Can a $1 Billion Group of Babies Provide Fair Value in Health Care?

The issue of executive compensation in health care seems to be attracting more media attention.

A St Louis Post-Dispatch editorial noted how executive compensation for for-profit health insurance CEOs has grown. It started with a quote from Steven Hemsley, the CEO of UnitedHealth:

Today the American people are questioning whether or not we receive fair value for the $2.6 trillion we, as a society, are expecting to spend this year on our health care system. The vast majority, including those of us at UnitedHealth Group, believe the answer is, 'No.'

Here is a summary of the compensation information:

Modern Healthcare, a leading health industry trade journal, published its annual executive compensation survey this week. Topping the list is Stephen Hemsley, quoted above, who gave a speech to the Detroit Economic Club last year questioning the value Americans receive for all that health spending. [Note: We discussed Hemsley's compensation here.]

His take for 2009: $106 million — $7.5 million in salary and benefits and $98.5 million in stock options.

Mr. Hemsley is not alone. The CEOs at insurance giants Cigna, Humana, Aetna, Coventry Health Systems and WellPoint all took home between $10 million and about $18 million. Many of those companies already have announced double-digit premium increases for next year.

In all, the CEOs of America’s 10 largest health insurance companies made $228.1 million in salary and stock options during 2009, according to the liberal advocacy group Health Care For America Now. (That's enough to buy health insurance for at least 47,284 people, based on figured cited in this Kaiser Family Foundation survey on average premiums.)

Since 2000, those CEOs have received slightly less than $1 billion in compensation, the group said.

As an aside, the article noted how the compensation received by CEOs of the larger US health care corporations of all types, not just health insurance companies, has grown:

Researchers analyzed pay and benefits for 342 CEOs of corporations in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index.

They found that health care CEOs received an average compensation of $10.5 million last year. That’s 40 percent more than the average for all S&P 500 companies — 77 percent higher than chief executives at financial services companies.

Even the CEOs of not-for-profit hospital systems have become million dollar babies:

Last year, the average compensation for hospital system CEOs was $1 million. That’s enough to hire five new primary care doctors.

However, the editorial was a bit vague about why paying CEOs of health care organizations so much was a bad idea, although it did imply that it was unseemly given that much of health care is funded by government programs, and not-for-profit health care organizations receive tax breaks that give "the public an even larger stake in their efficient operation"

In my humble opinion, there are other big problems with the massive compensation that hired managers of health care organizations now command.

Paying them so much instantly vaults them into the upper class, and the CEOs of larger health care corporations now live a life style more reminiscent of aristocracy than of that of the patients who depend on them. Such riches isolate those who receive them in their own bubbles. Can one really expect a million, or ten million, or hundred million dollar CEO to really care about the health of individual patients?

Furthermore, paying them so much, usually regardless of their performance, their companies' performance, or the health effects of their products and services gives them perverse incentives to maintain their position at any cost, even at the cost of the patients they are supposed to serve.

So, we do not receive "fair value for the $2.6 trillion we, as a society, are expecting to spend on our health care system." But we cannot really expect a billion dollar group of babies to fix that.

True health care reform would decrease perverse incentives throughout the systems, spread the power in organizations more broadly, and make leaders accountable.

Can a $1 Billion Group of Babies Provide Fair Value in Health Care?

The issue of executive compensation in health care seems to be attracting more media attention.

A St Louis Post-Dispatch editorial noted how executive compensation for for-profit health insurance CEOs has grown. It started with a quote from Steven Hemsley, the CEO of UnitedHealth:

Today the American people are questioning whether or not we receive fair value for the $2.6 trillion we, as a society, are expecting to spend this year on our health care system. The vast majority, including those of us at UnitedHealth Group, believe the answer is, 'No.'

Here is a summary of the compensation information:

Modern Healthcare, a leading health industry trade journal, published its annual executive compensation survey this week. Topping the list is Stephen Hemsley, quoted above, who gave a speech to the Detroit Economic Club last year questioning the value Americans receive for all that health spending. [Note: We discussed Hemsley's compensation here.]

His take for 2009: $106 million — $7.5 million in salary and benefits and $98.5 million in stock options.

Mr. Hemsley is not alone. The CEOs at insurance giants Cigna, Humana, Aetna, Coventry Health Systems and WellPoint all took home between $10 million and about $18 million. Many of those companies already have announced double-digit premium increases for next year.

In all, the CEOs of America’s 10 largest health insurance companies made $228.1 million in salary and stock options during 2009, according to the liberal advocacy group Health Care For America Now. (That's enough to buy health insurance for at least 47,284 people, based on figured cited in this Kaiser Family Foundation survey on average premiums.)

Since 2000, those CEOs have received slightly less than $1 billion in compensation, the group said.

As an aside, the article noted how the compensation received by CEOs of the larger US health care corporations of all types, not just health insurance companies, has grown:

Researchers analyzed pay and benefits for 342 CEOs of corporations in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index.

They found that health care CEOs received an average compensation of $10.5 million last year. That’s 40 percent more than the average for all S&P 500 companies — 77 percent higher than chief executives at financial services companies.

Even the CEOs of not-for-profit hospital systems have become million dollar babies:

Last year, the average compensation for hospital system CEOs was $1 million. That’s enough to hire five new primary care doctors.

