for help.

Reversals by patients are common, Olson explained in an interview with the Pioneer Press last month. Schizophrenics often arrive for treatment with delusions and denial but change their outlook while hospitalized.

A judge agreed Nov. 20 with Olson's new recommendation, requiring Markingson to follow the doctor's treatment plan. The next day, Markingson signed a consent form to be part of a national anti-psychotic drug study, Comparison of Atypicals for First Episode, or CAFE.

His mother's multiple complaints that while in the study, Markingson was not getting better and not getting proper treatment were ignored

Weiss' letters to Olson and Schulz, who was a co-investigator in the study, urged them to consider different treatment options for her son, which would have disqualified him from the study. But the doctors were unconvinced by her pleas.

In particular, she wrote with strange prescience,

'Do we have to wait until he kills himself or someone else,' she asked three weeks before his suicide, 'before anyone does anything.'

There was evidence that Markingson was not getting optimal treatment

In retrospect, it was not even clear that Markingson was taking his study medications prior to his suicide:

An autopsy showed no medication in Markingson's bloodstream, and a coroner's photo showed a sealed bottle of his medication. Had he been taking his drugs?

Study officials could have been fooled. They only counted drugs left in pill bottles instead of testing blood levels in patients.

Suggestions that financial conflicts of interest influenced trial investigators' actions

The initial news article raised questions whether the study investigator had been unduly influenced to keep Markingson in the study by financial concerns:

CAFE was an early opportunity at the U for Olson to add research experience to his academic credentials. The U had recruited him in 2001 for his expertise in schizophrenia.

It was a slow start. Olson recruited one patient in 2002, and CAFE study leaders considered dropping him altogether, according to monthly recruiting summaries. Olson and the university had been dropped from a previous study because of low recruiting numbers, the doctor later said in his court deposition.

Exchanges between local and national study officials made it clear that there was pressure for results and a 'risk' that the study would be shut down if it didn't recruit enough patients.

Note that:

As Subject 13, Markingson was worth $15,000 to the U, with some of that going to Olson's salary and the psychiatry department. Switching or adding medications could have disqualified Markingson and halted payments to Olson and the department from AstraZeneca.

Overall, the study offered $327,000 to the U and an opportunity to raise the profile of its schizophrenia program.

An accompanying Pioneer Press article indicated that both Dr Olson, and the Chair of Psychiatry, Dr S Charles Schulz, were receiving considerable financial support from AstraZeneca and other pharmaceutical companies at the time of the study.

Olson received $220,000 from six companies since 2002, including $149,000 from AstraZeneca, according to the state records. Schulz received $562,000, including $112,000 as a researcher and consultant to AstraZeneca.

Olson said his AstraZeneca money went straight to the U but did support his salary. Markingson's full participation in the yearlong study meant up to $15,000 for the university.

Did the lawsuit's results indicate nothing was wrong?

Mr Markingson's mother sued the University of Minnesota and AstraZeneca, but (per the first Pioneer Press article),

The lawsuit ended this year after a judge ruled that the university had statutory immunity from such lawsuits and that AstraZeneca shouldn't stand trial because there was no convincing proof that its drug caused Markingson's death. Weiss settled with Olson, the only defendant left. She said she was granted $75,000, which went entirely toward legal bills.

Note that the results did not address the university's or its administration's role.

Dr Carl Elliott Takes Another Look

Thus the case appeared to end, with no real reconsideration of how medical schools' dependence on commercial funding of clinical studies, and how individual faculty members' financial relationships with drug, device, and biotechnology firms may affect research done on human beings.

However, in September, 2010, Mother Jones published an article by Dr Carl Elliott, a University of Minnesota bioethicist, which raised further questions about the case.

I talked to several university colleagues and administrators, trying to learn what had happened. Many of them dismissed the story as slanted and incomplete. Yet the more I examined the medical and court records, the more I became convinced that the problem was worse than the Pioneer Press had reported. The danger lies not just in the particular circumstances that led to Dan's death, but in a system of clinical research that has been thoroughly co-opted by market forces, so that many studies have become little more than covert instruments for promoting drugs

Major design defects of the CAFE study:

It barred subjects from being taken off their assigned drug; it didn't allow them to be switched to another drug if their assigned drug was not working; and it restricted the number of additional drugs subjects could be given to manage side effects and symptoms such as depression, anxiety, or agitation. Like many clinical trials, the study was also randomized and double-blinded: Subjects were assigned a drug randomly by a computer, and neither the subjects nor the researchers knew which drug it was. These restrictions meant that subjects in the CAFE study had fewer therapeutic options than they would have had outside the study.

In fact, the CAFE study also contained a serious oversight that, if corrected, would have prevented patients like Dan from being enrolled. Like other patients with schizophrenia, patients experiencing their first psychotic episode are at higher risk of killing themselves or other people. For this reason, most studies of antipsychotic drugs specifically bar researchers from recruiting patients at risk of violence or suicide, for fear that they might kill themselves or someone else during the study. Conveniently, however, the CAFE study only prohibited patients at risk of suicide, not homicide. This meant that Dan—who had threatened to slit his mother's throat, but had not threatened to harm himself—was a legitimate target for recruitment.

As Dr Elliott noted, this appeared to be yet another example of manipulation of clinical research designed to make the sponsors' products look better, a topic we have frequently discussed on Health Care Renewal:

A 2006 study in The American Journal of Psychiatry, which looked at 32 head-to-head trials of atypicals, found that 90 percent of them came out positively for whichever company had designed and financed the trial. This startling result was not a matter of selective publication. The companies had simply designed the studies in a way that virtually ensured their own drugs would come out ahead—for instance, by dosing the competing drugs too low to be effective, or so high that they would produce damaging side effects. Much of this manipulation came from biased statistical analyses and rigged trial designs of such complexity that outside reviewers were unable to spot them. As Dr. Richard Smith, the former editor of the British Medical Journal, has pointed out, 'The companies seem to get the results they want not by fiddling the results, which would be far too crude and possibly detectable by peer review, but rather by asking the 'right' questions.'

