After Manufacturing Problems, Genzyme CEO's Golden Parachute Means "Failure = Success"

In late 2009, I posted about problems at a Genzyme plant that manufactured some fabulously expensive drugs, e.g. Cerezyme whose cost to patients approximated $160,000 a year. We thought then that for a drug costing that much, the company ought to have figured out a conservative process to provide pure and unadulterated product. In a later post I asked why a company that could afford to make its CEO very rich could not afford to adequately maintain its manufacturing facilities. In May, 2010, I posted about a legal settlement of charges related to its manufacturing problems requiring Genzyme to pay a $175 million fine and function under US government supervision.  And in August, 2010, I posted about how this series of management missteps could lead to the company's CEO becoming even richer because they lead to a declining stock price, which increased the likely that the company would be bought out, which could trigger the CEO's golden parachute.  I suggested then that were this to happen, it would be a gross example of how massively perverse incentives stupendously reward the top brass of health care organizations for mediocre, or worse leadership and bad results for both patients/ clients/ customers and stock-holders alike.

Now it  looks like this will happen.  Yesterday, the Boston Globe reported:

Ggenzyme Corp., the largest biotechnology company in Massachusetts and one of the industry’s historic pioneers, has struck a definitive agreement to be bought by French pharmaceutical giant Sanofi-Aventis SA, in a deal valued at about $20.1 billion.

As a result of this deal,

Genzyme’s high-profile president and chief executive, Henri A. Termeer, who has run the company for 28 years, will resign following the close of the transaction. But he will advise Sanofi on integrating the two companies. Termeer built the company into a global operation with 10,000 employees worldwide and a business model that has been the envy of the biotechnology industry. He turns 65 on Feb. 28.

Termeer, though fiercely proud of Genzyme’s independence, stands to make more than $23 million when the sale is completed, according to a 'change of control' clause in his employment contract. In addition, as a major Genzyme shareholder, he would be in a position to cash out shares that last year were worth more than $275 million.

That and several other articles s noted that it was Genzyme's manufacturing problems that lead to the buy-out:

the string of events that made Genzyme vulnerable to a takeover began in the summer of 2009 when workers discovered viral contamination at Genzyme’s Allston Landing plant overlooking the Charles River.

Genzyme was forced to temporarily shut down and clean up the plant and ration shipments of its best-selling Cerezyme and Fabrazyme drugs, both of which treat enzyme deficiencies. The events created an opening for competitors such as Shire and Israel’s Protalix Biotherapeutics and sent Genzyme’s stock tumbling on the Nasdaq.

The dip in Genzyme’s share price drew activist investors, including Carl C. Icahn of New York and Ralph Whitworth of San Diego, who accumulated shares they hoped to sell at a rich premium. They pressured management to take steps to boost shareholder value, including a stock buyout and the elimination of 1,000 jobs worldwide.

Ultimately, the company gave Whitworth a seat on its board, and, after Icahn threatened to unseat Genzyme directors in a proxy battle, it granted two seats to his associates.

In many ways, industry watchers said, an acquisition became inevitable once Genzyme stumbled at its Allston plant.

A Bloomberg article noted that this sequence of events would lead to

The departure package [which] makes him 'one of the biggest all- time winners in biotech,' said [University of Michigan business professor Erik] Gordon, who has studied the pharmaceutical industry for three decades.

Our criticism of the Genzyme CEO's potential for reaping hugely perverse incentives was paralleled by Jim Edwards' critique of what actually happened:

Here’s how crazy CEO incentive compensation is: Genzyme (GENZ) CEO Henri Termeer walked away from his company with a payout that may be worth $300 million yesterday when Sanofi-Aventis (SNY) acquired his company. But the only reason Genzyme was acquired — triggering Termeer’s gargantuan change-of-control package — is because Termeer nearly ran his company into the ground, making his stock cheap enough for Sanofi to buy.

In other words, failure = success when it comes to change-of-control packages for CEOs.

So let me just repeat my conclusion from last August: As long as being a health care CEO is effectively a license to loot the company, is it any wonder that health care organizations continue to be badly lead, and health care costs soar while quality and access suffer?

Once more with feeling: real health care reform would require us to make health care executives truly accountable for their actions, and penalize them for those that are ill-informed, contemptuous of health care values, self-interested, or corrupt.

After Manufacturing Problems, Genzyme CEO's Golden Parachute Means "Failure = Success"

In late 2009, I posted about problems at a Genzyme plant that manufactured some fabulously expensive drugs, e.g. Cerezyme whose cost to patients approximated $160,000 a year. We thought then that for a drug costing that much, the company ought to have figured out a conservative process to provide pure and unadulterated product. In a later post I asked why a company that could afford to make its CEO very rich could not afford to adequately maintain its manufacturing facilities. In May, 2010, I posted about a legal settlement of charges related to its manufacturing problems requiring Genzyme to pay a $175 million fine and function under US government supervision.  And in August, 2010, I posted about how this series of management missteps could lead to the company's CEO becoming even richer because they lead to a declining stock price, which increased the likely that the company would be bought out, which could trigger the CEO's golden parachute.  I suggested then that were this to happen, it would be a gross example of how massively perverse incentives stupendously reward the top brass of health care organizations for mediocre, or worse leadership and bad results for both patients/ clients/ customers and stock-holders alike.

Now it  looks like this will happen.  Yesterday, the Boston Globe reported:

Ggenzyme Corp., the largest biotechnology company in Massachusetts and one of the industry’s historic pioneers, has struck a definitive agreement to be bought by French pharmaceutical giant Sanofi-Aventis SA, in a deal valued at about $20.1 billion.

As a result of this deal,

Genzyme’s high-profile president and chief executive, Henri A. Termeer, who has run the company for 28 years, will resign following the close of the transaction. But he will advise Sanofi on integrating the two companies. Termeer built the company into a global operation with 10,000 employees worldwide and a business model that has been the envy of the biotechnology industry. He turns 65 on Feb. 28.

Termeer, though fiercely proud of Genzyme’s independence, stands to make more than $23 million when the sale is completed, according to a 'change of control' clause in his employment contract. In addition, as a major Genzyme shareholder, he would be in a position to cash out shares that last year were worth more than $275 million.

That and several other articles s noted that it was Genzyme's manufacturing problems that lead to the buy-out:

the string of events that made Genzyme vulnerable to a takeover began in the summer of 2009 when workers discovered viral contamination at Genzyme’s Allston Landing plant overlooking the Charles River.

Genzyme was forced to temporarily shut down and clean up the plant and ration shipments of its best-selling Cerezyme and Fabrazyme drugs, both of which treat enzyme deficiencies. The events created an opening for competitors such as Shire and Israel’s Protalix Biotherapeutics and sent Genzyme’s stock tumbling on the Nasdaq.

The dip in Genzyme’s share price drew activist investors, including Carl C. Icahn of New York and Ralph Whitworth of San Diego, who accumulated shares they hoped to sell at a rich premium. They pressured management to take steps to boost shareholder value, including a stock buyout and the elimination of 1,000 jobs worldwide.

Ultimately, the company gave Whitworth a seat on its board, and, after Icahn threatened to unseat Genzyme directors in a proxy battle, it granted two seats to his associates.

In many ways, industry watchers said, an acquisition became inevitable once Genzyme stumbled at its Allston plant.

A Bloomberg article noted that this sequence of events would lead to

The departure package [which] makes him 'one of the biggest all- time winners in biotech,' said [University of Michigan business professor Erik] Gordon, who has studied the pharmaceutical industry for three decades.

Our criticism of the Genzyme CEO's potential for reaping hugely perverse incentives was paralleled by Jim Edwards' critique of what actually happened:

Here’s how crazy CEO incentive compensation is: Genzyme (GENZ) CEO Henri Termeer walked away from his company with a payout that may be worth $300 million yesterday when Sanofi-Aventis (SNY) acquired his company. But the only reason Genzyme was acquired — triggering Termeer’s gargantuan change-of-control package — is because Termeer nearly ran his company into the ground, making his stock cheap enough for Sanofi to buy.