However, the editorial was a bit vague about why paying CEOs of health care organizations so much was a bad idea, although it did imply that it was unseemly given that much of health care is funded by government programs, and not-for-profit health care organizations receive tax breaks that give "the public an even larger stake in their efficient operation"

In my humble opinion, there are other big problems with the massive compensation that hired managers of health care organizations now command.

Paying them so much instantly vaults them into the upper class, and the CEOs of larger health care corporations now live a life style more reminiscent of aristocracy than of that of the patients who depend on them. Such riches isolate those who receive them in their own bubbles. Can one really expect a million, or ten million, or hundred million dollar CEO to really care about the health of individual patients?

Furthermore, paying them so much, usually regardless of their performance, their companies' performance, or the health effects of their products and services gives them perverse incentives to maintain their position at any cost, even at the cost of the patients they are supposed to serve.

So, we do not receive "fair value for the $2.6 trillion we, as a society, are expecting to spend on our health care system." But we cannot really expect a billion dollar group of babies to fix that.

True health care reform would decrease perverse incentives throughout the systems, spread the power in organizations more broadly, and make leaders accountable.

Not Your Average Joe's Health Plan

A Denver Post article offered a brief glimpse into the health benefits of corporate leaders, on the unusual occasion of a former CEO now in legal fight for the health benefits in the style to which he had become accustomed:

Poor Joe. He's not getting the health-care benefits he was promised.

His former employer merged with another company, and then another, and then another. And, you know how it goes after a slew of mergers. Suddenly the new, conglomerated monster just doesn't care about retirees any more.

Joe isn't going to sit back and take it like an average Joe. He's suing his former employer in U.S. District Court in Manhattan for breach of contract, breach of faith, breach of fiduciary duty and even promissory estoppel.

The Joe in question was really:

Lord & Taylor's CEO.

Joseph E. Brooks of Greenwich, Conn., lorded over a fourfold increase in sales at Lord & Taylor, expanding to 46 from 19 locations.

His career and Lord and Taylor's course after that were checkered, perhaps contributing to the current dispute:

But that was a long time ago. And Macy's Inc., the current parent company, is resisting some of his medical claims.

Brooks didn't get a deal like this from Filene's, where he served as president before joining Lord & Taylor. Or Ann Taylor, where he went on to generate shareholder lawsuits and shopper hate mail after demanding lower prices from suppliers and higher prices from customers, destroying both quality and value at the same time.

Brooks also made his son president of Ann Taylor, sparking cries of nepotism. And then his son got snagged trying to slip by U.S. Customs without paying duties on pricey watches and was forced to resign. The senior Brooks subsequently resigned as well. A 1992 Newsday article called him 'as egotistical and extravagant as he was brilliant.'

What Health Care Benefits Do CEOs Get?

What had Brooks been promised as CEO of Lord and Taylor?

In 1983, Lord & Taylor's corporate parent told Brooks it sought to provide 'great comfort to executives knowing that their medical costs are fully reimbursed by the Corporation.' The company told Joe it was a lifetime guarantee.

CEOs should never, ever, have to worry about health care.

Here are some details about his benefits:

And for nearly 27 years, substantially all medical costs have been fully covered, even premiums.

We're not just talking doctors' visits, hospitals, medications and tests. We're talking all travel and ancillary expenses associated with care, too.

We're talking first-class transportation, accommodations and meals while being treated at the Mayo Clinic and the Duke Diet and Fitness Center. We're talking expenses for a companion or personal aide, too.

We're also talking 'cosmetic services (surgery, medications, injections, creams and the like)' dental care, gym memberships, personal trainers, vitamins, massages — all paid by Joe's former employer for the rest of Joe's life.

Oh, and if any of these benefits have tax consequences, we're talking gross-up payments to cover that, too.

Why should we be concerned about the extravagant health plans given to top corporate executives? 

The Implications

We noted in 2009 that the Goldman Sachs 2009 proxy statement indicated that top executives of that now controversial company received health plans worth about $40,000 each. 

My concern then were not how much the costs of the plans contribute to top corporate leaders' compensation packages. Such packages are generally already so outrageously huge that providing $40,000 rather than $13,000 worth of health insurance is a trivial increase. My concern was not that plan recipients' demands for health care will collectively increase health care costs, because they likely include only a tiny portion of the population.


My main concern, instead, was how much these plans further insulate already cocooned top executives from the vicissitudes of daily life, particularly related to coping with our current dysfunctional health care system. What benefits executive health care plans provided were not clear from the 2009 story about Goldman Sachs.  However, this year's case of Joe Brooks does suggest that the plans paid for every expense that could be conceivably health related. 

As I worried then, it now does appear that such plans could completely insulate executives from having to deal with the managed care/ health insurance bureaucracy which frustrates patients seeking particular services, but not necessarily the most expensive, or least beneficial services. Furthermore, such plans may completely insulate executives from the various other vicissitudes of managing our currently dysfunctional health care system.  (By the way, that is why it seemed amazing that the CEO of Pfizer had to put up with some of the common vicissitudes when he went to a hospital for an elective procedure, an experience he publicly talked about with an almost charming naivete, given that he runs such a powerful health care organization which has been so influential in shaping our US "health care reform," see post here.)

Such executives isolated from the real world of health care might thus not have gut level appreciation of how dysfunctional the health care system has become for even insured patients. Since top executives often are disproportionately influential members of the "superclass," their disconnection from the realities of dysfunctional health care is likely to translate into little real support by the powers that be for meaningful health care reform. There support may be further retarded by the influence of their fellow superclass members whose personal fortunes depend on the status quo in health care.

