Showing posts with label pharmaceuticals. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pharmaceuticals. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 30, 2011

How Large Health Care Organizations Set the "Rules of the Game" to Dominate Health Care

The notion that health care is increasingly "dominated by large, bureaucratic organizations which do not honor ... [its] core values"(1) just made it into a main-stream, large circulation US medical journal.  A brand new commentary in the American Journal of Medicine(2) by Supri and Malone declared:
To explain why we have the most expensive health care system in the world and yet one of the lowest performing, we need to take a perspective that focuses on the US institution of medicine as a whole. We expose the hidden rules by which this institution operates and discuss how its powerful organizations shape, control and perpetuate this ailing system.

The article then described the main types of large, powerful health care organizations:
The US institution of medicine is not a single, comprehensive and cohesive system of health care. Instead, it is comprised of a myriad of large and powerful organizations, including insurance companies, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), corporate for-profit hospital chains, and pharmaceutical companies. This institutional structure is large and vast, and has over the years become ever more labyrinthine.

Note that there are even more kinds of large and powerful health care organizations, including non-profit hospitals and hospital systems, employers acting as payers for health care, government agencies, device and biotechnology companies, health care information technology companies, public relations firms, medical education and communication companies, contract research organizations, professional societies, patient advocacy groups, accrediting bodies, health care charities, etc, etc, etc.  But the point is that the large organizations, not the patients, the physicians, nor the public dominate.

Supri and Malone suggested that each kind of organization sets the "rules of the game," that is, the priorities important to the organization, which are very different from the core values that many of us believe ought to guide health care:
Not only is the institutional structure large, it is dynamic, and actively creates, shapes, and maintains the institution of medicine. It does this through what we call setting the “rules of the game”; that is, by imposing the terms by which the system operates.

For example,
Insurance companies have set the rule 'restrict choice and coverage.' They enact this through their elaborate system of copayments and deductibles, exclusion clauses and loopholes, each designed to deter patients from claiming the health care they need, and to override physicians' medical judgment.

Similarly, it cited the rules for managed care, "manage care," that is, "restrict utilization of health care" regardless of patients' needs; the pharmaceutical industry, "charges as much as we want, because insurance will pay;" and "corporate hospital chains ... test as much as we want, because insurance will pay." Thus it made the point that US health care now is driven by the priorities of large organizations whose interests at best may disregard and at worst may conflict with providing the best possible care for individual patients.

Further, the resulting complexity is to the benefit of the large organizations:
As each organization has created its own 'rules of the game,' the institution of medicine has grown into a complex entity that few really understand. This very complexity actually works to the advantage of the organizations that comprise the system, creating an operating environment that allows them to siphon off billions of dollars. It is one of the main reasons why the cost of health care has spiraled out of control.

This is very important, and suggests that the system will just become more bureaucratic, complex and opaque until it finally collapses.

Finally, it raised the point that the organizations collude to promote their priorities at the expense of patients' and the public's health:
Although each organization sets their 'own rules of the game,' they are also strongly and deeply interlinked, and cooperate and collaborate to protect the system of health care that they have devised, so that it remains intact and continues to serve their own interests.

Although  Supri and Malone did not differentiate the leadership of large organizations from the organizations themselves, we have pointed out that the top leaders of various kinds of organizations seem to think alike, becoming a sort of de facto executives' guild, with a "superclass" of oligarchs at its pinnacle.  The guild may be enabled by these leaders' often huge compensation and other benefits and corporate arrangements that keep them shielded from the vicissitudes of daily life that patients, health care professionals, and lower level organizational employees must face.  Furthermore, the leadership of these organizations is often interlinked, for example, by leaders of one organization serving on boards of directors or trustees of others.

It is so nice for us at Health Care Renewal to have some company. It is a very important blow to the anechoic effect for these sorts of views to appear in a mainstream medical journal.

When I interviewed a motley group of physicians and health care professionals in the early part of the 21st century, many expressed concerns about how medicine had been taken over by large organizations which did not honor its values. The article published in 2003(1) in Europe which tried to summarize their concerns probably could not have been published at that time in the US, but its publication remote from its main topic only made it more anechoic. It may be that an article published in a respected American journal will generate some more echoes. Here is hoping that Health Care Renewal can help create some such echoes. 

Obviously, those who lead large organizations in health care will not be happy about that, so it is possible this article's appearance in a main-stream journal may incite some pushback, perhaps generated by the public relations machines of the large health care organizations (see this post about how Wendell Potter's excellent Deadly Spin documented how large organizations use propaganda and disinformation to undermine viewpoints that threaten their domination.)

In conclusion, I strongly support Supri and Malone's final sentiments:
The sum of the 'rules of the game' devised by these organizations has resulted in a fragmented, haphazard and broken system of health care. Reform is long overdue, and demands root and branch transformation of the 'rules of the game' governing the US institution of medicine. This requires us to understand these rules, who is setting them, and how these rules are being used to exploit the system of medicine. Only then can we begin to heal our ailing health care system.
Well said!

But now almost 8 years since the publication of "A Cautionary Tale," we still have a long way to go.

References


1.  Poses RM. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care.  Eur J Inte Med 2003; 14: 123-130.  Link here.
2.  Supri S, Malone K. On the critical list: the US institution of medicine. Am J Med 2011; 124: 192-193.  Link here. 

How Large Health Care Organizations Set the "Rules of the Game" to Dominate Health Care

The notion that health care is increasingly "dominated by large, bureaucratic organizations which do not honor ... [its] core values"(1) just made it into a main-stream, large circulation US medical journal.  A brand new commentary in the American Journal of Medicine(2) by Supri and Malone declared:
To explain why we have the most expensive health care system in the world and yet one of the lowest performing, we need to take a perspective that focuses on the US institution of medicine as a whole. We expose the hidden rules by which this institution operates and discuss how its powerful organizations shape, control and perpetuate this ailing system.

The article then described the main types of large, powerful health care organizations:
The US institution of medicine is not a single, comprehensive and cohesive system of health care. Instead, it is comprised of a myriad of large and powerful organizations, including insurance companies, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), corporate for-profit hospital chains, and pharmaceutical companies. This institutional structure is large and vast, and has over the years become ever more labyrinthine.

Note that there are even more kinds of large and powerful health care organizations, including non-profit hospitals and hospital systems, employers acting as payers for health care, government agencies, device and biotechnology companies, health care information technology companies, public relations firms, medical education and communication companies, contract research organizations, professional societies, patient advocacy groups, accrediting bodies, health care charities, etc, etc, etc.  But the point is that the large organizations, not the patients, the physicians, nor the public dominate.

Supri and Malone suggested that each kind of organization sets the "rules of the game," that is, the priorities important to the organization, which are very different from the core values that many of us believe ought to guide health care:
Not only is the institutional structure large, it is dynamic, and actively creates, shapes, and maintains the institution of medicine. It does this through what we call setting the “rules of the game”; that is, by imposing the terms by which the system operates.

For example,
Insurance companies have set the rule 'restrict choice and coverage.' They enact this through their elaborate system of copayments and deductibles, exclusion clauses and loopholes, each designed to deter patients from claiming the health care they need, and to override physicians' medical judgment.

Similarly, it cited the rules for managed care, "manage care," that is, "restrict utilization of health care" regardless of patients' needs; the pharmaceutical industry, "charges as much as we want, because insurance will pay;" and "corporate hospital chains ... test as much as we want, because insurance will pay." Thus it made the point that US health care now is driven by the priorities of large organizations whose interests at best may disregard and at worst may conflict with providing the best possible care for individual patients.