In other words, failure = success when it comes to change-of-control packages for CEOs.

So let me just repeat my conclusion from last August: As long as being a health care CEO is effectively a license to loot the company, is it any wonder that health care organizations continue to be badly lead, and health care costs soar while quality and access suffer?

Once more with feeling: real health care reform would require us to make health care executives truly accountable for their actions, and penalize them for those that are ill-informed, contemptuous of health care values, self-interested, or corrupt.

The Boards Who Ought to be Accountable for the Misbehavior of Health Care Corporations

I recently posted about the multiple conflicts of interest affecting a university health sciences leader.  While he was supposed to be running a medical school and an academic medical center, he was also responsible for the stewardship, as a board member, of three health major health care corporations, and a food and beverage corporation (whose products have bearing on nutrition and public health.)  .

This one case suggested how pervasive are conflicts of interest affecting the people at the top of health care leadership in the US, and also how such conflicts may be associated with problems for all the organizations involved.  The story originally came to my attention because students were demonstrating against the lavish compensation given the health sciences leader at a time of university cutbacks, suggesting that university leaders were paying more attention to their own enrichment than to the mission of the university.  At the same time, one of the corporations which he was stewarding (Genzyme) had to shut down a factory because the extremely expensive drug it was producing was found to be impure and adulterated, while its CEO continued to be compensated lavishly.  The other corporation (Medtronic) had to settle litigation accusing it of manufacturing defective products for hundreds of millions of dollars, while its CEO again continued to be compensated lavishly. 

So I thought it might be interesting to see who are the other stewards of these troubled corporations.  I consulted the official biographies of their board members from their 2010 proxy statements (Genzyme here, Medtronic here).  I looked for board members who also held leadership positions in other health care organizations whose interests may not be aligned with the two corporations of interest.  I also looked for those who held leadership positions in the discredited financial services corporation who helped usher in the global financial collapse.

The specifics of what I found follow.

Genzyme

Genzyme had 10 directors in 2010.  The following directors had relationships of interest:

-  Douglas A Berthiaume is "Chairman of the Children's Hospital (Boston) Trust Board, a member of the Children's Hospital board of trustees, and a Trustee of the University of Massachusetts Amherst Foundation."  Children's Hospital is a teaching hospital.  The University of Massachusetts includes a medical school. 
-  Robert J Bertolini "retired from Schering-Plough Corp following its merger with Merck & Co in November, 2009."  Schering-Plough was a large pharmaceutical company now combined with Merck to form an even larger company.
-  Gail K Boudreaux "has served since May 2008 as an Executive Vice President of United Health Group Incorporated."  Also, "she serves on the board of directors of America's Health Insurance Plans...."  UnitedHealth is one of the US' largest health insurance/ managed care corporations.  Incidentally,it has frequently misbehaved, as can be seen in this set of posts.  AHIP is the health insurance corporations' trade associations.
-  Robert J Carpenter "is Chairman of Hydra Biosciences Inc... He is also a trustee of the Immune Disease Institute, a non-profit institute affiliated with Children's Hospital in Boston...." 
-  Charles L Cooney "is a director of India-based Biocon Limited, a biotechnology healthcare company."
-  Victor J Dzau MD (discussed in the earlier post) is "Chancellor for Health Affairs and President and Chief Executive Officer of Duke University Health System...."  He "sits on the board of directors of Pepsico Inc, Anylam Inc, Medtronic Inc, and the Duke University Health System."
-  Senator Connie Mack III is "Chairman Emeritus of the parent board of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute...."  He also is director of "EXACT Sciences Corporation and Moody's Corp."  EXACT Sciences is a biotechnology company that develops diagnostic test technology.  Moody's Corp is a financial ratings agency whose lax ratings of financial derivatives, perhaps arising from conflicts of interest produced by payments from the producers of the derivatives, have been implicated as a major cause of the global financial collapse.
-  Richard E Syron was from "January 2004 to September 8, 2008 ... Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, commonly referred to as Freddie Mac...."    Freddie Mac as bailed out and taken over by the US government when he departed, or was forced out.  Freddie Mac, was a "government-sponsored enterprise," (GSE) one of another group of companies whose enthusiastic participation in securitizing dubious mortgages was implicated as a major cause of the global financial collapse.
- Henri A Termeer (CEO of Genzyme) is a "director of Massachusetts General Hospital, a board member of Partners HealthCare, and a member of the board of fellows of Harvard Medical School." 

So the box score for Genzyme's 10 directors: six have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (some such institutions are lead by more than one Genzyme director).  Seven have leadership positions in other drug, device or biotechnology corporations.  One have leadership positions in health insurance/ managed care corporations.  Two had or have leadership positions in discredited financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.

Medtronic

Medtronic had 11 directors in 2010.  The following directors had relationships of interest:

- Richard H Anderson "was Executive Vice President of UnitedHealth Group Incorporated."  As above, UnitedHealth is a health insurance/ managed care corporation.
- Victor J Dzau (see above) is "Chancellor for Health Affairs at Duke University and President and Chief Executive Officer of the Duke University Health System."  He is "a director of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals Inc, ... PepsiCo Inc, and Genzyme Corporation." (See discussion above.)
- James T Lenahan "served as President of Johnson & Johnson from 2002 until June 2004...."  He is "director of Telecris Biotherapeutics Inc, Alton Pharma Inc and Imacor Inc."  Johnson & Johnson is a large drug, device, and biotechnology company.  Telecris, and Alton Pharma are biotechnology pharmaceutical companies.  Imacor is a medical device company.
- Denise M O'Leary "is a director of Lucille Packard Children's Hospital and Stanford Hospitals and Clinics."  Also, "she was a member of the Stanford University Board of Trustees from 1996 through 2006, where she chaired the Committee of the Medical Center...."
-  Robert C Pozen is "an advisor to Gelesis Inc."  Gelesis is a biotechnology company.
-  Jack W Schuler "has been a director of Stericycle Inc since March 1990...."  He is a "director of Quidel Corporation and Elan Corporation plc...."    Stericycle company disposes of medical waste, including that produced by medical devices.  Quidel is a biotechnology and (medical diagnostic) device company.  Elan is an multinational biotechnology and pharmaceutical company.

So the box score for Genzyme's 11 directors is: Two have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (some such institutions are lead by more than one Genzyme director). Ten have leadership positions in other drug, device or biotechnology corporations. One has a leadership position in health insurance/ managed care corporations. None had or have leadership positions in discredited financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.

Summary

Just to summarize the sorts of conflicting interests these relationships suggest. 

Teaching hospitals and medical schools are supposed to provide unbiased teaching, including about issues relevant to drug and device corporations, such as choice of diagnostic strategies and treatments, and relevant health policy.  They are supposed to perform unbiased research, including research that evaluates drugs and devices.  They are supposed to provide the best possible patient care at a reasonable cost, which relates to choices of and prices paid for drugs and devices. 

Other drug, device, and biotechnology corporations may be producing, or developing products that compete with those of the index corporations.

Health insurance companies ostensibly try to control costs and improve quality in part by reducing excess utilization and bargaining down prices of drugs and devices. 

So this limited case study of the boards of directors, that is, the ostensible stewards of two health care corporations, selected because they have a common member who is the leader of a large medical school and academic medical center, and which both have histories of poor management or ethical missteps showed  - that the leadership of health care organizations is incredibly interrelated, interlocked, incestuous. 

This gave an example of how pervasive are the conflicts of interest that affect all kinds of health care organizations.  Companies that ought to be competing have interlocked directors.  Companies that ought to be negotiating at arms length have interlocked directors.  Not-for-profit academic medical institutions have leaders who are also directors of companies whose drugs their patients may take, whose devices their patients may receive, whose insurance their patients may buy, and whose products and services they may teach about and evaluate through clinical research and policy research. 

This also gives an example of how the failed culture of finance may be linked to the culture of medicine and health care.  Some of the stewards of health care organizations were also the stewards of financial services corporations whose reckless, if not arrogant, greedy and amoral leadership is widely believed to have caused the global financial collapse and our ongoing economic problems. 