Real improvement of health care may depend on finding leaders who have better understanding of the plight of real people.
 
Two Postscripts
 
Note: the Goldman Sachs 2010 proxy indicates that the executive health plans given to the five most highly paid executives cost up to $56,927.  
 
Also note that despite the effect that executive health plans may have on the thinking of those with the most power to influence health care policy, the plans have been of little interest to health care services and policy researchers.  I have not been able to find a single article in these literatures on the subject.  This appears to be yet another version of the anechoic effect, that certain inconvenient truths (to borrow from former US Vice President Al Gore) are not subjects of polite discussion of health care, lest the results excessively disturb the powers that be.

Not Your Average Joe's Health Plan

A Denver Post article offered a brief glimpse into the health benefits of corporate leaders, on the unusual occasion of a former CEO now in legal fight for the health benefits in the style to which he had become accustomed:

Poor Joe. He's not getting the health-care benefits he was promised.

His former employer merged with another company, and then another, and then another. And, you know how it goes after a slew of mergers. Suddenly the new, conglomerated monster just doesn't care about retirees any more.

Joe isn't going to sit back and take it like an average Joe. He's suing his former employer in U.S. District Court in Manhattan for breach of contract, breach of faith, breach of fiduciary duty and even promissory estoppel.

The Joe in question was really:

Lord & Taylor's CEO.

Joseph E. Brooks of Greenwich, Conn., lorded over a fourfold increase in sales at Lord & Taylor, expanding to 46 from 19 locations.

His career and Lord and Taylor's course after that were checkered, perhaps contributing to the current dispute:

But that was a long time ago. And Macy's Inc., the current parent company, is resisting some of his medical claims.

Brooks didn't get a deal like this from Filene's, where he served as president before joining Lord & Taylor. Or Ann Taylor, where he went on to generate shareholder lawsuits and shopper hate mail after demanding lower prices from suppliers and higher prices from customers, destroying both quality and value at the same time.

Brooks also made his son president of Ann Taylor, sparking cries of nepotism. And then his son got snagged trying to slip by U.S. Customs without paying duties on pricey watches and was forced to resign. The senior Brooks subsequently resigned as well. A 1992 Newsday article called him 'as egotistical and extravagant as he was brilliant.'

What Health Care Benefits Do CEOs Get?

What had Brooks been promised as CEO of Lord and Taylor?

In 1983, Lord & Taylor's corporate parent told Brooks it sought to provide 'great comfort to executives knowing that their medical costs are fully reimbursed by the Corporation.' The company told Joe it was a lifetime guarantee.

CEOs should never, ever, have to worry about health care.

Here are some details about his benefits:

And for nearly 27 years, substantially all medical costs have been fully covered, even premiums.

We're not just talking doctors' visits, hospitals, medications and tests. We're talking all travel and ancillary expenses associated with care, too.

We're talking first-class transportation, accommodations and meals while being treated at the Mayo Clinic and the Duke Diet and Fitness Center. We're talking expenses for a companion or personal aide, too.

We're also talking 'cosmetic services (surgery, medications, injections, creams and the like)' dental care, gym memberships, personal trainers, vitamins, massages — all paid by Joe's former employer for the rest of Joe's life.

Oh, and if any of these benefits have tax consequences, we're talking gross-up payments to cover that, too.

Why should we be concerned about the extravagant health plans given to top corporate executives? 

The Implications

We noted in 2009 that the Goldman Sachs 2009 proxy statement indicated that top executives of that now controversial company received health plans worth about $40,000 each. 

My concern then were not how much the costs of the plans contribute to top corporate leaders' compensation packages. Such packages are generally already so outrageously huge that providing $40,000 rather than $13,000 worth of health insurance is a trivial increase. My concern was not that plan recipients' demands for health care will collectively increase health care costs, because they likely include only a tiny portion of the population.


My main concern, instead, was how much these plans further insulate already cocooned top executives from the vicissitudes of daily life, particularly related to coping with our current dysfunctional health care system. What benefits executive health care plans provided were not clear from the 2009 story about Goldman Sachs.  However, this year's case of Joe Brooks does suggest that the plans paid for every expense that could be conceivably health related. 

As I worried then, it now does appear that such plans could completely insulate executives from having to deal with the managed care/ health insurance bureaucracy which frustrates patients seeking particular services, but not necessarily the most expensive, or least beneficial services. Furthermore, such plans may completely insulate executives from the various other vicissitudes of managing our currently dysfunctional health care system.  (By the way, that is why it seemed amazing that the CEO of Pfizer had to put up with some of the common vicissitudes when he went to a hospital for an elective procedure, an experience he publicly talked about with an almost charming naivete, given that he runs such a powerful health care organization which has been so influential in shaping our US "health care reform," see post here.)

Such executives isolated from the real world of health care might thus not have gut level appreciation of how dysfunctional the health care system has become for even insured patients. Since top executives often are disproportionately influential members of the "superclass," their disconnection from the realities of dysfunctional health care is likely to translate into little real support by the powers that be for meaningful health care reform. There support may be further retarded by the influence of their fellow superclass members whose personal fortunes depend on the status quo in health care.

Real improvement of health care may depend on finding leaders who have better understanding of the plight of real people.
 