Further, the resulting complexity is to the benefit of the large organizations:
As each organization has created its own 'rules of the game,' the institution of medicine has grown into a complex entity that few really understand. This very complexity actually works to the advantage of the organizations that comprise the system, creating an operating environment that allows them to siphon off billions of dollars. It is one of the main reasons why the cost of health care has spiraled out of control.

This is very important, and suggests that the system will just become more bureaucratic, complex and opaque until it finally collapses.

Finally, it raised the point that the organizations collude to promote their priorities at the expense of patients' and the public's health:
Although each organization sets their 'own rules of the game,' they are also strongly and deeply interlinked, and cooperate and collaborate to protect the system of health care that they have devised, so that it remains intact and continues to serve their own interests.

Although  Supri and Malone did not differentiate the leadership of large organizations from the organizations themselves, we have pointed out that the top leaders of various kinds of organizations seem to think alike, becoming a sort of de facto executives' guild, with a "superclass" of oligarchs at its pinnacle.  The guild may be enabled by these leaders' often huge compensation and other benefits and corporate arrangements that keep them shielded from the vicissitudes of daily life that patients, health care professionals, and lower level organizational employees must face.  Furthermore, the leadership of these organizations is often interlinked, for example, by leaders of one organization serving on boards of directors or trustees of others.

It is so nice for us at Health Care Renewal to have some company. It is a very important blow to the anechoic effect for these sorts of views to appear in a mainstream medical journal.

When I interviewed a motley group of physicians and health care professionals in the early part of the 21st century, many expressed concerns about how medicine had been taken over by large organizations which did not honor its values. The article published in 2003(1) in Europe which tried to summarize their concerns probably could not have been published at that time in the US, but its publication remote from its main topic only made it more anechoic. It may be that an article published in a respected American journal will generate some more echoes. Here is hoping that Health Care Renewal can help create some such echoes. 

Obviously, those who lead large organizations in health care will not be happy about that, so it is possible this article's appearance in a main-stream journal may incite some pushback, perhaps generated by the public relations machines of the large health care organizations (see this post about how Wendell Potter's excellent Deadly Spin documented how large organizations use propaganda and disinformation to undermine viewpoints that threaten their domination.)

In conclusion, I strongly support Supri and Malone's final sentiments:
The sum of the 'rules of the game' devised by these organizations has resulted in a fragmented, haphazard and broken system of health care. Reform is long overdue, and demands root and branch transformation of the 'rules of the game' governing the US institution of medicine. This requires us to understand these rules, who is setting them, and how these rules are being used to exploit the system of medicine. Only then can we begin to heal our ailing health care system.
Well said!

But now almost 8 years since the publication of "A Cautionary Tale," we still have a long way to go.

References


1.  Poses RM. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care.  Eur J Inte Med 2003; 14: 123-130.  Link here.
2.  Supri S, Malone K. On the critical list: the US institution of medicine. Am J Med 2011; 124: 192-193.  Link here. 

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

"I'm Not Here to Sell Drugs" - Then Why Use Company Provided "Correct" Slides?

In October, 2010, we discussed a series of reports by Pro Publica and multiple other respected news organizations about payments by seven pharmaceutical companies to thousands of doctors.  Industry often claims that they only pay the best and the brightest physicians and academics to provide education relevant to their products.  However, the ProPublica et al report suggested that they mainly recruited physicians who already showed their favor to their products by prescribing them often, but soothed their consciences by dubbing them "thought leaders" or "key opinion leaders."  While some of the physicians were well-known academics, others had notably blemished records. 

Since then, news media around the US have looked into interactions among local physicians and academic medical institutions and the seven pharmaceutical companies.  In November, 2010, here we discussed cases that suggested that pharmaceutical companies like physician speakers because they are more "believable" than pharmaceutical representatives, and choose physicians who already are prolific prescribers of the drug to be promoted, and that suggested that some physicians realized that speaking for pharmaceutical companies influenced their own prescribing.

Since then, more investigations of local physicians' interactions with pharmaceutical companies have appeared that reinforced contrasts between rationalizations that physicians and drug companies use to support continued payments for "drug talks," and what these talks are really about.

"Leaders in Their Field" vs Sanctions and Crimes

 Many pharmaceutical (and other health care corporations) have repeated the mantra that the physicians they hire to give talks are the best and the brightest.  The physicians who give the talks sometimes get to believe this.  For example, a ProPublica follow-up report[1] on discrepancies between data the pharmaceutical companies put on the web and gave to state regulators noted:
Pfizer, for example, told the state it paid Dr. Randy Schapiro $1,770 last year. But on the firm’s website, it reported spending $43,827 on him in the second half of 2009 alone.
It then quoted Dr Schapiro:
Schapiro said the doctors paid by pharmaceutical companies are 'leaders in their fields,' and patients should want to see their physician among them. 'If their doctor is not on the list,' he said, 'maybe they should look for a different doctor.'

On the other hand, several of the local news articles focused on physicians who were paid drug company speakers despite having chequered backgrounds, shall we say. In the Elmira Star Gazette[2]:
Tulio Ortega, a Rochester psychiatrist who made $144,548 from Eli Lilly and AstraZeneca for speaking to groups of peers during the last two years - was put of [sic] probation for two years in 2008 and ordered to pay a $7,500 fine after being sanctioned for negligence and incompetence.
Also,
Lilly also paid Yonkers physician Ali Sherzoy $4,334 in the first two quarter of this year, even though he had his license suspended in New York and New Jersey earlier this year after pleading guilty to a count of criminal sexual contact in 2008.

Sherzoy told ProPublica the incident involted his family's nanny and had nothing to do with his ability to practice medicine.

Other New York doctors were sanctioned for incidents ranging from deficiencies in handling controlled substances to being convicted of tax evasion.

Another article by the same author[3] noted two more cases:
In 1991, Johnson City doctor Louis Mateya was charged with professional misconduct after a 22-year-old woman accused him of unzipping his pants and fondling himself during an examination.

Mateya admitted guilt to the charge. The State Board for Professional Medical Conduct suspended his license for two months, followed by a 58-month probationary period, during which he was monitored by a psychiatrist and a health professional selected by the board.

During the last nine months of 2009, GlaxoSmithKline paid Mateya, an internist at United Health Services, $1,750 to speak on behalf of Lovaza, Glaxo's prescription omega 3 fish oil, according to an e-mail from a United Health Services spokeswoman.

Also,
A second Southern Tier physician, Robert Douenias, of Corning, was also paid by Glaxo: $20,000 during the same time frame to deliver speeches, even though he received sanctions in 1992.

According to the Office for Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) records, Douenias lied about a previous criminal conviction on his application for a New York medical license. He received a censure and reprimand from the OPMC, was ordered to perform 200 hours of public service and was placed on probation for two years. Douenias said on his application he had never been convicted of a crime in any state or country, even though he had a previous conviction, according to OPMC records.

Note that the original ProPublica reporting from their database emphasized cases of physicians paid to speak by pharmaceutical companies who also had been sanctioned by medical boards or the criminal justice system (see post here).

Although drug marketers like to tell physicians they are selected as "thought leaders" because of their brilliance, it appears that the selection of such "key opinion leaders" is not necessarily based on sterling character.

"I'm Not There to Sell a Drug," But Then Why Use the Company's Slides?

A number of the reports featured physicians who asserted their independence, at least from marketing goals. 

For example, as reported by the Duluth (MN) News Tribune[4],
A Duluth psychiatrist has received more than $525,000 since 2002 in payments from pharmaceutical companies, far more than any other Northland doctor, an analysis by the News Tribune shows.