This was likely what was going on with the CAFE study:

Although the documents unsealed in the Seroquel litigation do not specifically mention the CAFE study in which Dan was enrolled, they do suggest that AstraZeneca planned to establish Seroquel as the "atypical of choice in first-episode schizophrenia,' according to a 2000 'Seroquel Strate'y Summary.' A later document titled 'Seroquel PR Plan 2001' discusses the agenda for an advisory panel meeting in Hawaii. Among the potential topics were the marketing of Seroquel to first-episode patients, adolescents, and the elderly. The document refers to these populations as "vulnerable patient groups."

Even more alarming are internal documents suggesting that AstraZeneca was designing clinical trials as a covert method of marketing Seroquel. In 1997, when Dr. Andrew Goudie, a psychopharmacologist at the University of Liverpool, asked AstraZeneca to fund a research study he was planning, a company official replied that 'R&D is no longer responsible for Seroquel research—it is now the responsibility of Sales and Marketing.' The official also noted that funding decisions would depend on whether the study was likely to show a 'competitive advantage for Seroquel.'

Were study subjects protected?
So, as Dr Elliott wrote,

Many clinical studies place human subjects at risk—at a minimum, the risk of mild discomfort, and at worst, the risk of serious pain and death. Bioethicists and regulators spend a lot of time and energy debating the degree of risk that ought to be permitted in a study, how those risks should be presented to subjects, and the way those risks should be balanced against the potential benefits a subject might receive. What is simply assumed, without much consideration at all, is that the research is being conducted to produce scientific knowledge. This assumption is codified in a number of foundational ethics documents, such as the Nuremberg Code, which was instituted following Nazi experiments on concentration camp victims. The Nuremberg Code stipulates that an 'experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,' and 'the degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.'

But what if a research study is not really aimed at producing genuine scientific knowledge at all? The documents emerging in litigation suggest that pharmaceutical companies are designing, analyzing, and publishing trials primarily as a way of positioning their drugs in the marketplace. This raises a question unconsidered in any current code of research ethics. How much risk to human subjects is justified in a study whose principal aim is to 'generate commercially attractive messages'?

Conflicts of interest
Of course, university faculty pushed to bring in more external funds to support their careers (see this post) by university leaders with their eyes on the bottom line may not be too critical of the intricate designs of the studies they need to do to continue their academic careers, and whether such studies are really meant to promote science and improve patient care, or position products in the marketplace, especially when the same companies are paying them as consultants, speakers, etc.

In fact, Dr Elliott found reasons to make such concerns specific to the case of Mr Markingson's untimely death:

Olson had another financial reason to maintain good relations with AstraZeneca. According to a disclosure statement for a 2006 conference, he was a member of the AstraZeneca 'speaker's bureau,' giving paid talks for the company. He had similar arrangements with Eli Lilly and Janssen, the makers of the other atypicals being tested in the CAFE study, as well as Bristol-Myers Squibb and Pfizer. In addition, Olson was working as a paid consultant for Lilly, Janssen, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Pfizer.

Bioethicists Demand an Investigation

So eight University of Minnesota bioethicists, including Dr Elliott, wrote a letter to the University administration demanding an investigation, as reported in December, 2010, by the Minneapolis- St Paul Star-Tribune,

In a letter to the board Monday, the professors questioned whether U psychiatrists lacked ethical judgment in enrolling the victim, Dan Markingson, a schizophrenic who may have lacked the wherewithal to consent to research. They also questioned whether financial incentives from AstraZeneca, the drugmaker funding the study, presented conflicts for the researchers, Dr. Stephen Olson and Dr. S. Charles Schulz.

At the time, the administration promised a serious response:

U leaders will take the letter seriously and take the protection of human research subjects seriously, said the U's general counsel, Mark Rotenberg.

But then almost immediately indicated its bias:

'The fact that this is tragic doesn't mean the treating physicians did anything wrong,' he said.

What, Us Worry?

It did not take long for Mark Rotenberg to decide that there was nothing more to worry about. As reported in February, 2011, by the Pioneer Press:

in a Monday letter to Elliott and colleagues, the chairman of the U's board of regents wrote 'we do not believe further university resources should be expended re-reviewing a matter such as this, which has already received such exhaustive analysis by independent authoritative bodies.'

'Our general counsel has provided us with the extensive reviews of this case that were performed over the years by a number of independent experts and governmental units,' chairman Clyde Allen Jr. said in the letter. 'Each and every one of these reviews resulted in the same conclusion: there was no improper or inappropriate care provided to Mr. Markingson, nor is there evidence of misconduct or violation of applicable laws or regulations.'

Of course, since Mr Rotenberg is responsible for, among other things, reducing the university's legal liability, one could see how he might not want to delve further into this case.  As we noted earlier, it is not clear that previous "exhaustive" investigations asked the questions that needed to be asked, or had access to all the relevant data.  The issues are not whether their was criminal conduct, or even civil liability, but whether the university is presiding over good science and protection of research subjects?

So we should be worried, of course, that commercial firms sponsor research on human beings mainly to serve marketing objectives, and that university faculty and administrators go along, allowing their formerly prestigious universities' names to be added to the research in exchange for the money they so much want to keep themselves living in the style to which they are accustomed. We ought to be particularly worried when these universities seem to forget about their mission to find and disseminate new knowledge in favor of defending the work that continues to bring in the money.

Thus, physicians, researchers, patients, and the public ought to be very skeptical about clinical research sponsored by commercial firms with vested interests in the research turning out a particular way, and even about research not sponsored by such firms, but done by researchers who have personal financial ties to such firms. Worse, patients ought to be extremely skeptical about the motives of researchers who want to enroll them in trials when the researchers have financial ties to commercial firms whose products could be promoted through such trials, and especially when such firms are sponsoring the trials.

As a long-time advocate for evidence-based medicine, whose advancement depends on the continuing creation of valid research evidence from clinical research, it is heart-breaking to have to make these recommendations, but they will be necessary until there is better assurance that clinical research is being done to advance science and patient care, not the commercial interests of the sponsors and the researchers.

Until academic medicine becomes more open about how and why it is doing clinical research, such skepticism is warranted.

However, I will end with a ray of hope. If the administrators and faculty do not get it, the student journalists do. Read these words in an editorial in the Minnesota Daily:

Of course, the University has maintained neither it nor anyone involved in the case did anything wrong, an odd claim to make after the Minnesota Legislature unanimously passed a law that prohibits exactly what happened and named the law after Markingson.