Two Postscripts
 
Note: the Goldman Sachs 2010 proxy indicates that the executive health plans given to the five most highly paid executives cost up to $56,927.  
 
Also note that despite the effect that executive health plans may have on the thinking of those with the most power to influence health care policy, the plans have been of little interest to health care services and policy researchers.  I have not been able to find a single article in these literatures on the subject.  This appears to be yet another version of the anechoic effect, that certain inconvenient truths (to borrow from former US Vice President Al Gore) are not subjects of polite discussion of health care, lest the results excessively disturb the powers that be.

Corporate Proxies Suggest CEOs Rewarded for Influencing Health Care Reform

We have frequently discussed the often outsized, if not outrageous compensation awarded to top leaders of health care organizations.  Such compensation may seem disproportionate to the leaders' real-world achievements, and may contrast with organizational actions that seem inept, mission-hostile, or unethical.

In perusing this year's crop of proxy statements from some of the biggest US health care corporations, I noted that some provide some narrative, qualitative justification for their top leaders pay.  I was struck by three similar statements:

Johnson and Johnson

We recently discussed the contrast between Johnson and Johnson CEO William Weldon's gargantuan compensation and his detached response to the findings of an inspection of one of his company's factories that lead to its shutdown and the recall of its products.   According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, Mr Weldon's total compensation approved  in 2010 was $19,847,026.   The proxy statement included this overview of his performance:

The Board believes that Mr. Weldon generally exceeded expectations despite substantial economic, political, regulatory and competitive challenges as well as significant patent expirations. As referenced in the table above, the Company delivered solid financial results and positioned itself for future growth.

Under "strategic results" was this statement:

Mr. Weldon played an effective role in helping shape health care policy around the world and has been very involved with efforts on U.S. Health Care Reform. Mr. Weldon’s personal involvement with key leaders and organizations has ensured the interests of the Company are well represented.

Pfizer

We recently discussed the contrast between Pfizer Inc CEO Jeffrey Kindler's sizable compensation and the number and size of lawsuits alleging unethical conduct that the organization has settled, and its criminal conviction as a "racketeering influenced and corrupt organization" (RICO). According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, Mr Kindler's total compensation in 2009 was $14,898,038. The proxy statement included an Executive Compensation Discussion and Analysis. Its summary of Mr Kindler's performance was:

The committee believes that Mr Kindler's leadership was a significant factor in the continued progress made by Pfizer in 2009 in strengthening the foundation for future growth and long-term success.

It also specifically addressed Mr Kindler's "industry leadership":

During 2009, Mr Kindler was actively involved, through both Pfizer and external organizations, in developing and advancing US and global public policies that serve the overall interest of our Company and our shareholders, as well as doctors and patients. These efforts included constructive participation in the US legislative process to advance Pfizer's goals of achieving a more rational operating environment....

UnitedHealth Group

We recently discussed the contrast between UnitedHealth Group CEO Stephen J Helmsley's large total compensation and the profit he recently made from the sale of stock options and various questions raised about his company's ethical performance.  According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, his 2009 total compensation was $8,901,916. The company's 2010 proxy statement stated his compensation was based upon a variety of factors, including:

Positive participation and leadership of the Company in the health care reform and modernization debate

Summary

We have noted how health care organization may be gripped by "compensation madness," caused by "insiders hijacking established organizations for their personal benefit."  One could view the statements above as just one form of post-hoc justification for compensation madness.  It is possible that timid, if not crony boards are simply getting more inventive in their rationalizing CEOs' imperial pay scales.  On the other hand, those justifying the compensation of three extremely well-compensated health care corporate CEOs may really believe what they wrote about their CEOs roles in health care reform. 

We have posted little about the US health care reform effort because so much of it seemed irrelevant to the concerns mentioned on Health Care Renewal.  Health care reform legislation did little to address problems with health care leadership, governance and ethics, and how they challenge health care professionals' values and lead to higher costs, declining access, poor health care quality and disgruntled health care professionals (see this summary).  Maybe one reason this was so was that the top leaders of health care organizations did a good job pushing their personal and organizational priorities into the reform legislation, meanwhile discouraging any provisions that might threaten the way they were leading their organizations, and how much they were making while doing so. 

There a many reasons for the popular dissatisfaction with the recently enacted US health care reform legislation.  The influence of the leadership of top health care corporations in promoting their, rather than the populace's goals, ought to be a topic of further inquiry.  Meanwhile, it may be that the "superclass" has struck again. 

Corporate Proxies Suggest CEOs Rewarded for Influencing Health Care Reform

We have frequently discussed the often outsized, if not outrageous compensation awarded to top leaders of health care organizations.  Such compensation may seem disproportionate to the leaders' real-world achievements, and may contrast with organizational actions that seem inept, mission-hostile, or unethical.

In perusing this year's crop of proxy statements from some of the biggest US health care corporations, I noted that some provide some narrative, qualitative justification for their top leaders pay.  I was struck by three similar statements:

Johnson and Johnson

We recently discussed the contrast between Johnson and Johnson CEO William Weldon's gargantuan compensation and his detached response to the findings of an inspection of one of his company's factories that lead to its shutdown and the recall of its products.   According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, Mr Weldon's total compensation approved  in 2010 was $19,847,026.   The proxy statement included this overview of his performance:

The Board believes that Mr. Weldon generally exceeded expectations despite substantial economic, political, regulatory and competitive challenges as well as significant patent expirations. As referenced in the table above, the Company delivered solid financial results and positioned itself for future growth.