Dr. Tracy Tomac of St. Luke’s hospital was paid by the companies to give presentations on health and drug issues.

Furthermore,
'I’m there as an educator and resource,' she said. 'I’m not in business to do a sales pitch. I’m not a salesperson.'

Also,
In 2007, [Dr] Tomac said her presentations included content that was screened and approved by the FDA,....

However, other reporting suggested that content "screened and approved by the FDA" was content provided by the pharmaceutical companies.

For example, The Tennessean noted[5]:
Dr. Jan Brandes heads the Nashville Neuroscience Group, a clinic that's now part of Nashville-based Saint Thomas Health Services. She made $111,150 in outside income over the past two years, largely in speaker fees paid by drug company GlaxoSmithKline, which markets a wide array of brand-name drugs, literally from A to Z.

Dr Brandes also asserted,
'The real point is I'm not there to sell a drug,' Brandes said. 'I'm there to interpret trial results, talk about disease states and help physicians understand where this research might fit in the context of their practice.'

However,
Most drug companies now require physicians to use the company's slides and presentations if they pay them to speak at an event. The industry says that is to ensure that all U.S. Food and Drug Administration rules are met and that physicians don't wander off into discussing uses for a particular product that haven't been approved by regulators.

Also, an article in the Alexandria (VA) Gazette Packet[6] noted:

Whistleblower lawsuits filed in recent years have accused firms of using doctors to push pills for unapproved uses during dinnertime talks, prompting at least 10 firms to settle cases for nearly $7 billion in the last three years. Since that time, pharmaceutical companies have tightened control over what happens during presentations given on their dime. Last year, for example, GlaxoSmithKline instituted a new policy prohibiting doctors from using their own slides during presentations. Starting in 2010, all doctors giving speeches sponsored by GlaxoSmithKline must use slides presented by the pharmaceutical company in the order specified.

'We want to make sure that everything is correct,' said Mary Anne Rhyne, a spokeswoman for GlaxoSmithKline. 'The best way to do that is to have our team prepare the slide.'
Note that Dr Brandes above was paid mainly by GlaxoSmithKline, who presumably also provided all her slides and made sure that everything she said was "correct," at least in terms of what GlaxoSmithKline thought was correct.

And one more example per MyFoxAtlanta[7]:
Some of Georgia's highest paid physicians? .... and Roswell psychiatrist Dr. Michael Banov: over $68,000, also from Lilly.
Dr Banov asserted:
We don't sell medications. We simply educate physicians about data, and they make their own mind up.
However,
Banov says, the drug company - not him - creates the materials used in his speeches, and he says there's a reason for that.

'We are only able to present the data. We're not able to present our personal opinions. Our personal preferences, how we use the medication off label. any of that. So we're held to a very tight standard by the FDA,' said Banov.
Drug companies may say they make their paid physician speakers use slides provided by the company to prevent them from talking about "off-label" uses.  However, there is no reason for a physician-educator not to talk about "off-label" uses, and physicians can prescribe any legal drug for whatever purpose they see fit, whether or not the drug is on or "off label." 

But drug companies are prohibited by law from promoting off-label uses.  Requiring physicians to use drug companies' slides and preventing them from talking about "off-label" uses demonstrates that the physicians are functioning as marketers, not educators. 

Summary

As local reporters look into more cases, it becomes increasingly clear that up to now, pharmaceutical companies have been none too fussy about which physicians they pay to speak about their products. It is self-serving, but inaccurate for both sets of parties to assert that the companies choose only the "best and the brightest." 

Furthermore, it has now become glaringly obvious that the purpose of "drug talks" is, well, to sell drugs.  Some physicians paid by drug companies to speak may bluster about their independence, but if they are using company provided slides, who can deny they are influenced  by the company.  Furthermore, when companies insist not merely on providing slides, but on ensuring that "everything is correct," then it is clear that it is the companies' talks that the physicians are giving.  Physicians giving company talks cannot be speaking independently, and hence must be regarded as company sales personnel, whose disguises as independent doctors or medical academics are now in tatters.

Doctors who still choose to go to "drug talks" should have no illusions that they are being exposed to anything other than marketing.  Thus, I urge my colleagues to forgo the nice meals and the company prepared "correct" slides, and spend the time trying to more critically assess the clinical evidence. 

References


1.  Ornstein C, Weber T. In Minnesota, drug company reports of payments to doctors arrive riddled with mistakes.  ProPublica, Dec 10, 2010.  Link here.
2. Hunter J. Rochester psychiatrist, sanctioned for incompetence, made $144K from drug companies. Elmira Star-Gazette, Dec 4, 2010.
3. Hunter J. Despite sanctions, physicians hired as drug company pitchmen. PressConnects.com, Dec 4, 2010. Link here.
4. Stahl B. Duluth doctor denies payments from drug companies sway decisions.  Duluth News Tribune, Dec 20, 2010.  Link here.
5. Ward G. They say they prescribe based on patients, not Big Pharma. Tennessean, Dec 19, 2010. Link here.
6. Pope ML. Conflict of interest? - Alexandria doctors receive thousands of dollars from Big Pharma.  Alexandia Gazette Packet, Jan 13, 2010.  Link here.
7. Galvin B. Health watch: doctors and drug companies. MyFoxAtlanta, Dec 29, 2010. Link here.

"I'm Not Here to Sell Drugs" - Then Why Use Company Provided "Correct" Slides?

In October, 2010, we discussed a series of reports by Pro Publica and multiple other respected news organizations about payments by seven pharmaceutical companies to thousands of doctors.  Industry often claims that they only pay the best and the brightest physicians and academics to provide education relevant to their products.  However, the ProPublica et al report suggested that they mainly recruited physicians who already showed their favor to their products by prescribing them often, but soothed their consciences by dubbing them "thought leaders" or "key opinion leaders."  While some of the physicians were well-known academics, others had notably blemished records. 

Since then, news media around the US have looked into interactions among local physicians and academic medical institutions and the seven pharmaceutical companies.  In November, 2010, here we discussed cases that suggested that pharmaceutical companies like physician speakers because they are more "believable" than pharmaceutical representatives, and choose physicians who already are prolific prescribers of the drug to be promoted, and that suggested that some physicians realized that speaking for pharmaceutical companies influenced their own prescribing.

Since then, more investigations of local physicians' interactions with pharmaceutical companies have appeared that reinforced contrasts between rationalizations that physicians and drug companies use to support continued payments for "drug talks," and what these talks are really about.

"Leaders in Their Field" vs Sanctions and Crimes

 Many pharmaceutical (and other health care corporations) have repeated the mantra that the physicians they hire to give talks are the best and the brightest.  The physicians who give the talks sometimes get to believe this.  For example, a ProPublica follow-up report[1] on discrepancies between data the pharmaceutical companies put on the web and gave to state regulators noted:
Pfizer, for example, told the state it paid Dr. Randy Schapiro $1,770 last year. But on the firm’s website, it reported spending $43,827 on him in the second half of 2009 alone.
It then quoted Dr Schapiro:
Schapiro said the doctors paid by pharmaceutical companies are 'leaders in their fields,' and patients should want to see their physician among them. 'If their doctor is not on the list,' he said, 'maybe they should look for a different doctor.'