The University seems to think that because it was not held liable in court for Markingson’s death, it did nothing wrong. This is false; it is a cynical excuse to keep corporate drug money flowing into the University.

The regents’ decision fundamentally undermines our mission: Supposedly, the University is 'dedicated to … the search for truth.' But the letter makes it clear that corporate research cash is more important to the University than patient safety and transparency.

Refusing to set up an independent investigation is a willfully ignorant attempt to sweep the Markingson case under the rug and damages the integrity of the entire University.

Perhaps it is time for the state legislature to take another look at this issue.

True health care reform would separate clinical research, that is, research done on human beings, from the commercial interests of health care corporations and the people who work for them.

ADDENDUM (18 March, 2011) - See this post by Naomi Freundlich on the Health Beat blog.

The University of Minnesota, Where Nothing Can Go Wrong, Go Wrong, Go Wrong...

As noted on the Periodic Table blog, the administration of the University of Minnesota continues to believe all is well with its clinical research activities.  A recent internal review said there was nothing more to investigate about the unfortunate death of a psychiatric patient years before. So should we all be relieved?

It will take an extensive review of the case to ultimately suggest we should not at all be relieved.  The case raised important concerns about the validity of clinical research, and whether it violates the trust of its patient-subjects.  These concerns had not been addressed before the university's most recent review, and thus seem even more pointed after its recent non-investigation.

Background: the Untimely Death of Dan Markingson

In May, 2008, the (Minnesota) Pioneer Press ran a series of articles about the untimely death of Dan Markingson which occurred while he was enrolled in a randomized trial sponsored by AstraZeneca (the CAFE study) at a site at the University of Minnesota.  The first article in the series made the following major points:

Mr Markingson had given his consent to be enrolled despite evidence that he was actively psychotic

He started having visions of killing his mother in the storm. Markingson was taken Nov. 12, 2003, to Regions Hospital in St. Paul, but it had no open psychiatric beds. He was then transferred to the University of Minnesota Medical Center, Fairview.

Weiss said discussions about research started right away at the hospital. Markingson was placed in Fairview's Station 12, a new unit at the time created to treat psychotic patients and screen them for research. Olson and Dr. Charles Schulz, head of the U's psychiatry department, helped launch the unit in part to enhance the hospital's startup schizophrenia program and meet the U's mandate to bring in more research dollars.

Olson first recommended on Nov. 14 that a Dakota County District Court commit Markingson to the state treatment center in Anoka because he was not fit to make decisions about his care. He wrote to the court that Markingson was convinced his delusions were real and that he wasn't mentally ill.

The doctor changed his opinion about the commitment in less than a week, telling the court Markingson had started to acknowledge the need for help.

Reversals by patients are common, Olson explained in an interview with the Pioneer Press last month. Schizophrenics often arrive for treatment with delusions and denial but change their outlook while hospitalized.

A judge agreed Nov. 20 with Olson's new recommendation, requiring Markingson to follow the doctor's treatment plan. The next day, Markingson signed a consent form to be part of a national anti-psychotic drug study, Comparison of Atypicals for First Episode, or CAFE.

His mother's multiple complaints that while in the study, Markingson was not getting better and not getting proper treatment were ignored

Weiss' letters to Olson and Schulz, who was a co-investigator in the study, urged them to consider different treatment options for her son, which would have disqualified him from the study. But the doctors were unconvinced by her pleas.

In particular, she wrote with strange prescience,

'Do we have to wait until he kills himself or someone else,' she asked three weeks before his suicide, 'before anyone does anything.'

There was evidence that Markingson was not getting optimal treatment

In retrospect, it was not even clear that Markingson was taking his study medications prior to his suicide:

An autopsy showed no medication in Markingson's bloodstream, and a coroner's photo showed a sealed bottle of his medication. Had he been taking his drugs?

Study officials could have been fooled. They only counted drugs left in pill bottles instead of testing blood levels in patients.

Suggestions that financial conflicts of interest influenced trial investigators' actions

The initial news article raised questions whether the study investigator had been unduly influenced to keep Markingson in the study by financial concerns:

CAFE was an early opportunity at the U for Olson to add research experience to his academic credentials. The U had recruited him in 2001 for his expertise in schizophrenia.

It was a slow start. Olson recruited one patient in 2002, and CAFE study leaders considered dropping him altogether, according to monthly recruiting summaries. Olson and the university had been dropped from a previous study because of low recruiting numbers, the doctor later said in his court deposition.

Exchanges between local and national study officials made it clear that there was pressure for results and a 'risk' that the study would be shut down if it didn't recruit enough patients.

Note that:

As Subject 13, Markingson was worth $15,000 to the U, with some of that going to Olson's salary and the psychiatry department. Switching or adding medications could have disqualified Markingson and halted payments to Olson and the department from AstraZeneca.

Overall, the study offered $327,000 to the U and an opportunity to raise the profile of its schizophrenia program.

An accompanying Pioneer Press article indicated that both Dr Olson, and the Chair of Psychiatry, Dr S Charles Schulz, were receiving considerable financial support from AstraZeneca and other pharmaceutical companies at the time of the study.

Olson received $220,000 from six companies since 2002, including $149,000 from AstraZeneca, according to the state records. Schulz received $562,000, including $112,000 as a researcher and consultant to AstraZeneca.

Olson said his AstraZeneca money went straight to the U but did support his salary. Markingson's full participation in the yearlong study meant up to $15,000 for the university.

Did the lawsuit's results indicate nothing was wrong?

Mr Markingson's mother sued the University of Minnesota and AstraZeneca, but (per the first Pioneer Press article),

The lawsuit ended this year after a judge ruled that the university had statutory immunity from such lawsuits and that AstraZeneca shouldn't stand trial because there was no convincing proof that its drug caused Markingson's death. Weiss settled with Olson, the only defendant left. She said she was granted $75,000, which went entirely toward legal bills.

Note that the results did not address the university's or its administration's role.

Dr Carl Elliott Takes Another Look

Thus the case appeared to end, with no real reconsideration of how medical schools' dependence on commercial funding of clinical studies, and how individual faculty members' financial relationships with drug, device, and biotechnology firms may affect research done on human beings.