Finally, this suggests how top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients. 

What is to be done?

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships.  A few bloggers cannot do it all.  Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders.  However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment.  Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. 

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.   

The Boards Who Ought to be Accountable for the Misbehavior of Health Care Corporations

I recently posted about the multiple conflicts of interest affecting a university health sciences leader.  While he was supposed to be running a medical school and an academic medical center, he was also responsible for the stewardship, as a board member, of three health major health care corporations, and a food and beverage corporation (whose products have bearing on nutrition and public health.)  .

This one case suggested how pervasive are conflicts of interest affecting the people at the top of health care leadership in the US, and also how such conflicts may be associated with problems for all the organizations involved.  The story originally came to my attention because students were demonstrating against the lavish compensation given the health sciences leader at a time of university cutbacks, suggesting that university leaders were paying more attention to their own enrichment than to the mission of the university.  At the same time, one of the corporations which he was stewarding (Genzyme) had to shut down a factory because the extremely expensive drug it was producing was found to be impure and adulterated, while its CEO continued to be compensated lavishly.  The other corporation (Medtronic) had to settle litigation accusing it of manufacturing defective products for hundreds of millions of dollars, while its CEO again continued to be compensated lavishly. 

So I thought it might be interesting to see who are the other stewards of these troubled corporations.  I consulted the official biographies of their board members from their 2010 proxy statements (Genzyme here, Medtronic here).  I looked for board members who also held leadership positions in other health care organizations whose interests may not be aligned with the two corporations of interest.  I also looked for those who held leadership positions in the discredited financial services corporation who helped usher in the global financial collapse.

The specifics of what I found follow.

Genzyme

Genzyme had 10 directors in 2010.  The following directors had relationships of interest:

-  Douglas A Berthiaume is "Chairman of the Children's Hospital (Boston) Trust Board, a member of the Children's Hospital board of trustees, and a Trustee of the University of Massachusetts Amherst Foundation."  Children's Hospital is a teaching hospital.  The University of Massachusetts includes a medical school. 
-  Robert J Bertolini "retired from Schering-Plough Corp following its merger with Merck & Co in November, 2009."  Schering-Plough was a large pharmaceutical company now combined with Merck to form an even larger company.
-  Gail K Boudreaux "has served since May 2008 as an Executive Vice President of United Health Group Incorporated."  Also, "she serves on the board of directors of America's Health Insurance Plans...."  UnitedHealth is one of the US' largest health insurance/ managed care corporations.  Incidentally,it has frequently misbehaved, as can be seen in this set of posts.  AHIP is the health insurance corporations' trade associations.
-  Robert J Carpenter "is Chairman of Hydra Biosciences Inc... He is also a trustee of the Immune Disease Institute, a non-profit institute affiliated with Children's Hospital in Boston...." 
-  Charles L Cooney "is a director of India-based Biocon Limited, a biotechnology healthcare company."
-  Victor J Dzau MD (discussed in the earlier post) is "Chancellor for Health Affairs and President and Chief Executive Officer of Duke University Health System...."  He "sits on the board of directors of Pepsico Inc, Anylam Inc, Medtronic Inc, and the Duke University Health System."
-  Senator Connie Mack III is "Chairman Emeritus of the parent board of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute...."  He also is director of "EXACT Sciences Corporation and Moody's Corp."  EXACT Sciences is a biotechnology company that develops diagnostic test technology.  Moody's Corp is a financial ratings agency whose lax ratings of financial derivatives, perhaps arising from conflicts of interest produced by payments from the producers of the derivatives, have been implicated as a major cause of the global financial collapse.
-  Richard E Syron was from "January 2004 to September 8, 2008 ... Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, commonly referred to as Freddie Mac...."    Freddie Mac as bailed out and taken over by the US government when he departed, or was forced out.  Freddie Mac, was a "government-sponsored enterprise," (GSE) one of another group of companies whose enthusiastic participation in securitizing dubious mortgages was implicated as a major cause of the global financial collapse.
- Henri A Termeer (CEO of Genzyme) is a "director of Massachusetts General Hospital, a board member of Partners HealthCare, and a member of the board of fellows of Harvard Medical School." 

So the box score for Genzyme's 10 directors: six have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (some such institutions are lead by more than one Genzyme director).  Seven have leadership positions in other drug, device or biotechnology corporations.  One have leadership positions in health insurance/ managed care corporations.  Two had or have leadership positions in discredited financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.

Medtronic

Medtronic had 11 directors in 2010.  The following directors had relationships of interest:

- Richard H Anderson "was Executive Vice President of UnitedHealth Group Incorporated."  As above, UnitedHealth is a health insurance/ managed care corporation.
- Victor J Dzau (see above) is "Chancellor for Health Affairs at Duke University and President and Chief Executive Officer of the Duke University Health System."  He is "a director of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals Inc, ... PepsiCo Inc, and Genzyme Corporation." (See discussion above.)
- James T Lenahan "served as President of Johnson & Johnson from 2002 until June 2004...."  He is "director of Telecris Biotherapeutics Inc, Alton Pharma Inc and Imacor Inc."  Johnson & Johnson is a large drug, device, and biotechnology company.  Telecris, and Alton Pharma are biotechnology pharmaceutical companies.  Imacor is a medical device company.
- Denise M O'Leary "is a director of Lucille Packard Children's Hospital and Stanford Hospitals and Clinics."  Also, "she was a member of the Stanford University Board of Trustees from 1996 through 2006, where she chaired the Committee of the Medical Center...."
-  Robert C Pozen is "an advisor to Gelesis Inc."  Gelesis is a biotechnology company.
-  Jack W Schuler "has been a director of Stericycle Inc since March 1990...."  He is a "director of Quidel Corporation and Elan Corporation plc...."    Stericycle company disposes of medical waste, including that produced by medical devices.  Quidel is a biotechnology and (medical diagnostic) device company.  Elan is an multinational biotechnology and pharmaceutical company.

So the box score for Genzyme's 11 directors is: Two have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (some such institutions are lead by more than one Genzyme director). Ten have leadership positions in other drug, device or biotechnology corporations. One has a leadership position in health insurance/ managed care corporations. None had or have leadership positions in discredited financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.

Summary

Just to summarize the sorts of conflicting interests these relationships suggest. 

Teaching hospitals and medical schools are supposed to provide unbiased teaching, including about issues relevant to drug and device corporations, such as choice of diagnostic strategies and treatments, and relevant health policy.  They are supposed to perform unbiased research, including research that evaluates drugs and devices.  They are supposed to provide the best possible patient care at a reasonable cost, which relates to choices of and prices paid for drugs and devices. 

Other drug, device, and biotechnology corporations may be producing, or developing products that compete with those of the index corporations.

Health insurance companies ostensibly try to control costs and improve quality in part by reducing excess utilization and bargaining down prices of drugs and devices. 

So this limited case study of the boards of directors, that is, the ostensible stewards of two health care corporations, selected because they have a common member who is the leader of a large medical school and academic medical center, and which both have histories of poor management or ethical missteps showed  - that the leadership of health care organizations is incredibly interrelated, interlocked, incestuous. 

This gave an example of how pervasive are the conflicts of interest that affect all kinds of health care organizations.  Companies that ought to be competing have interlocked directors.  Companies that ought to be negotiating at arms length have interlocked directors.  Not-for-profit academic medical institutions have leaders who are also directors of companies whose drugs their patients may take, whose devices their patients may receive, whose insurance their patients may buy, and whose products and services they may teach about and evaluate through clinical research and policy research. 

This also gives an example of how the failed culture of finance may be linked to the culture of medicine and health care.  Some of the stewards of health care organizations were also the stewards of financial services corporations whose reckless, if not arrogant, greedy and amoral leadership is widely believed to have caused the global financial collapse and our ongoing economic problems. 

Finally, this suggests how top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients. 

What is to be done?

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships.  A few bloggers cannot do it all.  Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders.  However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment.  Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. 

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.   