Under "strategic results" was this statement:

Mr. Weldon played an effective role in helping shape health care policy around the world and has been very involved with efforts on U.S. Health Care Reform. Mr. Weldon’s personal involvement with key leaders and organizations has ensured the interests of the Company are well represented.

Pfizer

We recently discussed the contrast between Pfizer Inc CEO Jeffrey Kindler's sizable compensation and the number and size of lawsuits alleging unethical conduct that the organization has settled, and its criminal conviction as a "racketeering influenced and corrupt organization" (RICO). According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, Mr Kindler's total compensation in 2009 was $14,898,038. The proxy statement included an Executive Compensation Discussion and Analysis. Its summary of Mr Kindler's performance was:

The committee believes that Mr Kindler's leadership was a significant factor in the continued progress made by Pfizer in 2009 in strengthening the foundation for future growth and long-term success.

It also specifically addressed Mr Kindler's "industry leadership":

During 2009, Mr Kindler was actively involved, through both Pfizer and external organizations, in developing and advancing US and global public policies that serve the overall interest of our Company and our shareholders, as well as doctors and patients. These efforts included constructive participation in the US legislative process to advance Pfizer's goals of achieving a more rational operating environment....

UnitedHealth Group

We recently discussed the contrast between UnitedHealth Group CEO Stephen J Helmsley's large total compensation and the profit he recently made from the sale of stock options and various questions raised about his company's ethical performance.  According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, his 2009 total compensation was $8,901,916. The company's 2010 proxy statement stated his compensation was based upon a variety of factors, including:

Positive participation and leadership of the Company in the health care reform and modernization debate

Summary

We have noted how health care organization may be gripped by "compensation madness," caused by "insiders hijacking established organizations for their personal benefit."  One could view the statements above as just one form of post-hoc justification for compensation madness.  It is possible that timid, if not crony boards are simply getting more inventive in their rationalizing CEOs' imperial pay scales.  On the other hand, those justifying the compensation of three extremely well-compensated health care corporate CEOs may really believe what they wrote about their CEOs roles in health care reform. 

We have posted little about the US health care reform effort because so much of it seemed irrelevant to the concerns mentioned on Health Care Renewal.  Health care reform legislation did little to address problems with health care leadership, governance and ethics, and how they challenge health care professionals' values and lead to higher costs, declining access, poor health care quality and disgruntled health care professionals (see this summary).  Maybe one reason this was so was that the top leaders of health care organizations did a good job pushing their personal and organizational priorities into the reform legislation, meanwhile discouraging any provisions that might threaten the way they were leading their organizations, and how much they were making while doing so. 

There a many reasons for the popular dissatisfaction with the recently enacted US health care reform legislation.  The influence of the leadership of top health care corporations in promoting their, rather than the populace's goals, ought to be a topic of further inquiry.  Meanwhile, it may be that the "superclass" has struck again. 

University of California CEO - You Can Reduce My Pay if "You Throw In Air Force One"

The San Francisco Chronicle recently reported how students at the University of California have been providing a satirical approach to the problems of the university's leadership:

It's been a seriously dramatic year at the University of California, where hundreds of students seized buildings, demonstrated and shut down regents meetings last fall to protest rising tuition and the perceived privatization of the public school.

It's also been a satirically dramatic year, thanks to the UC Movement for Efficient Privatization, a fledgling group of mostly grad students in business attire that uses humor tinged with sarcasm to lampoon UC officials.

Their own name is an example. Many UC students believe leaps in tuition and reduced state funding are turning the public university into a private institution.

In particular, they drew attention to the university president's sense of entitlement:

UCMeP has made itself known on the Berkeley campus since September. That's when UC President Mark Yudof, who earns about $600,000, drew students' ire for telling the New York Times he'd take a $200,000 pay cut for salary parity with President Obama - if Air Force One were part of the package.

Seeing this as a philanthropic opportunity, UCMeP issued fundraising flyers: 'Help Buy Mark Yudof a Plane!'

The relevant parts of the New York Times interview, which I regret to say I missed at the time it was published, are:

Some people feel you could close the U.C. budget gap by cutting administrative salaries, including your own.
The stories of my compensation are greatly exaggerated.

When you began your job last year, your annual compensation was reportedly $828,000.
It actually was $600,000 until I cut my pay by $60,000. So my salary is $540,000, but it gets amplified because people say, 'You have a pension plan.'

What about your housing allowance? How much is the rent on your home in Oakland?
It’s about $10,000 a month.

Does U.C. pay for that on top of your salary?
Yes, and the reason they do that is because they have a president’s house, it needed $8 million of repairs and I decided that was not the way to go. Why the heck would I ever authorize $8 million for a house I didn’t want to live in anyhow?

Why can’t you have architecture students repair the house for course credit?
Let me ponder that.

What do you think of the idea that no administrator at a state university needs to earn more than the president of the United States, $400,000?

Will you throw in Air Force One and the White House?

While Yudof's response is clearly sarcastic, he obviously never substantively addressed why he is entitled to be paid comparably to the President of the richest country in the world.

We have written a few times about the travails of the University of California, some of its multiple campuses, and in particular its medical schools and teaching hospitals.  Most recently we have written about how leaders of its teaching hospitals also seemed to feel entitled to substantial compensation, including bonuses for "performance" even when their institutions were receiving bad publicity for quality problems (posts here and here).