However, in September, 2010, Mother Jones published an article by Dr Carl Elliott, a University of Minnesota bioethicist, which raised further questions about the case.

I talked to several university colleagues and administrators, trying to learn what had happened. Many of them dismissed the story as slanted and incomplete. Yet the more I examined the medical and court records, the more I became convinced that the problem was worse than the Pioneer Press had reported. The danger lies not just in the particular circumstances that led to Dan's death, but in a system of clinical research that has been thoroughly co-opted by market forces, so that many studies have become little more than covert instruments for promoting drugs

Major design defects of the CAFE study:

It barred subjects from being taken off their assigned drug; it didn't allow them to be switched to another drug if their assigned drug was not working; and it restricted the number of additional drugs subjects could be given to manage side effects and symptoms such as depression, anxiety, or agitation. Like many clinical trials, the study was also randomized and double-blinded: Subjects were assigned a drug randomly by a computer, and neither the subjects nor the researchers knew which drug it was. These restrictions meant that subjects in the CAFE study had fewer therapeutic options than they would have had outside the study.

In fact, the CAFE study also contained a serious oversight that, if corrected, would have prevented patients like Dan from being enrolled. Like other patients with schizophrenia, patients experiencing their first psychotic episode are at higher risk of killing themselves or other people. For this reason, most studies of antipsychotic drugs specifically bar researchers from recruiting patients at risk of violence or suicide, for fear that they might kill themselves or someone else during the study. Conveniently, however, the CAFE study only prohibited patients at risk of suicide, not homicide. This meant that Dan—who had threatened to slit his mother's throat, but had not threatened to harm himself—was a legitimate target for recruitment.

As Dr Elliott noted, this appeared to be yet another example of manipulation of clinical research designed to make the sponsors' products look better, a topic we have frequently discussed on Health Care Renewal:

A 2006 study in The American Journal of Psychiatry, which looked at 32 head-to-head trials of atypicals, found that 90 percent of them came out positively for whichever company had designed and financed the trial. This startling result was not a matter of selective publication. The companies had simply designed the studies in a way that virtually ensured their own drugs would come out ahead—for instance, by dosing the competing drugs too low to be effective, or so high that they would produce damaging side effects. Much of this manipulation came from biased statistical analyses and rigged trial designs of such complexity that outside reviewers were unable to spot them. As Dr. Richard Smith, the former editor of the British Medical Journal, has pointed out, 'The companies seem to get the results they want not by fiddling the results, which would be far too crude and possibly detectable by peer review, but rather by asking the 'right' questions.'

This was likely what was going on with the CAFE study:

Although the documents unsealed in the Seroquel litigation do not specifically mention the CAFE study in which Dan was enrolled, they do suggest that AstraZeneca planned to establish Seroquel as the "atypical of choice in first-episode schizophrenia,' according to a 2000 'Seroquel Strate'y Summary.' A later document titled 'Seroquel PR Plan 2001' discusses the agenda for an advisory panel meeting in Hawaii. Among the potential topics were the marketing of Seroquel to first-episode patients, adolescents, and the elderly. The document refers to these populations as "vulnerable patient groups."

Even more alarming are internal documents suggesting that AstraZeneca was designing clinical trials as a covert method of marketing Seroquel. In 1997, when Dr. Andrew Goudie, a psychopharmacologist at the University of Liverpool, asked AstraZeneca to fund a research study he was planning, a company official replied that 'R&D is no longer responsible for Seroquel research—it is now the responsibility of Sales and Marketing.' The official also noted that funding decisions would depend on whether the study was likely to show a 'competitive advantage for Seroquel.'

Were study subjects protected?
So, as Dr Elliott wrote,

Many clinical studies place human subjects at risk—at a minimum, the risk of mild discomfort, and at worst, the risk of serious pain and death. Bioethicists and regulators spend a lot of time and energy debating the degree of risk that ought to be permitted in a study, how those risks should be presented to subjects, and the way those risks should be balanced against the potential benefits a subject might receive. What is simply assumed, without much consideration at all, is that the research is being conducted to produce scientific knowledge. This assumption is codified in a number of foundational ethics documents, such as the Nuremberg Code, which was instituted following Nazi experiments on concentration camp victims. The Nuremberg Code stipulates that an 'experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society,' and 'the degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.'

But what if a research study is not really aimed at producing genuine scientific knowledge at all? The documents emerging in litigation suggest that pharmaceutical companies are designing, analyzing, and publishing trials primarily as a way of positioning their drugs in the marketplace. This raises a question unconsidered in any current code of research ethics. How much risk to human subjects is justified in a study whose principal aim is to 'generate commercially attractive messages'?

Conflicts of interest
Of course, university faculty pushed to bring in more external funds to support their careers (see this post) by university leaders with their eyes on the bottom line may not be too critical of the intricate designs of the studies they need to do to continue their academic careers, and whether such studies are really meant to promote science and improve patient care, or position products in the marketplace, especially when the same companies are paying them as consultants, speakers, etc.

In fact, Dr Elliott found reasons to make such concerns specific to the case of Mr Markingson's untimely death:

Olson had another financial reason to maintain good relations with AstraZeneca. According to a disclosure statement for a 2006 conference, he was a member of the AstraZeneca 'speaker's bureau,' giving paid talks for the company. He had similar arrangements with Eli Lilly and Janssen, the makers of the other atypicals being tested in the CAFE study, as well as Bristol-Myers Squibb and Pfizer. In addition, Olson was working as a paid consultant for Lilly, Janssen, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Pfizer.

Bioethicists Demand an Investigation

So eight University of Minnesota bioethicists, including Dr Elliott, wrote a letter to the University administration demanding an investigation, as reported in December, 2010, by the Minneapolis- St Paul Star-Tribune,

In a letter to the board Monday, the professors questioned whether U psychiatrists lacked ethical judgment in enrolling the victim, Dan Markingson, a schizophrenic who may have lacked the wherewithal to consent to research. They also questioned whether financial incentives from AstraZeneca, the drugmaker funding the study, presented conflicts for the researchers, Dr. Stephen Olson and Dr. S. Charles Schulz.

At the time, the administration promised a serious response:

U leaders will take the letter seriously and take the protection of human research subjects seriously, said the U's general counsel, Mark Rotenberg.