Duke Divinity Students Protest Pay of Chancellor for Health Affairs

This may be a first.  A small group of Duke University divinity students publicly protested the compensation given to some top university leaders, specifically including the Chancellor for Health Affairs.  According to the Raleigh-Durham News-Observer:

Theo Luebke strolled the plaza outside Duke's Bryan Center on Thursday afternoon with a bucketful of apples and a tale of woe.

'Come on! Everyone's in this together! Get your apples!' he exhorted students passing by during the lunchtime rush. 'With all the cuts we have around here and all the bonuses we have to give to the big guys, we need to raise all the money we can.'

Luebke isn't really the Depression-era fruit peddler his costume suggested. Luebke and a couple of other Duke divinity students hawked apples, ostensibly to raise money for the university, while others dressed as paperboys distributed a mock newspaper railing against bonuses paid to top officials within Duke's healthcare system and investment company.

For Duke workers whose pay has been frozen of late, the bonuses appear staggering.

A couple of examples: Neal Triplett, president of the management company, received a $729,749 bonus on top of his $413,603 salary; Victor Dzau, chancellor of the Duke health system, got a $983,654 bonus, bringing his total compensation to more than $2.2 million.

Thursday's skit, which mostly drew befuddled looks, was the third in a series mocking executive pay.

It turns out these munificent compensation amounts were paid at a time when Duke is in some financial difficulty:

In recent years, Duke has frozen pay and eliminated jobs in an attempt to pare its annual operating budget by $100 million.

Nearly 400 workers have accepted buyout offers since early 2009. Their jobs were then eliminated.

'During a time when the administration is saying we all needed to tighten our belts and make sacrifices...as it turns out, some of the folks who lost money for Duke were giving themselves bonuses,' said Amy Laura Hall, a tenured professor of Christian ethics. 'I think that's obscene.'

I cannot recall a previous example of students demonstrating against the compensation of a leader of a medical school and/or university health care system.  Maybe these students have started something.

In fact, we have frequently discussed executive compensation given by health care organizations that seems wildly out of proportion to the value of the health care they provide or the clinical value of their products.  Although compensation is even higher for executives of for-profit health care corporations, even leaders of not-for-profit organizations, including academic institutions, is now often in the millions per year range.

Service on (Mostly Health Care) Corporate Boards

Dr Dzau's compensation may appear even more extreme in the context of the money he brings in from outside work.  As Prof Margaret Soltan pointed out on the University Diaries blog, Dr Dzau also serves on multiple corporate boards.  The multiplicity of his outside work is not fully acknowledged in the most complete official biography posted on the Duke web-site, here, which only notes service on the Genzyme board.  In fact, he also serves on the boards of Anylam Pharmaceuticals, Medtronic, and PepsiCo.

According to the Alnylam Pharmaceuticals 2010 Proxy Statement, Dr Dzau's compensation as a director in 2009 was $234,433.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 45,000 shares, worth $424,800 at today's $9.44 price per share. 

According to the Genzyme 2010 Proxy Statement, Dr Dzau's compensation as a director in 2009 was $412,942.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 75,137shares, worth $5,312,937 at today's $70.71 price per share.

According to the Medtronic 2010 Proxy Statement, Dr Dzau's compensation as a director in 2009 was $173,698.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 14,552 shares, worth $493,895 at today's $33.94 price.

According to the PepsiCo 2010 Proxy Statement, Dr Dzau's compensation as a director in 2009 was $260,000.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 25,065 shares, worth $1,622,458 at today's $64.73 price per share.

So, in summary, in 2009, Dr Dzau received  $1,081,073 in compensation to be a director of these four companies.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned stock or equivalent in these four companies valued at $7,854,090.  He has become what most people would consider rich just from his work on these boards, in addition to the millions he has received from Duke.

Conflicts of Interest and Other Questions

So this raises even more questions.  The most obvious is how the good doctor has time to simultaneously fulfill his responsibilities at Duke and for the four corporations? 

The next most obvious is why the university does not make a full disclosure of what appear to be severe conflicts of interest?  Anylam and Genzyme are biotechnology pharmaceutical companies.  Medtronics is a medical device company.  PepsiCo is a food and beverage company whose products affect nutrition and public health.  Dr Dzau's service on the board of each of these companies means he has fiduciary duties to each company, and is supposed to show unyielding loyalty to the companies' stockholders.  Of course, many business commentators have charged that most corporate directors are mainly chosen to be compliant with the top hired management's wishes, if not to be frank cronies of the management.  Even in the best case, showing unyielding loyalties to the stockholders of companies that make drugs, medical devices, and sugary drinks seems to be likely to influence a leader of an academic medical institution in ways that risk degrading the leader's responsibilities to uphold the institution's mission, i.e., to create severe conflicts of interest. 

Dr Dzau has a fairly severe case of what we labeled as a "new species of conflict of interest" in 2006.  Concerns about such conflicts affecting university presidents, but not specifically chancellors or vice presidents for health affairs, appeared in the New York Times last summer (see post here).  Maybe some day student protesters will see such conflicts as a problem.

However, should Dr Dzau make the usual defense of such conflicts, that they promote collaboration with industry needed for innovation, maybe Duke students or alumni might ask questions about the other side of the coin.

The Other Side of the Conflict of Interest Coin

Dr Dzau is supposed to be responsible for the stewardship of Genzyme.  We have recently posted about the company's seeming recent inability to make pure, unadulterated pharmaceuticals, and while exhibiting such inability to perform such basic functions, its payment of extremely lucrative compensation to its hired CEO.  Maybe someone could ask Dr Dzau what he thought about such actions, and whether he would take any responsibility for them?

Dr Dzau is supposed to be responsible for the stewardship of Medtronic.  Medtronic recently settled thousands of patients' lawsuits that alleged injuries due to a faulty lead on one model of a Medtronic implantable cardiac defibrillator for over $200 million. Medtronic has been the source of several alleged conflicts of interest involving influential physicians (see posts about Medtronic here).   Maybe someone could ask Dr Dzau what he thought about such actions, and whether he would take any responsibility for them.

Finally, a larger question is: is it good to have a leader of a medical school and academic medical center who has presided over such ethical lapses by health care corporations?  Let's see if anyone does get to ask Dr Dzau such questions. 

Duke Divinity Students Protest Pay of Chancellor for Health Affairs

This may be a first.  A small group of Duke University divinity students publicly protested the compensation given to some top university leaders, specifically including the Chancellor for Health Affairs.  According to the Raleigh-Durham News-Observer:

Theo Luebke strolled the plaza outside Duke's Bryan Center on Thursday afternoon with a bucketful of apples and a tale of woe.

'Come on! Everyone's in this together! Get your apples!' he exhorted students passing by during the lunchtime rush. 'With all the cuts we have around here and all the bonuses we have to give to the big guys, we need to raise all the money we can.'

Luebke isn't really the Depression-era fruit peddler his costume suggested. Luebke and a couple of other Duke divinity students hawked apples, ostensibly to raise money for the university, while others dressed as paperboys distributed a mock newspaper railing against bonuses paid to top officials within Duke's healthcare system and investment company.

For Duke workers whose pay has been frozen of late, the bonuses appear staggering.

A couple of examples: Neal Triplett, president of the management company, received a $729,749 bonus on top of his $413,603 salary; Victor Dzau, chancellor of the Duke health system, got a $983,654 bonus, bringing his total compensation to more than $2.2 million.

Thursday's skit, which mostly drew befuddled looks, was the third in a series mocking executive pay.

It turns out these munificent compensation amounts were paid at a time when Duke is in some financial difficulty:

In recent years, Duke has frozen pay and eliminated jobs in an attempt to pare its annual operating budget by $100 million.

Nearly 400 workers have accepted buyout offers since early 2009. Their jobs were then eliminated.

'During a time when the administration is saying we all needed to tighten our belts and make sacrifices...as it turns out, some of the folks who lost money for Duke were giving themselves bonuses,' said Amy Laura Hall, a tenured professor of Christian ethics. 'I think that's obscene.'

I cannot recall a previous example of students demonstrating against the compensation of a leader of a medical school and/or university health care system.  Maybe these students have started something.