Again and again we see examples of leaders of academic medical institutions, and health care organizations in general who seem to feel entitled to be judged differently, and rewarded differently than the common folk.  These entitlements exist even when the economy, or the financial performance of the specific organization prevents other people from making any economic progress. This entitlement exists even if those other poeple actually do the work, and ultimately provide the money that sustains the organization.


Although the executives of not-for-profit health care organizations generally make far less than executives of for-profit health care corporations, collectively, hired managers of even not-for-profit health care organizations have become richer and richer at a time when most Americans, including many health professionals, and most primary care physicians, have seen their incomes stagnate or fall. They are less and less restrainted by passive, if not crony boards, and more and more unaccountable. In a kind of multi-centric coup d'etat of the hired managers, they have become our new de facto aristocracy.

Or as we wrote in our previous post, executive compensation in health care seems best described as Prof Mintzberg described compensation for finance CEOs, "All this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." As it did in finance, compensation madness is likely to keep the health care bubble inflating until it bursts, with the expected adverse consequences. Meanwhile, I say again, if health care reformers really care about improving access and controlling costs, they will have to have the courage to confront the powerful and self-interested leaders who benefit so well from their previously mission-driven organizations. It is time to reverse the coup d'etat of the hired managers.

University of California CEO - You Can Reduce My Pay if "You Throw In Air Force One"

The San Francisco Chronicle recently reported how students at the University of California have been providing a satirical approach to the problems of the university's leadership:

It's been a seriously dramatic year at the University of California, where hundreds of students seized buildings, demonstrated and shut down regents meetings last fall to protest rising tuition and the perceived privatization of the public school.

It's also been a satirically dramatic year, thanks to the UC Movement for Efficient Privatization, a fledgling group of mostly grad students in business attire that uses humor tinged with sarcasm to lampoon UC officials.

Their own name is an example. Many UC students believe leaps in tuition and reduced state funding are turning the public university into a private institution.

In particular, they drew attention to the university president's sense of entitlement:

UCMeP has made itself known on the Berkeley campus since September. That's when UC President Mark Yudof, who earns about $600,000, drew students' ire for telling the New York Times he'd take a $200,000 pay cut for salary parity with President Obama - if Air Force One were part of the package.

Seeing this as a philanthropic opportunity, UCMeP issued fundraising flyers: 'Help Buy Mark Yudof a Plane!'

The relevant parts of the New York Times interview, which I regret to say I missed at the time it was published, are:

Some people feel you could close the U.C. budget gap by cutting administrative salaries, including your own.
The stories of my compensation are greatly exaggerated.

When you began your job last year, your annual compensation was reportedly $828,000.
It actually was $600,000 until I cut my pay by $60,000. So my salary is $540,000, but it gets amplified because people say, 'You have a pension plan.'

What about your housing allowance? How much is the rent on your home in Oakland?
It’s about $10,000 a month.

Does U.C. pay for that on top of your salary?
Yes, and the reason they do that is because they have a president’s house, it needed $8 million of repairs and I decided that was not the way to go. Why the heck would I ever authorize $8 million for a house I didn’t want to live in anyhow?

Why can’t you have architecture students repair the house for course credit?
Let me ponder that.

What do you think of the idea that no administrator at a state university needs to earn more than the president of the United States, $400,000?

Will you throw in Air Force One and the White House?

While Yudof's response is clearly sarcastic, he obviously never substantively addressed why he is entitled to be paid comparably to the President of the richest country in the world.

We have written a few times about the travails of the University of California, some of its multiple campuses, and in particular its medical schools and teaching hospitals.  Most recently we have written about how leaders of its teaching hospitals also seemed to feel entitled to substantial compensation, including bonuses for "performance" even when their institutions were receiving bad publicity for quality problems (posts here and here).

Again and again we see examples of leaders of academic medical institutions, and health care organizations in general who seem to feel entitled to be judged differently, and rewarded differently than the common folk.  These entitlements exist even when the economy, or the financial performance of the specific organization prevents other people from making any economic progress. This entitlement exists even if those other poeple actually do the work, and ultimately provide the money that sustains the organization.


Although the executives of not-for-profit health care organizations generally make far less than executives of for-profit health care corporations, collectively, hired managers of even not-for-profit health care organizations have become richer and richer at a time when most Americans, including many health professionals, and most primary care physicians, have seen their incomes stagnate or fall. They are less and less restrainted by passive, if not crony boards, and more and more unaccountable. In a kind of multi-centric coup d'etat of the hired managers, they have become our new de facto aristocracy.

Or as we wrote in our previous post, executive compensation in health care seems best described as Prof Mintzberg described compensation for finance CEOs, "All this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." As it did in finance, compensation madness is likely to keep the health care bubble inflating until it bursts, with the expected adverse consequences. Meanwhile, I say again, if health care reformers really care about improving access and controlling costs, they will have to have the courage to confront the powerful and self-interested leaders who benefit so well from their previously mission-driven organizations. It is time to reverse the coup d'etat of the hired managers.

A University President, But No Longer a Goldman Sachs Director

A frequent topic on Health Care Renewal is how leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations now frequently value their "margin," that is, revenue generation more than mission.  (One good example here shows how medical school leaders value faculty most for how much money they bring in, rather than the quality of their teaching, research, or patient care.) 