But then almost immediately indicated its bias:

'The fact that this is tragic doesn't mean the treating physicians did anything wrong,' he said.

What, Us Worry?

It did not take long for Mark Rotenberg to decide that there was nothing more to worry about. As reported in February, 2011, by the Pioneer Press:

in a Monday letter to Elliott and colleagues, the chairman of the U's board of regents wrote 'we do not believe further university resources should be expended re-reviewing a matter such as this, which has already received such exhaustive analysis by independent authoritative bodies.'

'Our general counsel has provided us with the extensive reviews of this case that were performed over the years by a number of independent experts and governmental units,' chairman Clyde Allen Jr. said in the letter. 'Each and every one of these reviews resulted in the same conclusion: there was no improper or inappropriate care provided to Mr. Markingson, nor is there evidence of misconduct or violation of applicable laws or regulations.'

Of course, since Mr Rotenberg is responsible for, among other things, reducing the university's legal liability, one could see how he might not want to delve further into this case.  As we noted earlier, it is not clear that previous "exhaustive" investigations asked the questions that needed to be asked, or had access to all the relevant data.  The issues are not whether their was criminal conduct, or even civil liability, but whether the university is presiding over good science and protection of research subjects?

So we should be worried, of course, that commercial firms sponsor research on human beings mainly to serve marketing objectives, and that university faculty and administrators go along, allowing their formerly prestigious universities' names to be added to the research in exchange for the money they so much want to keep themselves living in the style to which they are accustomed. We ought to be particularly worried when these universities seem to forget about their mission to find and disseminate new knowledge in favor of defending the work that continues to bring in the money.

Thus, physicians, researchers, patients, and the public ought to be very skeptical about clinical research sponsored by commercial firms with vested interests in the research turning out a particular way, and even about research not sponsored by such firms, but done by researchers who have personal financial ties to such firms. Worse, patients ought to be extremely skeptical about the motives of researchers who want to enroll them in trials when the researchers have financial ties to commercial firms whose products could be promoted through such trials, and especially when such firms are sponsoring the trials.

As a long-time advocate for evidence-based medicine, whose advancement depends on the continuing creation of valid research evidence from clinical research, it is heart-breaking to have to make these recommendations, but they will be necessary until there is better assurance that clinical research is being done to advance science and patient care, not the commercial interests of the sponsors and the researchers.

Until academic medicine becomes more open about how and why it is doing clinical research, such skepticism is warranted.

However, I will end with a ray of hope. If the administrators and faculty do not get it, the student journalists do. Read these words in an editorial in the Minnesota Daily:

Of course, the University has maintained neither it nor anyone involved in the case did anything wrong, an odd claim to make after the Minnesota Legislature unanimously passed a law that prohibits exactly what happened and named the law after Markingson.

The University seems to think that because it was not held liable in court for Markingson’s death, it did nothing wrong. This is false; it is a cynical excuse to keep corporate drug money flowing into the University.

The regents’ decision fundamentally undermines our mission: Supposedly, the University is 'dedicated to … the search for truth.' But the letter makes it clear that corporate research cash is more important to the University than patient safety and transparency.

Refusing to set up an independent investigation is a willfully ignorant attempt to sweep the Markingson case under the rug and damages the integrity of the entire University.

Perhaps it is time for the state legislature to take another look at this issue.

True health care reform would separate clinical research, that is, research done on human beings, from the commercial interests of health care corporations and the people who work for them.

ADDENDUM (18 March, 2011) - See this post by Naomi Freundlich on the Health Beat blog.

Who You Gonna Call? - How Should a Young Academic Respond to a Proffered Conflict of Interest?

To prepare a workshop on conflicts of interest in health care, I wrote a case of a faculty member offered a proposition that might provide a conflict of interest:

Consider a health care researcher called by a commercial health care corporation's marketing department. The department representative proposes paying the researcher as a consultant to write a scholarly article on a specific policy topic of interest to the company. The implication is that the article should be favorable to the interests of the corporation in this arena. The corporation would be delighted to give the researcher editorial and staff assistance in writing the article and getting it published.

Who you gonna call?

The researcher is concerned that getting this consultancy might be a conflict of interest. What organization (e.g., appropriate professional society, unit within his or her academic institution, other academic unit, independent not-for-profit organization or NGO, or government agency) should the researcher contact for support and help? Please give at least one specific example, (preferably including a URL), with a brief justification of why that organization might be helpful.

I sent the case to a few hundred people on our combined mailing list, to see how they might answer.  Responses came from medical academics, with a sprinkling of practitioners, a journalist, and a well-informed lay-person.

Sources of Information: Is It a Conflict of Interest?

Nearly everyone thought it would be unethical for a young academic to be paid as a consultant to write a health policy review policy by a company with a vested interest in the subject, and with editorial and staff support coming from the company.

I implied (but did not make clear) that the faculty member felt uncomfortable with the situation, was looking either for advice and information, or actual support not to accept a conflict of interest that he or she might have felt pressured to take on.

People suggested some sources of information. Most appeared to be useful, but most also were specialized (by clinical specialty, directed at journal editors, directed only at conflicts related to pharmaceuticals, etc)  Those particularly worthy of mention include:
- The Prescription Project's site on medical school conflict of interest policies
- The World Association of Medical Editor's (WAME) site on conflict of interest in scholarly publication
- The PharmedOut.org general resource site
My personal preference for a single source of general information on COIs is the 2009 US Institute of Medicine report on same.  (I will add all these links to our side-bar, and note that there are some other relevant links there.)

The IOM definition of conflict of interest is:

Conflicts of interest are defined as circumstances that create a risk that professional judgments or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest.

Primary interest include promoting and protecting the integrity of research, the quality of medical education, and the welfare of patients.

So the offer in the above case clearly seemed to present a conflict. The situation presented in my case seemed to present the potential to violate the report's recommendations 5.1 that bans scientific publications "that are controlled by industry," or that "contain substantial portions written by someone who is not identified as an author...."

Note, however, that even the IOM report seems not to question the idea that "collaborations between physicians or medical researchers and pharmaceutical, medical device, and biotechnology companies can benefit society — most notably by promoting the discovery and development of new medications and medical devices that improve individual and public health."  It has never been clear to me that collaboration requires payment by one party to the other, or that academic medical institutions ought to be developing drugs and devices (as opposed to discovering knowledge that commercial firms might later use to do so.) Furthermore, the IOM report, while it is moderately tough and comprehensive, did not recommend that detailed public disclosure of all relevant conflicts by all parties to them, or an outright ban on all of the sorts of conflicts that many might think are objectionable.