In fact, we have frequently discussed executive compensation given by health care organizations that seems wildly out of proportion to the value of the health care they provide or the clinical value of their products.  Although compensation is even higher for executives of for-profit health care corporations, even leaders of not-for-profit organizations, including academic institutions, is now often in the millions per year range.

Service on (Mostly Health Care) Corporate Boards

Dr Dzau's compensation may appear even more extreme in the context of the money he brings in from outside work.  As Prof Margaret Soltan pointed out on the University Diaries blog, Dr Dzau also serves on multiple corporate boards.  The multiplicity of his outside work is not fully acknowledged in the most complete official biography posted on the Duke web-site, here, which only notes service on the Genzyme board.  In fact, he also serves on the boards of Anylam Pharmaceuticals, Medtronic, and PepsiCo.

According to the Alnylam Pharmaceuticals 2010 Proxy Statement, Dr Dzau's compensation as a director in 2009 was $234,433.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 45,000 shares, worth $424,800 at today's $9.44 price per share. 

According to the Genzyme 2010 Proxy Statement, Dr Dzau's compensation as a director in 2009 was $412,942.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 75,137shares, worth $5,312,937 at today's $70.71 price per share.

According to the Medtronic 2010 Proxy Statement, Dr Dzau's compensation as a director in 2009 was $173,698.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 14,552 shares, worth $493,895 at today's $33.94 price.

According to the PepsiCo 2010 Proxy Statement, Dr Dzau's compensation as a director in 2009 was $260,000.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned the equivalent of 25,065 shares, worth $1,622,458 at today's $64.73 price per share.

So, in summary, in 2009, Dr Dzau received  $1,081,073 in compensation to be a director of these four companies.  In 2009, Dr Dzau owned stock or equivalent in these four companies valued at $7,854,090.  He has become what most people would consider rich just from his work on these boards, in addition to the millions he has received from Duke.

Conflicts of Interest and Other Questions

So this raises even more questions.  The most obvious is how the good doctor has time to simultaneously fulfill his responsibilities at Duke and for the four corporations? 

The next most obvious is why the university does not make a full disclosure of what appear to be severe conflicts of interest?  Anylam and Genzyme are biotechnology pharmaceutical companies.  Medtronics is a medical device company.  PepsiCo is a food and beverage company whose products affect nutrition and public health.  Dr Dzau's service on the board of each of these companies means he has fiduciary duties to each company, and is supposed to show unyielding loyalty to the companies' stockholders.  Of course, many business commentators have charged that most corporate directors are mainly chosen to be compliant with the top hired management's wishes, if not to be frank cronies of the management.  Even in the best case, showing unyielding loyalties to the stockholders of companies that make drugs, medical devices, and sugary drinks seems to be likely to influence a leader of an academic medical institution in ways that risk degrading the leader's responsibilities to uphold the institution's mission, i.e., to create severe conflicts of interest. 

Dr Dzau has a fairly severe case of what we labeled as a "new species of conflict of interest" in 2006.  Concerns about such conflicts affecting university presidents, but not specifically chancellors or vice presidents for health affairs, appeared in the New York Times last summer (see post here).  Maybe some day student protesters will see such conflicts as a problem.

However, should Dr Dzau make the usual defense of such conflicts, that they promote collaboration with industry needed for innovation, maybe Duke students or alumni might ask questions about the other side of the coin.

The Other Side of the Conflict of Interest Coin

Dr Dzau is supposed to be responsible for the stewardship of Genzyme.  We have recently posted about the company's seeming recent inability to make pure, unadulterated pharmaceuticals, and while exhibiting such inability to perform such basic functions, its payment of extremely lucrative compensation to its hired CEO.  Maybe someone could ask Dr Dzau what he thought about such actions, and whether he would take any responsibility for them?

Dr Dzau is supposed to be responsible for the stewardship of Medtronic.  Medtronic recently settled thousands of patients' lawsuits that alleged injuries due to a faulty lead on one model of a Medtronic implantable cardiac defibrillator for over $200 million. Medtronic has been the source of several alleged conflicts of interest involving influential physicians (see posts about Medtronic here).   Maybe someone could ask Dr Dzau what he thought about such actions, and whether he would take any responsibility for them.

Finally, a larger question is: is it good to have a leader of a medical school and academic medical center who has presided over such ethical lapses by health care corporations?  Let's see if anyone does get to ask Dr Dzau such questions. 

A Golden Parachute for Making Contaminated Drugs?

In late 2009, we posted about problems at a Genzyme plant that manufactured some fabulously expensive drugs, e.g. Cerezyme whose cost to patients approximated $160,000 a year. We thought then that for a drug costing that much, the company ought to have figured out a conservative process to provide pure and unadulterated product. In a later post we also why a company that could afford to make its CEO very rich could not afford to adequately maintain its manufacturing facilities.  In May, 2010, we posted about a legal settlement of charges related to its manufacturing problems requiring Genzyme to pay a $175 million fine and function under US government supervision.

Recent news articles suggest that the fix of the company's inabilities to manufacture pure, unadulterated drug remained remote.  Reuters reported that it had to discard "additional inventories of drugs ... for failure to the meet the company's quality control standards."  Bloomberg reported that it "may take three to four years to complete changes requested by U.S regulators after plant contamination."

Meanwhile, however, the company continues to talk to Sanofi-Aventis about being bought out, and the Boston Globe reported just how much Genzyme CEO Henri A Termeer would stand to make if the buyout takes place:

Under the 'hange of control' agreement currently worth $23 million, Termeer would receive several payments. He would receive a lump sum of $11 million, a figure representing three times his base salary plus a bonus. He would also get $356,000 in benefits, including health, life, accident, and disability insurance, outplacement and relocation services, and legal fees. And he could cash out 175,137 shares through accelerated equity awards. Those shares are now worth $11.9 million, but almost certainly would be worth more if the company is acquired at a premium.

Furthermore,

Apart from the golden parachute, Termeer could reap huge stock gains if the company is sold. The 4.1 million Genzyme shares he owns represented about 1.5 percent of its stock as of April 9, the most recent regulatory filing. At the current share price, Termeer’s stake is worth more than $275 million.

So riddle me this: over the last 5 years, Genzyme stock-holders have seen their investment lose 5.7% of its value (according to Google Finance),  while patients have paid outlandish prices for contaminated medicine, or have had to reduce their medication dosages after the defective manufacturing plant was shut down.  So why should the CEO who presided over all this, whose has already become rich as a hired employee of Genzyme, get even richer? 

Once again we demonstrate how massively perverse incentives stupendously reward the top brass of health care organizations for mediocre, or worse leadership and bad results for both patients/ clients/ customers and stock-holders alike.  As long as being a health care CEO is effectively a license to loot the company, is it any wonder that health care organizations continue to be badly lead, and health care costs soar while quality and access suffer? 

Once more with feeling: real health care reform would require us to make health care executives truly accountable for their actions, and penalize them for those that are ill-informed, contemptuous of health care values, self-interested, or corrupt. 

A Golden Parachute for Making Contaminated Drugs?

In late 2009, we posted about problems at a Genzyme plant that manufactured some fabulously expensive drugs, e.g. Cerezyme whose cost to patients approximated $160,000 a year. We thought then that for a drug costing that much, the company ought to have figured out a conservative process to provide pure and unadulterated product. In a later post we also why a company that could afford to make its CEO very rich could not afford to adequately maintain its manufacturing facilities.  In May, 2010, we posted about a legal settlement of charges related to its manufacturing problems requiring Genzyme to pay a $175 million fine and function under US government supervision.

Recent news articles suggest that the fix of the company's inabilities to manufacture pure, unadulterated drug remained remote.  Reuters reported that it had to discard "additional inventories of drugs ... for failure to the meet the company's quality control standards."  Bloomberg reported that it "may take three to four years to complete changes requested by U.S regulators after plant contamination."