On the other hand, several of the local news articles focused on physicians who were paid drug company speakers despite having chequered backgrounds, shall we say. In the Elmira Star Gazette[2]:
Tulio Ortega, a Rochester psychiatrist who made $144,548 from Eli Lilly and AstraZeneca for speaking to groups of peers during the last two years - was put of [sic] probation for two years in 2008 and ordered to pay a $7,500 fine after being sanctioned for negligence and incompetence.
Also,
Lilly also paid Yonkers physician Ali Sherzoy $4,334 in the first two quarter of this year, even though he had his license suspended in New York and New Jersey earlier this year after pleading guilty to a count of criminal sexual contact in 2008.

Sherzoy told ProPublica the incident involted his family's nanny and had nothing to do with his ability to practice medicine.

Other New York doctors were sanctioned for incidents ranging from deficiencies in handling controlled substances to being convicted of tax evasion.

Another article by the same author[3] noted two more cases:
In 1991, Johnson City doctor Louis Mateya was charged with professional misconduct after a 22-year-old woman accused him of unzipping his pants and fondling himself during an examination.

Mateya admitted guilt to the charge. The State Board for Professional Medical Conduct suspended his license for two months, followed by a 58-month probationary period, during which he was monitored by a psychiatrist and a health professional selected by the board.

During the last nine months of 2009, GlaxoSmithKline paid Mateya, an internist at United Health Services, $1,750 to speak on behalf of Lovaza, Glaxo's prescription omega 3 fish oil, according to an e-mail from a United Health Services spokeswoman.

Also,
A second Southern Tier physician, Robert Douenias, of Corning, was also paid by Glaxo: $20,000 during the same time frame to deliver speeches, even though he received sanctions in 1992.

According to the Office for Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) records, Douenias lied about a previous criminal conviction on his application for a New York medical license. He received a censure and reprimand from the OPMC, was ordered to perform 200 hours of public service and was placed on probation for two years. Douenias said on his application he had never been convicted of a crime in any state or country, even though he had a previous conviction, according to OPMC records.

Note that the original ProPublica reporting from their database emphasized cases of physicians paid to speak by pharmaceutical companies who also had been sanctioned by medical boards or the criminal justice system (see post here).

Although drug marketers like to tell physicians they are selected as "thought leaders" because of their brilliance, it appears that the selection of such "key opinion leaders" is not necessarily based on sterling character.

"I'm Not There to Sell a Drug," But Then Why Use the Company's Slides?

A number of the reports featured physicians who asserted their independence, at least from marketing goals. 

For example, as reported by the Duluth (MN) News Tribune[4],
A Duluth psychiatrist has received more than $525,000 since 2002 in payments from pharmaceutical companies, far more than any other Northland doctor, an analysis by the News Tribune shows.

Dr. Tracy Tomac of St. Luke’s hospital was paid by the companies to give presentations on health and drug issues.

Furthermore,
'I’m there as an educator and resource,' she said. 'I’m not in business to do a sales pitch. I’m not a salesperson.'

Also,
In 2007, [Dr] Tomac said her presentations included content that was screened and approved by the FDA,....

However, other reporting suggested that content "screened and approved by the FDA" was content provided by the pharmaceutical companies.

For example, The Tennessean noted[5]:
Dr. Jan Brandes heads the Nashville Neuroscience Group, a clinic that's now part of Nashville-based Saint Thomas Health Services. She made $111,150 in outside income over the past two years, largely in speaker fees paid by drug company GlaxoSmithKline, which markets a wide array of brand-name drugs, literally from A to Z.

Dr Brandes also asserted,
'The real point is I'm not there to sell a drug,' Brandes said. 'I'm there to interpret trial results, talk about disease states and help physicians understand where this research might fit in the context of their practice.'

However,
Most drug companies now require physicians to use the company's slides and presentations if they pay them to speak at an event. The industry says that is to ensure that all U.S. Food and Drug Administration rules are met and that physicians don't wander off into discussing uses for a particular product that haven't been approved by regulators.

Also, an article in the Alexandria (VA) Gazette Packet[6] noted:

Whistleblower lawsuits filed in recent years have accused firms of using doctors to push pills for unapproved uses during dinnertime talks, prompting at least 10 firms to settle cases for nearly $7 billion in the last three years. Since that time, pharmaceutical companies have tightened control over what happens during presentations given on their dime. Last year, for example, GlaxoSmithKline instituted a new policy prohibiting doctors from using their own slides during presentations. Starting in 2010, all doctors giving speeches sponsored by GlaxoSmithKline must use slides presented by the pharmaceutical company in the order specified.

'We want to make sure that everything is correct,' said Mary Anne Rhyne, a spokeswoman for GlaxoSmithKline. 'The best way to do that is to have our team prepare the slide.'
Note that Dr Brandes above was paid mainly by GlaxoSmithKline, who presumably also provided all her slides and made sure that everything she said was "correct," at least in terms of what GlaxoSmithKline thought was correct.

And one more example per MyFoxAtlanta[7]:
Some of Georgia's highest paid physicians? .... and Roswell psychiatrist Dr. Michael Banov: over $68,000, also from Lilly.
Dr Banov asserted:
We don't sell medications. We simply educate physicians about data, and they make their own mind up.
However,
Banov says, the drug company - not him - creates the materials used in his speeches, and he says there's a reason for that.

'We are only able to present the data. We're not able to present our personal opinions. Our personal preferences, how we use the medication off label. any of that. So we're held to a very tight standard by the FDA,' said Banov.
Drug companies may say they make their paid physician speakers use slides provided by the company to prevent them from talking about "off-label" uses.  However, there is no reason for a physician-educator not to talk about "off-label" uses, and physicians can prescribe any legal drug for whatever purpose they see fit, whether or not the drug is on or "off label." 

But drug companies are prohibited by law from promoting off-label uses.  Requiring physicians to use drug companies' slides and preventing them from talking about "off-label" uses demonstrates that the physicians are functioning as marketers, not educators. 

Summary

As local reporters look into more cases, it becomes increasingly clear that up to now, pharmaceutical companies have been none too fussy about which physicians they pay to speak about their products. It is self-serving, but inaccurate for both sets of parties to assert that the companies choose only the "best and the brightest." 

Furthermore, it has now become glaringly obvious that the purpose of "drug talks" is, well, to sell drugs.  Some physicians paid by drug companies to speak may bluster about their independence, but if they are using company provided slides, who can deny they are influenced  by the company.  Furthermore, when companies insist not merely on providing slides, but on ensuring that "everything is correct," then it is clear that it is the companies' talks that the physicians are giving.  Physicians giving company talks cannot be speaking independently, and hence must be regarded as company sales personnel, whose disguises as independent doctors or medical academics are now in tatters.

Doctors who still choose to go to "drug talks" should have no illusions that they are being exposed to anything other than marketing.  Thus, I urge my colleagues to forgo the nice meals and the company prepared "correct" slides, and spend the time trying to more critically assess the clinical evidence. 

References


1.  Ornstein C, Weber T. In Minnesota, drug company reports of payments to doctors arrive riddled with mistakes.  ProPublica, Dec 10, 2010.  Link here.
2. Hunter J. Rochester psychiatrist, sanctioned for incompetence, made $144K from drug companies. Elmira Star-Gazette, Dec 4, 2010.
3. Hunter J. Despite sanctions, physicians hired as drug company pitchmen. PressConnects.com, Dec 4, 2010. Link here.
4. Stahl B. Duluth doctor denies payments from drug companies sway decisions.  Duluth News Tribune, Dec 20, 2010.  Link here.
5. Ward G. They say they prescribe based on patients, not Big Pharma. Tennessean, Dec 19, 2010. Link here.
6. Pope ML. Conflict of interest? - Alexandria doctors receive thousands of dollars from Big Pharma.  Alexandia Gazette Packet, Jan 13, 2010.  Link here.
7. Galvin B. Health watch: doctors and drug companies. MyFoxAtlanta, Dec 29, 2010. Link here.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

There You Go Again: Richard Epstein Says "Conflict-of-Interest Rules Thwart Medical Progress"

Richard Epstein, a professor at the New York University and University of Chicago law schools, just authored a report on the perils of conflict of interest rules.  In his blog, "The Libertarian," he summarized his beliefs that strict conflict of interest (COI) rules and restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing "spell lower rates of innovation and slower dissemination of new products." 