Support to Resist the Proffered Conflict

Suggested sources of help resisting pressure to assume an unwanted conflict of interest included local sources: mentors, grants and contracts offices, local conflict of interest/ ethics committees, compliance departments, and research officers. Some people thought their local versions of the above might be helpful. No person seemed sure that any of these options would clearly lead to support if the academic was being pressured by his or her academic superiors.

However, I have big concerns about the availability of even these sorts of local support.  We know COIs are very prevalent among individual academics.  About 60% of all academics, and of department chairs have important conflicts according to two articles by Campbell et al.(1-2)  So it might be hard for the young academic to find a mentor or university officer who was not already conflicted.

We also know that medical schools and academic medical centers see commercializing their discoveries as taking precedence over their traditional mission of seeking and disseminating knowledge, and providing and improving patient care and public health.  For example, in 2000, a Vice President of the American Association of Medical Colleges(3) wrote that research universities must respond to "societal demands that they become engines of economic development…."[caps added for emphasis] Furthermore,

Academic medicine… finds itself struggling to create a precarious equipoise between the world and values of commerce and those of traditional public service….

Also

In our capitalistic economy the pathway by which research invention becomes beneficial application is often totally dependent on venture capital, the availability of which commonly demands the active participation of academic inventors in the commercial venture; put simply, no participation, no money. It is this demand … that has driven the dramatic increase in medical faculty entrepreneurship.

I have seen university conflict of interest policies that include such verbiage in their introductions. The impression is that most academic medical institutions now think that is their mission, maybe their overriding mission, to develop and commercialize drugs and devices.

So it might also be hard for the young academic to find a local academic unit that is not affected by institutional conflicts of interest. Indeed, none of the people on our list was sure that their institutions had local authorities or units that could help the young academic in the case above avoid the proffered conflict of interest.

A few people suggested external sources of support: e.g., a small medical society, an association of journal editors, a bioethics center. But they too were ambivalent about how helpful they might be. The small medical society would only be helpful for its few members, and the person who mentioned it doubted it could provide more help that citing its own COI policy. The journal editors and their organizations might only be helpful about how the proffered conflict might affect the ability of the faculty member to get the resulting study published. The bioethics center appeared to have heavy institutional conflicts of interest of its own. No one could suggest an independent organization likely to provide effective support to resist COIs to a wide spectrum of academics (or other health care professionals, etc)

Summary

So this exercise did reinforce one of the assumptions I made when writing the case. Young academics at most US (at least) institutions may have little local support for resisting the extant pressure to become conflicted. There are NO generally useful and effective external sources of such support.

I would point out that with all its limitations, the IOM report still called on academic institutions to develop clear guidelines for COIs (3.1, 3.2); ban people with COIs from research on humans (that is, from all clinical research) (4.1); develop educational programs on COIs (5.2); participate in developing continuing medical education that is free of industry influence (5.3); set up a committee on COIs at the board of trustees level (8.1). It also called on the US government to promote research about COIs (9.2).

As far as I can tell, that was all pretty much wishful thinking. Despite the prestige of the IOM, almost none of these recommendations have been implemented. (I have heard so far of one university that seems to have implemented watered down versions of some of the IOM recommendations in their own policy. I would love to be told there are more extensive implementations of these recommendations. If there are, please show me the specifics.)

Furthermore, there seems to be no effective support for the reduction of COIs from accrediting organizations, professional societies, or foundations that fund health care initiatives. (Again, I would love to be told I am wrong, but if I am, show me the specifics.)  Of course, it appears that most professional societies get extensive support from commercial sources, particularly drug, device, and biotechnology companies, and their leadership often have their own financial relationships with for-profit health care corporations.  Foundations that support health care and medicine may have leaders with similar relationships, and may have endowments disproportionately invested in health care corporations.   

Given the pervasive nature of personal and institutional COIs throughout health care, which we have documented on Health Care Renewal , I was saddened, but not surprised by the responses to my query. So many people and so many institutions are making so much money from their industry payments. They will nearly all have excuses so that they can keep accepting the money. Young faculty are unlikely to be able to resist the prevailing culture, especially when it affects so many of their colleagues and supervisors.

I know that the people on our email lists are more aware of this than most. But we all should be saddened and ashamed that so little progress is being made.

Will academic medical institutions ever again put seeking and disseminating new knowledge, and providing and improving patient care and for the public health ahead of trying to be ersatz drug and device companies?

Will professional societies ever again put put their members' core values ahead of pleasing their corporate funders?

Will health care foundations ever again put rescuing health care's core values ahead of bland projects meant not to offend health care corporate leaders?

References


1. Campbell EG, Gruen RL, Mountford J et al. A national survey of physician–industry relationships. N Engl J Med 2007; 356:1742-1750. (link here)
2. Campbell EG, Weissman JS, Ehringhaus S et al. Institutional academic-industry relationships. JAMA 2007; 298: 1779-1786. (link here)
3. Korn D. Conflicts of interest in biomedical research. JAMA 2000; 284: 2234-2237. (link here)

Who You Gonna Call? - How Should a Young Academic Respond to a Proffered Conflict of Interest?

To prepare a workshop on conflicts of interest in health care, I wrote a case of a faculty member offered a proposition that might provide a conflict of interest:

Consider a health care researcher called by a commercial health care corporation's marketing department. The department representative proposes paying the researcher as a consultant to write a scholarly article on a specific policy topic of interest to the company. The implication is that the article should be favorable to the interests of the corporation in this arena. The corporation would be delighted to give the researcher editorial and staff assistance in writing the article and getting it published.

Who you gonna call?

The researcher is concerned that getting this consultancy might be a conflict of interest. What organization (e.g., appropriate professional society, unit within his or her academic institution, other academic unit, independent not-for-profit organization or NGO, or government agency) should the researcher contact for support and help? Please give at least one specific example, (preferably including a URL), with a brief justification of why that organization might be helpful.