Meanwhile, however, the company continues to talk to Sanofi-Aventis about being bought out, and the Boston Globe reported just how much Genzyme CEO Henri A Termeer would stand to make if the buyout takes place:

Under the 'hange of control' agreement currently worth $23 million, Termeer would receive several payments. He would receive a lump sum of $11 million, a figure representing three times his base salary plus a bonus. He would also get $356,000 in benefits, including health, life, accident, and disability insurance, outplacement and relocation services, and legal fees. And he could cash out 175,137 shares through accelerated equity awards. Those shares are now worth $11.9 million, but almost certainly would be worth more if the company is acquired at a premium.

Furthermore,

Apart from the golden parachute, Termeer could reap huge stock gains if the company is sold. The 4.1 million Genzyme shares he owns represented about 1.5 percent of its stock as of April 9, the most recent regulatory filing. At the current share price, Termeer’s stake is worth more than $275 million.

So riddle me this: over the last 5 years, Genzyme stock-holders have seen their investment lose 5.7% of its value (according to Google Finance),  while patients have paid outlandish prices for contaminated medicine, or have had to reduce their medication dosages after the defective manufacturing plant was shut down.  So why should the CEO who presided over all this, whose has already become rich as a hired employee of Genzyme, get even richer? 

Once again we demonstrate how massively perverse incentives stupendously reward the top brass of health care organizations for mediocre, or worse leadership and bad results for both patients/ clients/ customers and stock-holders alike.  As long as being a health care CEO is effectively a license to loot the company, is it any wonder that health care organizations continue to be badly lead, and health care costs soar while quality and access suffer? 

Once more with feeling: real health care reform would require us to make health care executives truly accountable for their actions, and penalize them for those that are ill-informed, contemptuous of health care values, self-interested, or corrupt. 

Genzyme Settles

In late 2009, we posted about problems at a Genzyme plant that manufactured some fabulously expensive drugs, e.g. Cerezyme whose cost to patients approximated $160,000 a year.  We thought then that for a drug costing that much, the company ought to have figured out a conservative process to provide pure and unadulterated product.  In a later post we also why a company that could afford to make its CEO very rich could not afford to adequately maintain its manufacturing facilities.

Now Genzyme has reached a settlement with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on the matter.  As reported by the Boston Globe,

Genzyme Corp will remain under federal oversight for the next seven to eight years as it works to fix quality-control problems that have bedeviled its Allston Landing plant for 15 months.

The timetable was spelled out in a consent decree struck between Genzyme and the Food and Drug Administration.

Under its terms, Genzyme will pay a previously disclosed $175 million federal fine, the first in its 29-year history. The agreement, filed with the US District Court in Boston yesterday, is subject to court approval.

Although the company said last month that it expected to pay the $175 million fine, other terms of the consent decree were not known until yesterday. Among them, Genzyme agreed to move fill-finishing work for its domestic drug shipments out of the Allston site by November. The transfer of fill-finishing for overseas shipments will take place by Aug. 31, 2011.

Fill finishing is the process of pouring drugs into vials for shipments to hospitals and clinics, where they are administered to patients.

Late last year, inspectors found bits of steel, rubber, and fiber in some drugs during the fill-finishing process in Allston. The work will be moved to a Genzyme operation in Waterford, Ireland, and to subcontractors such as Hospira Inc., subject to approval by federal regulators.

The firm faces additional fines if it fails to meet FDA deadlines

In all, the Cambridge biotechnology giant will spend two to three years in remediation under the consent decree, and another five years under oversight by a third-party contractor, the Quantic Group, a Livingston, N.J., consulting firm focused on boosting manufacturing quality and safety.

Quantic will craft a remediation plan with Genzyme, and the company could be fined $15,000 a day for missing milestones.

So now Genzyme is marching in our parade of settlements.  While this settlement is of charges related to very fundamental violations, failure to manufacture pure and unadulterated drugs, in one important way its provisions seem similar to many other such settlements we have now seen.  The settlement fines the company as a whole, but results in no penalties for any individuals. 

As we have noted before, fines, even fines larger than this one, can be regarded just as a cost of doing business (especially when the business is very lucrative.  The company's 2010 proxy statement noted that even in 2009, when production was affected by the plant closure, "sales of Cerezyme were $793 million, compared with $1.2 billion in 2008. Sales of Fabrazyme were $431 million compared with $494 million in the previous year. So the company was fined $175 million for production problems with two drugs that brought in over $1.2 billion in revenue in 2009.) 

Furthermore, the fine's impact may be diffused over the whole company, and ultimately comes out of the pockets of stockholders, employees, and customers alike.  It provides no negative incentives for those who authorized, directed, or implemented the behavior in question.  So it is not clear that settlements like this deter future wrong-doing.

Additionally, as we noted in the earlier post, the current CEO of Genzyme has gotten quite rich by virtue of his position.  While the 2010 Genzyme proxy statement indicates his compensation was affected by the financial impact of the production slowdown, even so he continued to get richer, albeit at a slightly slower pace than he did before.  That statement indicates that in 2009, CEO Henri Termeer's total compensation was a mere $9,507,403, down from $12,699,301 the previous year.  The main difference was that his non-equity incentive plan compensation dropped from $1,962,725 to 0.  While a $3 million plus salary decrement seems sizable, it is hard to conceive of an executive who makes nearly $10 million a year as suffering major financial consequences from the current debacle. 

As I have said before, endlessly, we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Genzyme Settles

In late 2009, we posted about problems at a Genzyme plant that manufactured some fabulously expensive drugs, e.g. Cerezyme whose cost to patients approximated $160,000 a year.  We thought then that for a drug costing that much, the company ought to have figured out a conservative process to provide pure and unadulterated product.  In a later post we also why a company that could afford to make its CEO very rich could not afford to adequately maintain its manufacturing facilities.

Now Genzyme has reached a settlement with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on the matter.  As reported by the Boston Globe,

Genzyme Corp will remain under federal oversight for the next seven to eight years as it works to fix quality-control problems that have bedeviled its Allston Landing plant for 15 months.

The timetable was spelled out in a consent decree struck between Genzyme and the Food and Drug Administration.

Under its terms, Genzyme will pay a previously disclosed $175 million federal fine, the first in its 29-year history. The agreement, filed with the US District Court in Boston yesterday, is subject to court approval.

Although the company said last month that it expected to pay the $175 million fine, other terms of the consent decree were not known until yesterday. Among them, Genzyme agreed to move fill-finishing work for its domestic drug shipments out of the Allston site by November. The transfer of fill-finishing for overseas shipments will take place by Aug. 31, 2011.

Fill finishing is the process of pouring drugs into vials for shipments to hospitals and clinics, where they are administered to patients.

Late last year, inspectors found bits of steel, rubber, and fiber in some drugs during the fill-finishing process in Allston. The work will be moved to a Genzyme operation in Waterford, Ireland, and to subcontractors such as Hospira Inc., subject to approval by federal regulators.

The firm faces additional fines if it fails to meet FDA deadlines

In all, the Cambridge biotechnology giant will spend two to three years in remediation under the consent decree, and another five years under oversight by a third-party contractor, the Quantic Group, a Livingston, N.J., consulting firm focused on boosting manufacturing quality and safety.

Quantic will craft a remediation plan with Genzyme, and the company could be fined $15,000 a day for missing milestones.

So now Genzyme is marching in our parade of settlements.  While this settlement is of charges related to very fundamental violations, failure to manufacture pure and unadulterated drugs, in one important way its provisions seem similar to many other such settlements we have now seen.  The settlement fines the company as a whole, but results in no penalties for any individuals. 

As we have noted before, fines, even fines larger than this one, can be regarded just as a cost of doing business (especially when the business is very lucrative.  The company's 2010 proxy statement noted that even in 2009, when production was affected by the plant closure, "sales of Cerezyme were $793 million, compared with $1.2 billion in 2008. Sales of Fabrazyme were $431 million compared with $494 million in the previous year. So the company was fined $175 million for production problems with two drugs that brought in over $1.2 billion in revenue in 2009.) 

Furthermore, the fine's impact may be diffused over the whole company, and ultimately comes out of the pockets of stockholders, employees, and customers alike.  It provides no negative incentives for those who authorized, directed, or implemented the behavior in question.  So it is not clear that settlements like this deter future wrong-doing.