"Masters of the Universe" as Leaders of Academic Medicine

As we have cast about for reasons behind this important and unfortunate transformation, we noticed that many of the members of the boards of trustees of some of the most prestigious universities that house medical schools, medical schools, and teaching hospitals seemed to be leaders in the finance industry. The importance of that finding became more relevant after the global financial collapse, aka "great recession," became evident.  Since then, we noted the influence of finance leaders on the leadership of Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Yeshiva University, and the Hospital for Special Surgery.

Although it seems that the complex relationships between various "masters of the universe" and academia, particularly academic medicine ought to have generated considerable discussion, they remained almost as anechoic as many of the other issues discussed on Health Care Renewal.

Therefore, with some regret, I will take up the latest example of such relationships from my own alma mater, Brown University.  ((Full disclosure: I am an alumnus of the College at Brown, and of the Medical School. I am a former full-time Brown faculty member, and currently a voluntary Clinical Associate Professor in the  Alpert Medical School.)  (Also note that here we discussed some of the questions about the financial dealings of a prominent member of Brown's Board of Fellows, the inner circle of the Brown Corporation, the equivalent of its board of trustees, who was also the very wealthy leader of a prominent hedge fund.  We noted then that his connection to Brown was not noted in current media stories about the controversy.)

A Goldman Sachs Director as University President

Last week (9 February, 2010), the Brown Daily Herald published an interview with the President of Brown, Ruth Simmons, about her service on the board of directors of Goldman Sachs, one of the most prominent, profitable and controversial investment banks.  Some of the main points were:

- President Simmons seemingly denied responsibility for any of the company's past actions that have inspired criticism:

"There are lots of things in a complex institution that go on." So, "you're not in charge of everything that your friends do and every policy that organizations that you're affiliated with issue."

- She also implied that she joined the board expressly and only to advocate for women and minorities in finance:

"We had a big push to think about how we could improve the knowledge and ability of women to manage their financial affairs." Also, "at the same time, there was a good deal of interest in the fact that women have not done so well in the financial sector and on Wall Street."

The goal was "to make certain fields more accessible to women and minorities through her service on the boards of Goldman, Texas Instruments and Pfizer."

"She called her work with women and minorities on boards meaningful to her in 'a way that a lot of people won't understand.'"

She stated "the seniority she now enjoys on Goldman's board allows her to advocate for programs to help women and minorities."

- She implied that she served on the board to learn something about economics, "her service on Goldman's board gave her the economic savvy to take certain risks...."

So in summary, in her role as a member of the board of Goldman Sachs, one of the most important financial companies in the world, which had major involvement in the events that lead to the global economic collapse, or "great recession," President Simmons claimed that her major role was to advocate particular political positions on the board, implied that she did not know much about the company's core business when she joined the board, and took no responsibilities for any actions of the company which might have inspired criticism.

Presdient Simmons' responses might have made sense were she just a member of an advisory board on diversity.   However, she is was a member of the board of directors.

In this interview, she seemed to ignore her fiduciary duties as a board member to show "unyielding loyalty"  to the stockholders of the company and their interests  [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]. She in particular seemed to disavow any responsibility for overseeing the actions of hired Goldman Sachs management. 

It is a testament to the power of the anechoic effect that an interview showing a member of the board of directors of one of the most important and controversial finance firms involved in the global financial collapse seemed to dodge responsibility for the firm's overall direction and financial practices seemed to inspire only one piece of commentary beyond Brown.  Felix Salmon opined

In all the bellyaching about the governance of the biggest banks, and the fact that their boards were spectacularly unqualified to provide any kind of oversight of what they were doing, Goldman Sachs has gone largely unmentioned. But what’s true of Merrill Lynch and Bank of America is true of Goldman too: its executives need some kind of adult supervision, seeing as how they work for their shareholders, rather than just for themselves.

He then noted,

this interview with one Goldman board member, Ruth Simmons, hardly instills in me the confidence that she can or will understand what Goldman is doing, stop them from acting in a reckless manner, or keep a close eye on compensation as she wears her hat as a member of the compensation committee....

A Rapid Resignation


However, what happened next does suggest maybe the times they are "a-changing." On 13 February, 2010, per Business Week

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the most profitable securities firm in Wall Street history, said Ruth Simmons will leave its board after 10 years because of 'increasing time requirements' in her role as Brown University president.

This despite the small fortune that President Simmons had made learning to develop "economic savvy,"

According to a Feb. 5 filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Simmons owned 27,386 restricted stock units in Goldman Sachs, worth $4.2 million at yesterday’s closing share price of $153.93. According to the filing, the units convert to shares on the first trading day in the third quarter of the year following her retirement from the board.

Simmons also has 10,000 options that she can exercise on the date she ceases to be a director, according to the filing.

Felix Salmon then commented,

I said after Tuesday’s interview with Simmons was published that she seemed to think about her membership on Goldman’s board much more in terms of what it could do for her and her pet causes than in terms of being a shareholder representative tasked with overseeing senior management, and I called for a revamp of the board. Friday’s news is exactly the step in that direction that I was looking for: maybe Simmons took my comments to heart!

Summary

So in the end, the complex relationships among academic, and academic medical leaders and the finance industry are at least less anechoic.