I sent the case to a few hundred people on our combined mailing list, to see how they might answer.  Responses came from medical academics, with a sprinkling of practitioners, a journalist, and a well-informed lay-person.

Sources of Information: Is It a Conflict of Interest?

Nearly everyone thought it would be unethical for a young academic to be paid as a consultant to write a health policy review policy by a company with a vested interest in the subject, and with editorial and staff support coming from the company.

I implied (but did not make clear) that the faculty member felt uncomfortable with the situation, was looking either for advice and information, or actual support not to accept a conflict of interest that he or she might have felt pressured to take on.

People suggested some sources of information. Most appeared to be useful, but most also were specialized (by clinical specialty, directed at journal editors, directed only at conflicts related to pharmaceuticals, etc)  Those particularly worthy of mention include:
- The Prescription Project's site on medical school conflict of interest policies
- The World Association of Medical Editor's (WAME) site on conflict of interest in scholarly publication
- The PharmedOut.org general resource site
My personal preference for a single source of general information on COIs is the 2009 US Institute of Medicine report on same.  (I will add all these links to our side-bar, and note that there are some other relevant links there.)

The IOM definition of conflict of interest is:

Conflicts of interest are defined as circumstances that create a risk that professional judgments or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest.

Primary interest include promoting and protecting the integrity of research, the quality of medical education, and the welfare of patients.

So the offer in the above case clearly seemed to present a conflict. The situation presented in my case seemed to present the potential to violate the report's recommendations 5.1 that bans scientific publications "that are controlled by industry," or that "contain substantial portions written by someone who is not identified as an author...."

Note, however, that even the IOM report seems not to question the idea that "collaborations between physicians or medical researchers and pharmaceutical, medical device, and biotechnology companies can benefit society — most notably by promoting the discovery and development of new medications and medical devices that improve individual and public health."  It has never been clear to me that collaboration requires payment by one party to the other, or that academic medical institutions ought to be developing drugs and devices (as opposed to discovering knowledge that commercial firms might later use to do so.) Furthermore, the IOM report, while it is moderately tough and comprehensive, did not recommend that detailed public disclosure of all relevant conflicts by all parties to them, or an outright ban on all of the sorts of conflicts that many might think are objectionable.

Support to Resist the Proffered Conflict

Suggested sources of help resisting pressure to assume an unwanted conflict of interest included local sources: mentors, grants and contracts offices, local conflict of interest/ ethics committees, compliance departments, and research officers. Some people thought their local versions of the above might be helpful. No person seemed sure that any of these options would clearly lead to support if the academic was being pressured by his or her academic superiors.

However, I have big concerns about the availability of even these sorts of local support.  We know COIs are very prevalent among individual academics.  About 60% of all academics, and of department chairs have important conflicts according to two articles by Campbell et al.(1-2)  So it might be hard for the young academic to find a mentor or university officer who was not already conflicted.

We also know that medical schools and academic medical centers see commercializing their discoveries as taking precedence over their traditional mission of seeking and disseminating knowledge, and providing and improving patient care and public health.  For example, in 2000, a Vice President of the American Association of Medical Colleges(3) wrote that research universities must respond to "societal demands that they become engines of economic development…."[caps added for emphasis] Furthermore,

Academic medicine… finds itself struggling to create a precarious equipoise between the world and values of commerce and those of traditional public service….

Also

In our capitalistic economy the pathway by which research invention becomes beneficial application is often totally dependent on venture capital, the availability of which commonly demands the active participation of academic inventors in the commercial venture; put simply, no participation, no money. It is this demand … that has driven the dramatic increase in medical faculty entrepreneurship.

I have seen university conflict of interest policies that include such verbiage in their introductions. The impression is that most academic medical institutions now think that is their mission, maybe their overriding mission, to develop and commercialize drugs and devices.

So it might also be hard for the young academic to find a local academic unit that is not affected by institutional conflicts of interest. Indeed, none of the people on our list was sure that their institutions had local authorities or units that could help the young academic in the case above avoid the proffered conflict of interest.

A few people suggested external sources of support: e.g., a small medical society, an association of journal editors, a bioethics center. But they too were ambivalent about how helpful they might be. The small medical society would only be helpful for its few members, and the person who mentioned it doubted it could provide more help that citing its own COI policy. The journal editors and their organizations might only be helpful about how the proffered conflict might affect the ability of the faculty member to get the resulting study published. The bioethics center appeared to have heavy institutional conflicts of interest of its own. No one could suggest an independent organization likely to provide effective support to resist COIs to a wide spectrum of academics (or other health care professionals, etc)

Summary

So this exercise did reinforce one of the assumptions I made when writing the case. Young academics at most US (at least) institutions may have little local support for resisting the extant pressure to become conflicted. There are NO generally useful and effective external sources of such support.

I would point out that with all its limitations, the IOM report still called on academic institutions to develop clear guidelines for COIs (3.1, 3.2); ban people with COIs from research on humans (that is, from all clinical research) (4.1); develop educational programs on COIs (5.2); participate in developing continuing medical education that is free of industry influence (5.3); set up a committee on COIs at the board of trustees level (8.1). It also called on the US government to promote research about COIs (9.2).

As far as I can tell, that was all pretty much wishful thinking. Despite the prestige of the IOM, almost none of these recommendations have been implemented. (I have heard so far of one university that seems to have implemented watered down versions of some of the IOM recommendations in their own policy. I would love to be told there are more extensive implementations of these recommendations. If there are, please show me the specifics.)

Furthermore, there seems to be no effective support for the reduction of COIs from accrediting organizations, professional societies, or foundations that fund health care initiatives. (Again, I would love to be told I am wrong, but if I am, show me the specifics.)  Of course, it appears that most professional societies get extensive support from commercial sources, particularly drug, device, and biotechnology companies, and their leadership often have their own financial relationships with for-profit health care corporations.  Foundations that support health care and medicine may have leaders with similar relationships, and may have endowments disproportionately invested in health care corporations.   

Given the pervasive nature of personal and institutional COIs throughout health care, which we have documented on Health Care Renewal , I was saddened, but not surprised by the responses to my query. So many people and so many institutions are making so much money from their industry payments. They will nearly all have excuses so that they can keep accepting the money. Young faculty are unlikely to be able to resist the prevailing culture, especially when it affects so many of their colleagues and supervisors.