Prof Epstein is extremely prominent.  The Manhattan Institute, of which he is a fellow, claimed, "Professor Epstein's influence is profound: he is one of the three most cited law professors in the United States and the most cited professor writing largely in private law." Thus, it is disturbing that it appears that his objections are based on a series of logical fallacies.  (Note that we critiqued a defense of certain conflicts of interest he made in 2007 here on similar grounds.)

Ad Hominem: Enemies of Capitalism

Prof Epstein implied that the people who advocate strong conflict of interest rules are enemies of capitalism and free markets.  For example, he wrote, "most of the modern critics of the drug and medical device industries start with the assumption that the profit-motive alone is sufficient to distort the behavior of all scientists and researchers."  Later, "the people who line up most strongly against drug and device companies often treat the phrase 'market forces' as though it embodies the worst things in life."  How he was able to read the minds of those who disagree with him is unclear.  Attacking proponents of strict COI regulation as anti-capitalists (and by implication, socialists or communists) appears to be an ad hominem fallacy.

Burden of Proof: Ignoring Evidence of Harms of COI, Asserting Evidence of Benefits

Prof Epstein argued that COIs rarely if ever leads to bad effects: "the number of instances of serious abuses of power in the drug and device industry, like in medical research itself, is small, relative to the huge number of interactions that have taken place." Thus, he ignored evidence that commercially funded research may be biased in favor of the sponsors' products.(1-4) On the other hand, he implied that financial relationships  among physicians and researchers and commercial firms that sell health care products and services are necessary for "rapid development and deployment of new pharmaceuticals and medical devices," and for "innovation" in the field, but provided no evidence for these points.  Thus, while ignoring evidence of the possible harms of COIs, he failed to provide evidence for their benefits.  By placing the burden of proof on those who disagree with him, while avoiding it himself, he invoked the burden of proof (or appeal to ignorance) fallacy.

Appeal to Common Practice: Scientists Wearing Multiple Hats

Prof Epstein asserted that strict COI rules would disturb what is now common practice.  They would threaten how "the best research scientists in universities ... wear multiple hats.  In addition to researching within the academy, they also offer consulting services to drug companies, or start businesses of  their own."  Academics may currently behave in this way, but that does not mean this behavior is optimal in any sense.  Thus, Epstein employed the fallacy of the appeal to common practice. 

Slippery Slope: Silencing Communication and Collaboration

Prof Epstein asserted that strict rules on COI would "prohibit the collaborative efforts that have long characterized standard practices [in research]."  Specifically, he asserted the rules could stipulate that "no scientist who sits on any Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) review committee, or any hospital conflict of interest committee, should be allowed to have connections with the pharmaceutical industry."  Also, "collaborations between government and industry scientists on research projects of common interests should either be totally eliminated or heavily regulated."  Finally, he asserted, "free interchange of information within and across firm boundaries is best calculated to allow the sharing and coordination of vital information," but "strong conflict of interest regulation poses real threats to these dynamic interactions."

Yet rules about conflicts of interest generally refer to those generated by financial relationships, most often payments by commercial firms to academics, researchers or physicians.  Payments are not necessary for collaboration.  Researchers can communicate, share information, even work together without one party paying the other.  Warning of such dire consequences of regulations that have nothing directly to do with communication or collaboration amount to the slippery slope fallacy.

Appeal to Authority: the "Most Gifted Members of the Academy"


Prof Epstein noted above that it was the best researchers who consult for commercial firms or start their own firms.  Later, he stated, "the ablest scientists often have the most extensive outside practices."  In complaining about rules that limit the pay of faculty members for services on boards of directors of for-profit health care companies, he asked, "why crimp the behavior of the most gifted members of the academy who can also make major contributions to industry?"  Thus he seemed to agree with the arguments made by representatives of pharmaceutical and device companies that the doctors who they pay to speak, consult, or do research are the best and the brightest.  However, there is considerable evidence (e.g., see posts here and here), that such "key opinion leaders" or "thought leaders" are chosen because of their sympathy to the companies and their products, and their malleability.  In addition, there is evidence that medical schools now put more emphasis on ability to attract external funding than any other faculty characteristic in decisions about payment, promotion, and retention (see post here).  Prof Epstein's invocation of the need to honor the best and the brightest appears to be a variant on the appeal to authority fallacy. 

Summary

So here we have another example, by " one of the nation's most prolific legal thinkers, (according to the Manhattan Institute) of a defense of the prevalent conflicts of interest that affect academic physicians and clinical researchers.  Like many previous such defenses, it seemed to be mainly based on logical fallacies. 

Also, like many previous such defenses, it was made by someone with a history of his own financial relationships with health care corporations.  To his credit, Prof Epstein did disclose, "over the years, I have worked extensively with various groups in the pharmaceutical industry, but have done no such work in the past few years."  On the other hand, he did not disclose his previous relationships with eSapience, a company which once claimed it "shapes the debate on issues that intersect law, economics, and policy."  (See post here.)

The currently prevalent relationships with health care corporations among academic physicians, researchers, and other decision makers and influencers in health care have been lucrative for them.  I have yet to see a coherent, logical argument that these relationships are good for patients, medical education, biomedical or clinical science, or public health made by anyone who does not have such relationships.

By the way, Prof Epstein also complained about overly rigorous regulation of pharmaceutical marketing in the same blog post, but since this really seems to be a distinct topic, I will not discuss his arguments here. 

References

1.  Bekelman JE et al. Scope and impact of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research: a systematic review.  JAMA 2003; 289: 454-465.  Link here.
2.  Lexchin J et al.  Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: systematic review.  Brit Med J 2003; 326:  1167.  Link here.
3.  Jorgenson AW et al. Cochrane reviews compared with industry supported meta-analyses and other meta-analyses of the same drugs: systematic review. Brit Med J 2006; 333: 782.  Link here.
4.  McGauran N et al. Reporting bias in medical research - a narrative review.  Trials 2010; 11: 37.  Link here. 

There You Go Again: Richard Epstein Says "Conflict-of-Interest Rules Thwart Medical Progress"

Richard Epstein, a professor at the New York University and University of Chicago law schools, just authored a report on the perils of conflict of interest rules.  In his blog, "The Libertarian," he summarized his beliefs that strict conflict of interest (COI) rules and restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing "spell lower rates of innovation and slower dissemination of new products." 

Prof Epstein is extremely prominent.  The Manhattan Institute, of which he is a fellow, claimed, "Professor Epstein's influence is profound: he is one of the three most cited law professors in the United States and the most cited professor writing largely in private law." Thus, it is disturbing that it appears that his objections are based on a series of logical fallacies.  (Note that we critiqued a defense of certain conflicts of interest he made in 2007 here on similar grounds.)