Additionally, as we noted in the earlier post, the current CEO of Genzyme has gotten quite rich by virtue of his position.  While the 2010 Genzyme proxy statement indicates his compensation was affected by the financial impact of the production slowdown, even so he continued to get richer, albeit at a slightly slower pace than he did before.  That statement indicates that in 2009, CEO Henri Termeer's total compensation was a mere $9,507,403, down from $12,699,301 the previous year.  The main difference was that his non-equity incentive plan compensation dropped from $1,962,725 to 0.  While a $3 million plus salary decrement seems sizable, it is hard to conceive of an executive who makes nearly $10 million a year as suffering major financial consequences from the current debacle. 

As I have said before, endlessly, we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Leaders of Discredited Financial Rating Agencies as Leaders of Health Care

This is the latest in our informal series on the cross-linkages between the thinking and leadership that lead to the global financial collapse/ great recession and that current in health care.  Last month, a US Senate sub-committee held hearings on the role of the rating agencies, actually for-profit corporations that evaluated securities, including derivatives, in the collapse. 

The Fundamentally Conflicted Rating Agencies

To briefly provide some background, these agencies were hired by the firms that created these securities to evaluate them.  Because the securities were complex, they were hard for investors to evaluate.  Investors had become used to using the rating agencies' evaluations as benchmarks for the quality and riskiness of complex securities.  Many did not seem to realize that the agencies themselves were for-profit corporations, or subsidiaries thereof, which made more money the more securities they rated.  The rating agencies gave many of their highest ratings (AAA) to securities that later failed.  (See an informal video discussion by corporate governance expert Robert A G Monks here.)

Some key quotes from the news coverage follow.

Former credit rating agency officials said on Friday that the quest for market share fueled a drive for short-term profits, sacrificing credit quality in the process.

Eric Kolchinsky, who was in charge of the Moody's (MCO.N) unit that rated subprime CDOs, or collateralized debt obligations, said that people 'across the financial food chain, from the mortgage broker to the CDO banker, were compensated based on quantity rather than quality,' according to testimony prepared for a Senate panel.

'The situation was no different at the rating agencies.'

from Reuters

Former Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s employees said they were excluded from assessing mortgage bonds if they questioned Wall Street’s conclusions and that credit-rating companies focused on protecting business at the expense of accurate grading.

Richard Michalek, a former managing director in Moody’s structured products derivatives group, told the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at a hearing today that managers said he was 'not welcome on deals' involving certain banks.

Eric Kolchinsky, who led the Moody’s group that rated collateralized debt obligations made up of mortgage bonds, said he was berated by his boss when the company lost business after implementing more conservative ratings.

S&P wrongly concluded that its increasing profits amid an inflated U.S. housing market was based on 'superior management skill and insight,' said Frank Raiter, a former managing director at the company. In reality, regulators had made the firm part of 'an oligopoly' by requiring investors to hold assets it rated, Raiter said.

per Bloomberg

The documents show, sometimes in excruciating detail, the conflicts of interest that many claim lie at the heart of the ratings business model and the concerns of employees about what was happening inside the companies well before the crisis broke.

One employee at Standard & Poor's, the world's largest rating agency, said its handling of awkward questions in the summer of 2007 made it 'sound like the Nixon White House'.

And,

As one Moody's managing director wrote to his superiors in 2007, the company's errors, made it look 'either incompetent at credit analysis, or like we sold our soul to the devil for revenue, or a little bit of both'.

per the Financial Times

The two companies targeted by these hearings were Moodys, and Standard & Poors (a subsidiary of McGraw-Hill Inc).

Overlaps with Health Care Leadership: Moody's Corporation

Perusal of the roster of the Moody's board of directors in 2008, per that year's proxy statement, reveals the following overlaps with health care leadership, of its 8 directors.

Connie Mack - is also on the boards of EXACT Sciences Corporation (a biotechnology company), and Genzyme.  He is the chair of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center.

Henry A McKinnell Jr - was chairman of the board and CEO from 2001-06 of Pfizer Inc.

Basil L Anderson - is a member of the board of directors of Becton Dickinson.

Overlaps with Health Care Leadership: McGraw-Hill Inc

Via the company's 2008 proxy statement, of 12 directors:

Sir Winfried Bischoff - is a director of Eli Lilly and Company.

Linda Koch Lorimer - is Vice President and Secretary of Yale University, and a Director of Yale-New Haven Hospital.

Kurt L Schmoke - is a Trustee of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute

Sidney Taurel - was chairman and CEO of Eli Lilly and Company.

Summary

So, in summary, the 20 board members of one for-profit "ratings agency," and of the corporation of which the other major "ratings agency" was a subsidiary, served on the boards of 2 biotechnology corporations (EXACT Sciences Corporation and Genzyme), one medical device company (Becton-Dickinson), one pharmaceutical company (Eli Lilly) , 2 major academic medical centers (Moffitt Cancer Center and Yale-New Haven), and one medical research institution (Howard Hughes).  Two were recent former CEOs and chairmen of the boards of 2 of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies (Pfizer and Eli Lilly). 

Most of these health care organizations have been involved with cases we have discussed on Health Care Renewal (see links above).

Given the serious concerns about the conflicts of interest that became the core of these corporations' business models, and their central role in the global financial collapse, one has to wonder why so many of the directors who presided over them still have such influential positions in health care organizations?

As we have pointed out, as the world economy was driven to near ruin by "masters of the universe," some of the same also became leaders of academia and academic medicine in their spare time. Maybe this made sense 10 or 20 years ago, but why does it still make sense? On the other hand, now that we understand how bad the leadership of finance really was, it is a little easier to understand why the leadership of health care has become so bad. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that some of the problems of academia, and particularly the problems of medical academia, may have been at least enabled by leadership more used to working in an increasingly amoral marketplace than to upholding the academic mission. The failures of the leadership and governance of finance thus suggest we need to re-examine the leadership of health care.

Leaders of Discredited Financial Rating Agencies as Leaders of Health Care

This is the latest in our informal series on the cross-linkages between the thinking and leadership that lead to the global financial collapse/ great recession and that current in health care.  Last month, a US Senate sub-committee held hearings on the role of the rating agencies, actually for-profit corporations that evaluated securities, including derivatives, in the collapse. 

The Fundamentally Conflicted Rating Agencies

To briefly provide some background, these agencies were hired by the firms that created these securities to evaluate them.  Because the securities were complex, they were hard for investors to evaluate.  Investors had become used to using the rating agencies' evaluations as benchmarks for the quality and riskiness of complex securities.  Many did not seem to realize that the agencies themselves were for-profit corporations, or subsidiaries thereof, which made more money the more securities they rated.  The rating agencies gave many of their highest ratings (AAA) to securities that later failed.  (See an informal video discussion by corporate governance expert Robert A G Monks here.)

Some key quotes from the news coverage follow.

Former credit rating agency officials said on Friday that the quest for market share fueled a drive for short-term profits, sacrificing credit quality in the process.

Eric Kolchinsky, who was in charge of the Moody's (MCO.N) unit that rated subprime CDOs, or collateralized debt obligations, said that people 'across the financial food chain, from the mortgage broker to the CDO banker, were compensated based on quantity rather than quality,' according to testimony prepared for a Senate panel.

'The situation was no different at the rating agencies.'

from Reuters

Former Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s employees said they were excluded from assessing mortgage bonds if they questioned Wall Street’s conclusions and that credit-rating companies focused on protecting business at the expense of accurate grading.

Richard Michalek, a former managing director in Moody’s structured products derivatives group, told the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at a hearing today that managers said he was 'not welcome on deals' involving certain banks.

Eric Kolchinsky, who led the Moody’s group that rated collateralized debt obligations made up of mortgage bonds, said he was berated by his boss when the company lost business after implementing more conservative ratings.