I know that the people on our email lists are more aware of this than most. But we all should be saddened and ashamed that so little progress is being made.

Will academic medical institutions ever again put seeking and disseminating new knowledge, and providing and improving patient care and for the public health ahead of trying to be ersatz drug and device companies?

Will professional societies ever again put put their members' core values ahead of pleasing their corporate funders?

Will health care foundations ever again put rescuing health care's core values ahead of bland projects meant not to offend health care corporate leaders?

References


1. Campbell EG, Gruen RL, Mountford J et al. A national survey of physician–industry relationships. N Engl J Med 2007; 356:1742-1750. (link here)
2. Campbell EG, Weissman JS, Ehringhaus S et al. Institutional academic-industry relationships. JAMA 2007; 298: 1779-1786. (link here)
3. Korn D. Conflicts of interest in biomedical research. JAMA 2000; 284: 2234-2237. (link here)

The Avandia Spin Cycle Continues Even After the FDA Safety Hearings

We have posted multiple times about Avandia (rosiglitazone), GlaxoSmithKline's star-crossed glucose-lowering drug.  While Avandia has received considerable media coverage, we focused on two questions: 1 - what are the benefits and harms of rosiglitazone as a treatment of type 2 diabetes, and therefore for which patients under what circumstances should this drug be used? 2 - what barriers have prevented physicians and patients from getting the best possible answer to the first question, and what can be done about them?  (See recent post here.) 

In particular, the Avandia case has illustrated how those with vested interests in the success of a health care product have done their best to obscure information that might threaten its success, even when doing so obscures the information that physicians and patients need to make the best possible decisions.  At one point, (in 2007, no less) we called this the "Avandia spin cycle."

Avandia once again has been in the news after the US Food and Drug Administration's hearings on the safety of the drug.  These hearings were so well covered in the media that a lengthy summary would be superfluous.  However, their main points demonstrated the persistence of the Avandia spin cycle:
- An FDA reviewer felt that "the company's misreadings of the ... Record trial ... were so profound, he concluded, that they 'suggest serious flaws with trial conduct.'" (per Gardiner Harris writing in the New York Times)
-A former FDA reviewer "withheld from regulators a study showing its Avandia diabetes drug may cause heart attacks." (per Bloomberg News)
- GlaxoSmithKline's forerunner SmithKline Beecham "secretly began a study to find out if its diabetes medicine, Avandia, was safer for the heart than a competing pill, Actos, made by Takeda."  However, "the study also provided clear signs that it [Avandia] was riskier to the heart.  But instead of publishing the results, the company spent the next 11 years trying to cover them up." (per Gardiner Harris writing in the New York Times.
- "Government experts and a panel of medical advisers repeatedly voiced skepticism on Tuesday about the trustworthiness of GlaxoSmithKline, which makes the controversial diabetes drug Avandia." (per Gardiner Harris again writing in the New York Times.)

So the Avandia saga has brought to the front pages the concerns we have had with suppression and manipulation of clinical research, especially when pursued by health care organizations with vested interests in the results of specific research projects coming out a certain way, and how they have been enabled by those with conflicts of interest.  Doctors thus should be worried whether those of us who try to practice evidence-based medicine have been fooled into practicing pseudo-evidence-based-medicine.

Those commenting on the story focused on the need for transparency when clinical research is funded and run by the corporations whose products are being evaluated.
-  "GlaxoSmithKline, the maker of Avandia, can't be trusted to report adverse clinical results fairly.  The company must be watched like a hawk as additional trials that it sponsors go forward."  (NY Times editorial)
-  "What America should demand in return for ... [generous patent] protection is that the FDA be able to make an honest evaluation of the efficacy of drugs.  When drug companies make this impossible by suppressing test results, not only do they violate their fundamental obligation of honesty with the public, their customers and their regulator, but they also break the bargain they have struck in return for the protection of their intellectual capital."  (Former NY Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in Slate.)

Instead, as I have written before, maybe we ought to consider whether those with vested interests in drugs or devices ought to be running clinical research meant to evaluate their own products.

 Ironically, while this discussion of how the Avandia spin cycle first began to revolve were going on, others were still trying to add revolutions (per minute).  In particular, a Reuters story noted:

Three influential groups of doctors who treat diabetes urged patients not to stop taking Avandia, saying on Thursday that while news about the controversial drug may be frightening, it would be worse to suddenly stop taking it.

That is odd, given that Avandia has never been shown to improve clinical outcomes for patients with diabetes, and that there are many other drugs that control blood sugar which appear to be safer. But wait, there is more,

The Endocrine Society, American Diabetes Association and the American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists worried that patients may be afraid to take Avandia.

'Patients should continue taking all currently prescribed medications unless instructed otherwise by their health care provider,' Dr. Robert Vigersky of the Endocrine Society said in a statement.

'Stopping diabetes medications can cause significant harm and result in higher levels of blood glucose that may cause severe short term health problems and could increase the risk of diabetes-related complications in the long term.'

Would not it make more sense to advise patients still on Avandia to consult with their doctors urgently about possible alternatives?  Meanwhile, it does not seem irrational to be afraid of taking Avandia, given the increasing evidence about its harms, and increasing evidence that what we know about its harms may be an under-estimate.

So I wondered why these august medical societies seemed so unaffected about the doubts about Avandia's safety, and about the evidence offered to support its use that the latest news ought to generate. It turns out that all three of the medical societies get financial support from, -- wait for it --, GlaxoSmithKline.

The Endocrine Society lists GSK as one of its Corporate Liaison Board Members. The American Diabetes Association lists GSK as one of its Banting Circle Supporters, that is, those that give at least $1,000,000 a year. The American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists lists GSK as a member of its Corporate AACE Partnership. (I was not able to find out the total amount contributed by GSK to either the Endocrine Society or the AACE.)

So once again, the loudest voices in support of the product come from those used to, and perhaps dependent on financial support from its manufacturer. As a physician, I have been particularly disappointed that our medical societies, whose missions are ostensibly to support our professional values, seem to act more and more like marketers for the companies whose contributions, rather than members' dues increasingly support them.

The cycle keeps spinning.

For further thoughts on the latest in the Avandia case, see this post by Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog, and this by Alison Bass on the Alison Bass Blog.