Ad Hominem: Enemies of Capitalism

Prof Epstein implied that the people who advocate strong conflict of interest rules are enemies of capitalism and free markets.  For example, he wrote, "most of the modern critics of the drug and medical device industries start with the assumption that the profit-motive alone is sufficient to distort the behavior of all scientists and researchers."  Later, "the people who line up most strongly against drug and device companies often treat the phrase 'market forces' as though it embodies the worst things in life."  How he was able to read the minds of those who disagree with him is unclear.  Attacking proponents of strict COI regulation as anti-capitalists (and by implication, socialists or communists) appears to be an ad hominem fallacy.

Burden of Proof: Ignoring Evidence of Harms of COI, Asserting Evidence of Benefits

Prof Epstein argued that COIs rarely if ever leads to bad effects: "the number of instances of serious abuses of power in the drug and device industry, like in medical research itself, is small, relative to the huge number of interactions that have taken place." Thus, he ignored evidence that commercially funded research may be biased in favor of the sponsors' products.(1-4) On the other hand, he implied that financial relationships  among physicians and researchers and commercial firms that sell health care products and services are necessary for "rapid development and deployment of new pharmaceuticals and medical devices," and for "innovation" in the field, but provided no evidence for these points.  Thus, while ignoring evidence of the possible harms of COIs, he failed to provide evidence for their benefits.  By placing the burden of proof on those who disagree with him, while avoiding it himself, he invoked the burden of proof (or appeal to ignorance) fallacy.

Appeal to Common Practice: Scientists Wearing Multiple Hats

Prof Epstein asserted that strict COI rules would disturb what is now common practice.  They would threaten how "the best research scientists in universities ... wear multiple hats.  In addition to researching within the academy, they also offer consulting services to drug companies, or start businesses of  their own."  Academics may currently behave in this way, but that does not mean this behavior is optimal in any sense.  Thus, Epstein employed the fallacy of the appeal to common practice. 

Slippery Slope: Silencing Communication and Collaboration

Prof Epstein asserted that strict rules on COI would "prohibit the collaborative efforts that have long characterized standard practices [in research]."  Specifically, he asserted the rules could stipulate that "no scientist who sits on any Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) review committee, or any hospital conflict of interest committee, should be allowed to have connections with the pharmaceutical industry."  Also, "collaborations between government and industry scientists on research projects of common interests should either be totally eliminated or heavily regulated."  Finally, he asserted, "free interchange of information within and across firm boundaries is best calculated to allow the sharing and coordination of vital information," but "strong conflict of interest regulation poses real threats to these dynamic interactions."

Yet rules about conflicts of interest generally refer to those generated by financial relationships, most often payments by commercial firms to academics, researchers or physicians.  Payments are not necessary for collaboration.  Researchers can communicate, share information, even work together without one party paying the other.  Warning of such dire consequences of regulations that have nothing directly to do with communication or collaboration amount to the slippery slope fallacy.

Appeal to Authority: the "Most Gifted Members of the Academy"


Prof Epstein noted above that it was the best researchers who consult for commercial firms or start their own firms.  Later, he stated, "the ablest scientists often have the most extensive outside practices."  In complaining about rules that limit the pay of faculty members for services on boards of directors of for-profit health care companies, he asked, "why crimp the behavior of the most gifted members of the academy who can also make major contributions to industry?"  Thus he seemed to agree with the arguments made by representatives of pharmaceutical and device companies that the doctors who they pay to speak, consult, or do research are the best and the brightest.  However, there is considerable evidence (e.g., see posts here and here), that such "key opinion leaders" or "thought leaders" are chosen because of their sympathy to the companies and their products, and their malleability.  In addition, there is evidence that medical schools now put more emphasis on ability to attract external funding than any other faculty characteristic in decisions about payment, promotion, and retention (see post here).  Prof Epstein's invocation of the need to honor the best and the brightest appears to be a variant on the appeal to authority fallacy. 

Summary

So here we have another example, by " one of the nation's most prolific legal thinkers, (according to the Manhattan Institute) of a defense of the prevalent conflicts of interest that affect academic physicians and clinical researchers.  Like many previous such defenses, it seemed to be mainly based on logical fallacies. 

Also, like many previous such defenses, it was made by someone with a history of his own financial relationships with health care corporations.  To his credit, Prof Epstein did disclose, "over the years, I have worked extensively with various groups in the pharmaceutical industry, but have done no such work in the past few years."  On the other hand, he did not disclose his previous relationships with eSapience, a company which once claimed it "shapes the debate on issues that intersect law, economics, and policy."  (See post here.)

The currently prevalent relationships with health care corporations among academic physicians, researchers, and other decision makers and influencers in health care have been lucrative for them.  I have yet to see a coherent, logical argument that these relationships are good for patients, medical education, biomedical or clinical science, or public health made by anyone who does not have such relationships.

By the way, Prof Epstein also complained about overly rigorous regulation of pharmaceutical marketing in the same blog post, but since this really seems to be a distinct topic, I will not discuss his arguments here. 

References

1.  Bekelman JE et al. Scope and impact of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research: a systematic review.  JAMA 2003; 289: 454-465.  Link here.
2.  Lexchin J et al.  Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: systematic review.  Brit Med J 2003; 326:  1167.  Link here.
3.  Jorgenson AW et al. Cochrane reviews compared with industry supported meta-analyses and other meta-analyses of the same drugs: systematic review. Brit Med J 2006; 333: 782.  Link here.
4.  McGauran N et al. Reporting bias in medical research - a narrative review.  Trials 2010; 11: 37.  Link here. 

Friday, October 8, 2010

Another Wheel Already Invented (in 1988) - the WHO Ethical Criteria for Medicinal Drug Promotion

At the 2010 Gezonde Scepsis (Healthy Skepticism) "Selling Sickness" conference, I was made aware of another wheel invented a long time ago, the 1988 WHO Ethical Criteria for Medicinal Drug Promotion, a document about which few now seem to be aware.  Were this code to have been widely followed, it might have prevented some of the problems afflicting the pharmaceutical industry today.

Some relevant quotes follow:

Drug Promotion

6. In this context, 'promotion' refers to all informational and persuasive activities by manufacturers and distributors, the effect of which is to induce the prescription, supply, purchase and/or use of medicinal drugs.

7. Active promotion within a country should take place only with respect to drugs legally available in the country. Promotion should be in keeping with national health policies and in compliance with national regulations, as well as with voluntary standards where they exist. All promotion-making claims concerning medicinal drugs should be reliable, accurate, truthful, informative, balanced, up-to-date, capable of substantiation and in good taste. They should not contain misleading or unverifiable statements or omissions likely to induce medically unjustifiable drug use or to give rise to undue risks. The word 'safe' should only be used if properly qualified. Comparison of products should be factual, fair and capable of substantiation. Promotional material should not be designed so as to disguise its real nature.

8. Scientific data in the public domain should be made available to prescribers and any other person entitled to receive it, on request, as appropriate to their requirements. Promotion in the form of financial or material benefits should not be offered to or sought by health care practitioners to influence them in the prescription of drugs.

9. Scientific and educational activities should not be deliberately used for promotional purposes.

Note that these provisions would seem to prohibit promotional efforts begun before a drug is legally approved (e.g., ghost-writing as in this case), the use of "key opinion leaders" without full disclosure of their role as marketers of drugs, suppression of clinical research sponsored by pharmaceutical companies whose results did not support these companies' marketing interests, e.g. studies which failed to show efficacy of their products, nearly all kinds of payments to physicians, and nearly all pharmaceutical sponsored continuing medical education.