S&P wrongly concluded that its increasing profits amid an inflated U.S. housing market was based on 'superior management skill and insight,' said Frank Raiter, a former managing director at the company. In reality, regulators had made the firm part of 'an oligopoly' by requiring investors to hold assets it rated, Raiter said.

per Bloomberg

The documents show, sometimes in excruciating detail, the conflicts of interest that many claim lie at the heart of the ratings business model and the concerns of employees about what was happening inside the companies well before the crisis broke.

One employee at Standard & Poor's, the world's largest rating agency, said its handling of awkward questions in the summer of 2007 made it 'sound like the Nixon White House'.

And,

As one Moody's managing director wrote to his superiors in 2007, the company's errors, made it look 'either incompetent at credit analysis, or like we sold our soul to the devil for revenue, or a little bit of both'.

per the Financial Times

The two companies targeted by these hearings were Moodys, and Standard & Poors (a subsidiary of McGraw-Hill Inc).

Overlaps with Health Care Leadership: Moody's Corporation

Perusal of the roster of the Moody's board of directors in 2008, per that year's proxy statement, reveals the following overlaps with health care leadership, of its 8 directors.

Connie Mack - is also on the boards of EXACT Sciences Corporation (a biotechnology company), and Genzyme.  He is the chair of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center.

Henry A McKinnell Jr - was chairman of the board and CEO from 2001-06 of Pfizer Inc.

Basil L Anderson - is a member of the board of directors of Becton Dickinson.

Overlaps with Health Care Leadership: McGraw-Hill Inc

Via the company's 2008 proxy statement, of 12 directors:

Sir Winfried Bischoff - is a director of Eli Lilly and Company.

Linda Koch Lorimer - is Vice President and Secretary of Yale University, and a Director of Yale-New Haven Hospital.

Kurt L Schmoke - is a Trustee of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute

Sidney Taurel - was chairman and CEO of Eli Lilly and Company.

Summary

So, in summary, the 20 board members of one for-profit "ratings agency," and of the corporation of which the other major "ratings agency" was a subsidiary, served on the boards of 2 biotechnology corporations (EXACT Sciences Corporation and Genzyme), one medical device company (Becton-Dickinson), one pharmaceutical company (Eli Lilly) , 2 major academic medical centers (Moffitt Cancer Center and Yale-New Haven), and one medical research institution (Howard Hughes).  Two were recent former CEOs and chairmen of the boards of 2 of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies (Pfizer and Eli Lilly). 

Most of these health care organizations have been involved with cases we have discussed on Health Care Renewal (see links above).

Given the serious concerns about the conflicts of interest that became the core of these corporations' business models, and their central role in the global financial collapse, one has to wonder why so many of the directors who presided over them still have such influential positions in health care organizations?

As we have pointed out, as the world economy was driven to near ruin by "masters of the universe," some of the same also became leaders of academia and academic medicine in their spare time. Maybe this made sense 10 or 20 years ago, but why does it still make sense? On the other hand, now that we understand how bad the leadership of finance really was, it is a little easier to understand why the leadership of health care has become so bad. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that some of the problems of academia, and particularly the problems of medical academia, may have been at least enabled by leadership more used to working in an increasingly amoral marketplace than to upholding the academic mission. The failures of the leadership and governance of finance thus suggest we need to re-examine the leadership of health care.

What is the "Worst Biotech CEO" Worth?

Recently, we posted about misadventures of the leadership of biotechnology giant Genzyme.  Although the company has long priced its drug Cerezyme for the rare Gaucher's disease at a stratospheric level, it did not sufficiently reinvest money in its manufacturing facility for the drug.  Deferred maintenance at a production facility running at maximum capacity has apparently lead to two different kinds of contamination problems, forcing a shut-down of the plant, and now a shortage of the drug.  For this, Genzyme CEO Henri Termeer was just labeled the "Worst Biotech CEO of '09" by TheStreet.com.

It was not always thus.  A 2008 profile of Mr Termeer in Boston Magazine chronicled the rise of Genzyme from a "startup [which] operated 15 stories above the Combat Zone in an old garment building on a dodgy stretch of Kneeland Street."  Termeer pushed the company to develop a practical way to manufacture Cerezyme, and had the vision that the company could make money selling the drug to a relatively small number of patients.   Of course, his solution was to price the drug so high as to "drop jaws."  However, perhaps that was what was needed to get a innovative drug to a small number of patients.

Furthermore, Termeer posited that the revenues derived from drugs such as Cerezyme would lead to innovations that would help many more people.

The biotech tycoon's immodest goal is to change healthcare. That is what he's trying to do, after all. That's part of why he doesn't sweat the bad press, which he regards as the penance of the innovator. His therapies for ultrarare diseases, he says, point the way forward, toward a day when very targeted drugs cure ailments perfectly, precisely. Don't think of his niche therapies as being used by tiny, statistically inconsequential groups; think of them as being deployed in ways that get results every time. Now contrast this with the trial-and-error approach that dominates medicine as it's practiced today, in which doctors pick and choose from the menu of drugs available and calibrate dosages until finally, hopefully, they land on what works best for that particular person. What if instead every condition had a drug that was the smart bomb that Cerezyme is for Gaucher's?

While we wait for these marvelous new innovations, however, patients with Gaucher's disease must wait for their effective but amazingly expensive drug apparently because Mr Termeer presided over the failure to pay enough attention to mundane issues like manufacturing plant maintenance while he touted his vision of the future.

Whether that vision is realistic depends on one's view of Mr Termeer's predictive abilities. The Boston Magazine article suggested he is not a good fortune teller.  In 1994, Mr Termeer "suggested to the [New York] Times that the cost [of Cerezyme] would soon drop. 'Once we have the new plant running and approved, we will start to see some economies of scale,' Termeer told the paper in 1994. 'We can start to pass on some of these economies to the marketplace while at the same time improving the financial results of the company.' Fourteen years later, the price of Cerezyme has never come down.

In my humble opinion, the tale of Henri Termeer's and Genzyme's current woes tells a lot about the culture of leadership now prevalent in health care. On one hand, it seems that some of the business-people who took over leadership of health care organizations had administrative skills that turned innovative ideas into reality. This success may have derived from real vision about the possibilities of high-technology medicine and health care.

On the other hand, as their administrative abilities and vision lead to success, their judgment was liable to become over-confident, if not arrogant. This may have been fueled by the a business ethos that celebrates executives and managers, and their administrative skills and vision, beyond all else.

However, Mr Termeer's success was dependent on the painstaking and often thankless work of physicians and scientists, particularly those who first developed the drug that became Cerezyme, the initial funding of this work by the US National Institutes of Health, and the work by scientists and engineers to develop a practical way to manufacture this drug. Termeer also benefited from the Orphan Drug Act which "allowed companies that brought drugs to market seven years of monopoly sales." Without federal research money, favorable laws, and multiple dedicated scientists, physicians, and engineers, Mr Termeer's administrative skills and vision would have yielded nothing.

Nonetheless, it was Mr Termeer who was so richly rewarded. In 2006, Boston Magazine listed him as among the 50 wealthiest Bostonians, with an estimate worth of $342 million.  The 2008 profile noted "Over the past three years, Termeer has earned more than $50 million in total compensation, and thanks to the performance of Genzyme's stock, his stake in the company is now worth about $260 million."  He was interviewed at his waterfront home in tony Marblehead, Massachusetts.  He skippers his (only) "36-foot Hickley Pilot" which is "docked near the new home he's built outside Kennebunkport [Maine]..." the town in which former US President George HW Bush keeps a summer home. 

The US (and global) health care business culture disproportionately rewards managers and executives for "innovation," as opposed to the scientists and professionals who actually developed the innovation, or the other people whose money funded these efforts.  These leaders are rewarded them sufficiently to make them into a sort of pseudo-aristocracy.  I hypothesize that such rewards make them believe that they have actually done things worthy of them, breeding over-confidence, arrogance, and a sense of entitlement that puts them beyond the usual rules of society.  The result is leadership that may be ignorant of physicians' values, self-interested, and even corrupt, and health care that is too expensive, inaccessible, and that fails to deliver quality and value commensurate with its cost. 

To truly reform health care, we need to reform how health care oganizations' culture and leadership.