Medical Representatives

17. Medical representatives should have an appropriate educational background. They should be adequately trained. They should possess sufficient medical and technical knowledge and integrity to present information on products and carry out other promotional activities in an accurate and responsible manner. Employers are responsible for the basic and continuing training of their representatives. Such training should include instruction regarding appropriate ethical conduct taking into consideration the WHO criteria. In this context, exposure of medical representatives and trainees to feed-back from the medical and allied professions and from independent members of the public, particularly regarding risks, can be salutary.

18. Medical representatives should make available to prescribers and dispensers complete and unbiased information for each product discussed, such as an approved scientific data sheet or other source of information with similar content.

19. Employers should be responsible for the statements and activities of their medical representatives. Medical representatives should not offer inducements to prescribers and dispensers. Prescribers and dispensers should not solicit such inducements. In order to avoid over-promotion, the main part of the remuneration of medical representatives should not be directly related to the volume of sales they generate.

Note that these provisions appear to prohibit the current cheer leader/ ex-athlete model of the drug representative, and to prohibit many of the current activities of such representative, including providing gifts, meals, travel to meetings, honoraria, etc  (e.g., see posts here and here).

If only these standards had gotten some traction, think of the trouble that could have been averted.  On the other hand, it is obvious that such traction would have threatened some peoples' lucrative incomes and power, who may have worked hard to make sure it did not happen.

Another Wheel Already Invented (in 1988) - the WHO Ethical Criteria for Medicinal Drug Promotion

At the 2010 Gezonde Scepsis (Healthy Skepticism) "Selling Sickness" conference, I was made aware of another wheel invented a long time ago, the 1988 WHO Ethical Criteria for Medicinal Drug Promotion, a document about which few now seem to be aware.  Were this code to have been widely followed, it might have prevented some of the problems afflicting the pharmaceutical industry today.

Some relevant quotes follow:

Drug Promotion

6. In this context, 'promotion' refers to all informational and persuasive activities by manufacturers and distributors, the effect of which is to induce the prescription, supply, purchase and/or use of medicinal drugs.

7. Active promotion within a country should take place only with respect to drugs legally available in the country. Promotion should be in keeping with national health policies and in compliance with national regulations, as well as with voluntary standards where they exist. All promotion-making claims concerning medicinal drugs should be reliable, accurate, truthful, informative, balanced, up-to-date, capable of substantiation and in good taste. They should not contain misleading or unverifiable statements or omissions likely to induce medically unjustifiable drug use or to give rise to undue risks. The word 'safe' should only be used if properly qualified. Comparison of products should be factual, fair and capable of substantiation. Promotional material should not be designed so as to disguise its real nature.

8. Scientific data in the public domain should be made available to prescribers and any other person entitled to receive it, on request, as appropriate to their requirements. Promotion in the form of financial or material benefits should not be offered to or sought by health care practitioners to influence them in the prescription of drugs.

9. Scientific and educational activities should not be deliberately used for promotional purposes.

Note that these provisions would seem to prohibit promotional efforts begun before a drug is legally approved (e.g., ghost-writing as in this case), the use of "key opinion leaders" without full disclosure of their role as marketers of drugs, suppression of clinical research sponsored by pharmaceutical companies whose results did not support these companies' marketing interests, e.g. studies which failed to show efficacy of their products, nearly all kinds of payments to physicians, and nearly all pharmaceutical sponsored continuing medical education.

Medical Representatives

17. Medical representatives should have an appropriate educational background. They should be adequately trained. They should possess sufficient medical and technical knowledge and integrity to present information on products and carry out other promotional activities in an accurate and responsible manner. Employers are responsible for the basic and continuing training of their representatives. Such training should include instruction regarding appropriate ethical conduct taking into consideration the WHO criteria. In this context, exposure of medical representatives and trainees to feed-back from the medical and allied professions and from independent members of the public, particularly regarding risks, can be salutary.

18. Medical representatives should make available to prescribers and dispensers complete and unbiased information for each product discussed, such as an approved scientific data sheet or other source of information with similar content.

19. Employers should be responsible for the statements and activities of their medical representatives. Medical representatives should not offer inducements to prescribers and dispensers. Prescribers and dispensers should not solicit such inducements. In order to avoid over-promotion, the main part of the remuneration of medical representatives should not be directly related to the volume of sales they generate.

Note that these provisions appear to prohibit the current cheer leader/ ex-athlete model of the drug representative, and to prohibit many of the current activities of such representative, including providing gifts, meals, travel to meetings, honoraria, etc  (e.g., see posts here and here).

If only these standards had gotten some traction, think of the trouble that could have been averted.  On the other hand, it is obvious that such traction would have threatened some peoples' lucrative incomes and power, who may have worked hard to make sure it did not happen.

Wednesday, September 29, 2010

That Wheel Was Already Invented: the UN Special Rapporteur's Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies

For five years now, we have been writing about concentration and abuse of power in health care, and on specific tactics used predominantly by large health care organizations that threaten the values that physicians and other health care professionals once swore to uphold.

Pharmaceutical companies may not have been the worst offenders when it came to threatening these values, but they have not been laggards.  Specific issues we have discussed included (in a peculiar order that I will explain in a minute): failure of the companies' boards of directors to be accountable for misbehavior by its management, sometimes associated with conflicts of interest affecting these board members (e.g., this recent case); outright crime and corruption (e.g., this case); use of key opinion leaders paid by the company to market products cloaked in the mantle of academia; payments made by the companies to patient advocacy groups (e.g., this one), medical societies, and academic institutions that induce institutional conflicts of interest, and enlist these well-reputed organizations as stealth marketers; ridiculously high prices charged for particular medicines, often to particularly vulnerable patients (e.g., this case); suppression and manipulation of clinical research evaluating the companies' products; and deceptive drug marketing practices.

Many other bloggers have written about these issues.  Some of them have been widely taken up in the mainstream media.  A few have even made it into the medical and health care literature. 

But those of us who bring them up have been attacked as a tiny group of pharmascolds (e.g., here), who get in the way of the needed innovation and scientific advances that the pharmaceutical industry generously brings to the public.  Despite such attacks, it may be that our concerns are somewhat more universal, although those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo might not want that publicized too much.

A new issue of PLoS Medicine included several articles on drug companies' responsibilities for human rights.  One was by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to the highest attainable standard of health.  I, and I suspect most of even our Health Care Renewal readers were not familiar with that office.  I also confess to being unaware that he had published a report to the UN General Assembly entitled Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines, which included 47 specific guidelines. 

Amazingly enough, it turns out that some of these guidelines seemed to directly address the issues raised above, to wit:

Board of Directors' Accountability
11. The company should have a governance system that includes direct board level responsibility and accountability for its access to medicines policy.

Anti-Corruption
15. A company should publicly adopt effective anti-corruption policies and measures, and comply with relevant national law implementing the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Disclosure of Financial Support
18. The company should annually disclose its financial and other support to key opinion leaders, patient associations, political parties and candidates, trade associations, academic departments, research centres and others, through which it seeks to influence public policy and national, regional and international law and practice. The disclosure should extend to amounts, beneficiaries and channels by which the support is provided.

19. When providing any financial or other support, the company should require all recipients to publicly disclose such support on all appropriate occasions.

Drug Pricing
33. When formulating and implementing its access to medicines policy, the company should consider all the arrangements at its disposal with a view to ensuring that its medicines are affordable to as many people as possible. In keeping with Guideline 5, the company should give particular attention to ensuring its medicines are accessible to disadvantaged individuals, communities and populations, including those living in poverty and the very poorest in all markets. The arrangements should include, for example, differential pricing between countries, differential pricing within countries, commercial voluntary licences, not-for-profit voluntary licences, donation programmes, and public private partnerships.

34. The arrangements should take into account a country’s stage of economic development, as well as the differential purchasing power of populations within a country. The same medicine, for example, may be priced and packaged differently for the private and public sectors within the same country.

35. The arrangements should extend to all medicines manufactured by the company, including those for non-communicable conditions, such as heart disease and diabetes.

Suppression and Manipulation of Clinical Research
39. The company should take effective measures to ensure that all information bearing upon the safety, efficacy and possible side effects of a medicine are easily accessible to individuals so they can make informed decisions about its possible use.

Deceptive Drug Marketing
41. The company should publicly disclose its promotional and marketing policies and activities, including costs.

Needless to say, I can see no evidence that any big pharmaceutical companies are trying to adhere to any of these guidelines.  Somehow I suspect that those who are supporting the vested interests of big pharmaceutical corporations may not all have that much respect for the United Nations.  However, I think that the Special Rapporteur's guidelines lend more credibility to the argument that we need better leadership of health care organizations, and specifically that such organizations should follow clear ethical precepts, and their leadership should be held accountable when they do not.

So the next time someone calls you a "pharmascold," you can say, "yeah, yeah, so is the UN Special Rapporteur."

That Wheel Was Already Invented: the UN Special Rapporteur's Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies

For five years now, we have been writing about concentration and abuse of power in health care, and on specific tactics used predominantly by large health care organizations that threaten the values that physicians and other health care professionals once swore to uphold.

Pharmaceutical companies may not have been the worst offenders when it came to threatening these values, but they have not been laggards.  Specific issues we have discussed included (in a peculiar order that I will explain in a minute): failure of the companies' boards of directors to be accountable for misbehavior by its management, sometimes associated with conflicts of interest affecting these board members (e.g., this recent case); outright crime and corruption (e.g., this case); use of key opinion leaders paid by the company to market products cloaked in the mantle of academia; payments made by the companies to patient advocacy groups (e.g., this one), medical societies, and academic institutions that induce institutional conflicts of interest, and enlist these well-reputed organizations as stealth marketers; ridiculously high prices charged for particular medicines, often to particularly vulnerable patients (e.g., this case); suppression and manipulation of clinical research evaluating the companies' products; and deceptive drug marketing practices.

Many other bloggers have written about these issues.  Some of them have been widely taken up in the mainstream media.  A few have even made it into the medical and health care literature. 

But those of us who bring them up have been attacked as a tiny group of pharmascolds (e.g., here), who get in the way of the needed innovation and scientific advances that the pharmaceutical industry generously brings to the public.  Despite such attacks, it may be that our concerns are somewhat more universal, although those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo might not want that publicized too much.

A new issue of PLoS Medicine included several articles on drug companies' responsibilities for human rights.  One was by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to the highest attainable standard of health.  I, and I suspect most of even our Health Care Renewal readers were not familiar with that office.  I also confess to being unaware that he had published a report to the UN General Assembly entitled Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines, which included 47 specific guidelines. 

Amazingly enough, it turns out that some of these guidelines seemed to directly address the issues raised above, to wit:

Board of Directors' Accountability
11. The company should have a governance system that includes direct board level responsibility and accountability for its access to medicines policy.

Anti-Corruption
15. A company should publicly adopt effective anti-corruption policies and measures, and comply with relevant national law implementing the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Disclosure of Financial Support
18. The company should annually disclose its financial and other support to key opinion leaders, patient associations, political parties and candidates, trade associations, academic departments, research centres and others, through which it seeks to influence public policy and national, regional and international law and practice. The disclosure should extend to amounts, beneficiaries and channels by which the support is provided.

19. When providing any financial or other support, the company should require all recipients to publicly disclose such support on all appropriate occasions.

Drug Pricing
33. When formulating and implementing its access to medicines policy, the company should consider all the arrangements at its disposal with a view to ensuring that its medicines are affordable to as many people as possible. In keeping with Guideline 5, the company should give particular attention to ensuring its medicines are accessible to disadvantaged individuals, communities and populations, including those living in poverty and the very poorest in all markets. The arrangements should include, for example, differential pricing between countries, differential pricing within countries, commercial voluntary licences, not-for-profit voluntary licences, donation programmes, and public private partnerships.

34. The arrangements should take into account a country’s stage of economic development, as well as the differential purchasing power of populations within a country. The same medicine, for example, may be priced and packaged differently for the private and public sectors within the same country.

35. The arrangements should extend to all medicines manufactured by the company, including those for non-communicable conditions, such as heart disease and diabetes.

Suppression and Manipulation of Clinical Research
39. The company should take effective measures to ensure that all information bearing upon the safety, efficacy and possible side effects of a medicine are easily accessible to individuals so they can make informed decisions about its possible use.

Deceptive Drug Marketing
41. The company should publicly disclose its promotional and marketing policies and activities, including costs.

Needless to say, I can see no evidence that any big pharmaceutical companies are trying to adhere to any of these guidelines.  Somehow I suspect that those who are supporting the vested interests of big pharmaceutical corporations may not all have that much respect for the United Nations.  However, I think that the Special Rapporteur's guidelines lend more credibility to the argument that we need better leadership of health care organizations, and specifically that such organizations should follow clear ethical precepts, and their leadership should be held accountable when they do not.

So the next time someone calls you a "pharmascold," you can say, "yeah, yeah, so is the UN Special Rapporteur."

Monday, August 30, 2010

"Trouble Coming Every Day" as Discussed by our Fellow Health Care Skeptics

With apologies to the late Frank Zappa... even though we are going through the dog days of summer, the parade of health care troubles in the news is never ending, so I thought I would recap some of the more interesting issues discussed by some of my fellow health care skeptic bloggers.

We have discussed the ongoing decline of primary care. On DB's Medical Rants, Dr Robert Centor takes on the topic: "The system has, without consciously meaning to, held primary care in contempt." The result is a "quiet rebellion: of primary doctors.

We have discussed whether the currently fashionable idea of "accountable care organizations" (ACOs) might turn out to be a cover for health care oligopolies. See what Paul Levy, CEO of the Beth Israel/ Deaconess Medical Center said about them in his blog, Running a Hospital.

We frequently talk about the manipulation or suppression of clinical research studies by those with vested interests in the results pointing in a particular direction. On the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog, Dr Howard Brody wondered why the FDA will not even reveal the identities of the clinical researchers who did the studies on which it based its decision to approve the Infuse bone growth enhancement device.

Prof Carl Elliott has done an outstanding job investigating commercially funded and implemented clinical research. Dr Brody reviewed his new book, White Coat, Black Hat.  In the Carlat Psychiatry Blog, Dr Daniel Carlat reviewed Prof Elliott's new article in Mother Jones on how a pharmaceutical company sponsored drug trial went badly awry.

We asked whether the former CEO of a for-profit hospital chain who resigned after the company paid a > $1.7 billion penalty to settle charges of fraud would be a proper candidate to be governor of Florida. After Rick Scott won the Florida Republican primary, Maggie Maher, writing in the Health Beat blog, took on Scott's dubious past as prologue to a worrisome future.

Well I'm about to get sick
From watchin' my TV
Been checkin' out the news
Until my eyeballs fail to see
I mean to say that every day
Is just another rotten mess
And when it's gonna change, my friend
Is anybody's guess

So I'm watchin' and I'm waitin'
Hopin' for the best
Even think I'll go to prayin'
Every time I hear 'em sayin'
That there's no way to delay
That trouble comin' every day
No way to delay
That trouble comin' every day
- Frank Zappa