The issue is likely not over at Brown. While the initial Brown Daily Herald interview focused on whether President Simmons' position on the Goldman Sachs board might have lead to a direct conflict of interest, he did not ask whether her position in the leadership of Goldman Sachs had any relevance to the prominence of financial leaders on the Brown Corporation.  In fact, the same day that the Brown Daily Herald published the interview, it published an article on the legal travails of a Brown Corporation who has become one of the richest hedge fund leaders in the world.  The 2008-09 Brown Corporation (webpage no longer works here, but cached here) included three other current or retired Goldman Sachs leaders, a former partner, head of merchant banking, and former leader with less specified responsibilties.  It also included numerous other leaders of various other finance companies. 

In the aftermath of the global economic collapse, and in an ongoing health care crisis, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that some of the problems of academia, and particularly the problems of medical academia, may have been at least enabled by leadership more used to working in an increasingly amoral marketplace than to upholding the academic mission.  I hope that Brown's latest travails will inspire more interest in who now leads academia, especially medical academia, how they got there, and what they have wrought.  Academic medical institutions and other not-for-profit health care organizations need leaders who value their missions more than the money they may bring in. 

A University President, But No Longer a Goldman Sachs Director

A frequent topic on Health Care Renewal is how leaders of not-for-profit health care organizations now frequently value their "margin," that is, revenue generation more than mission.  (One good example here shows how medical school leaders value faculty most for how much money they bring in, rather than the quality of their teaching, research, or patient care.) 

"Masters of the Universe" as Leaders of Academic Medicine

As we have cast about for reasons behind this important and unfortunate transformation, we noticed that many of the members of the boards of trustees of some of the most prestigious universities that house medical schools, medical schools, and teaching hospitals seemed to be leaders in the finance industry. The importance of that finding became more relevant after the global financial collapse, aka "great recession," became evident.  Since then, we noted the influence of finance leaders on the leadership of Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Yeshiva University, and the Hospital for Special Surgery.

Although it seems that the complex relationships between various "masters of the universe" and academia, particularly academic medicine ought to have generated considerable discussion, they remained almost as anechoic as many of the other issues discussed on Health Care Renewal.

Therefore, with some regret, I will take up the latest example of such relationships from my own alma mater, Brown University.  ((Full disclosure: I am an alumnus of the College at Brown, and of the Medical School. I am a former full-time Brown faculty member, and currently a voluntary Clinical Associate Professor in the  Alpert Medical School.)  (Also note that here we discussed some of the questions about the financial dealings of a prominent member of Brown's Board of Fellows, the inner circle of the Brown Corporation, the equivalent of its board of trustees, who was also the very wealthy leader of a prominent hedge fund.  We noted then that his connection to Brown was not noted in current media stories about the controversy.)

A Goldman Sachs Director as University President

Last week (9 February, 2010), the Brown Daily Herald published an interview with the President of Brown, Ruth Simmons, about her service on the board of directors of Goldman Sachs, one of the most prominent, profitable and controversial investment banks.  Some of the main points were:

- President Simmons seemingly denied responsibility for any of the company's past actions that have inspired criticism:

"There are lots of things in a complex institution that go on." So, "you're not in charge of everything that your friends do and every policy that organizations that you're affiliated with issue."

- She also implied that she joined the board expressly and only to advocate for women and minorities in finance:

"We had a big push to think about how we could improve the knowledge and ability of women to manage their financial affairs." Also, "at the same time, there was a good deal of interest in the fact that women have not done so well in the financial sector and on Wall Street."

The goal was "to make certain fields more accessible to women and minorities through her service on the boards of Goldman, Texas Instruments and Pfizer."

"She called her work with women and minorities on boards meaningful to her in 'a way that a lot of people won't understand.'"

She stated "the seniority she now enjoys on Goldman's board allows her to advocate for programs to help women and minorities."

- She implied that she served on the board to learn something about economics, "her service on Goldman's board gave her the economic savvy to take certain risks...."

So in summary, in her role as a member of the board of Goldman Sachs, one of the most important financial companies in the world, which had major involvement in the events that lead to the global economic collapse, or "great recession," President Simmons claimed that her major role was to advocate particular political positions on the board, implied that she did not know much about the company's core business when she joined the board, and took no responsibilities for any actions of the company which might have inspired criticism.

Presdient Simmons' responses might have made sense were she just a member of an advisory board on diversity.   However, she is was a member of the board of directors.

In this interview, she seemed to ignore her fiduciary duties as a board member to show "unyielding loyalty"  to the stockholders of the company and their interests  [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]. She in particular seemed to disavow any responsibility for overseeing the actions of hired Goldman Sachs management. 

It is a testament to the power of the anechoic effect that an interview showing a member of the board of directors of one of the most important and controversial finance firms involved in the global financial collapse seemed to dodge responsibility for the firm's overall direction and financial practices seemed to inspire only one piece of commentary beyond Brown.  Felix Salmon opined

In all the bellyaching about the governance of the biggest banks, and the fact that their boards were spectacularly unqualified to provide any kind of oversight of what they were doing, Goldman Sachs has gone largely unmentioned. But what’s true of Merrill Lynch and Bank of America is true of Goldman too: its executives need some kind of adult supervision, seeing as how they work for their shareholders, rather than just for themselves.

He then noted,

this interview with one Goldman board member, Ruth Simmons, hardly instills in me the confidence that she can or will understand what Goldman is doing, stop them from acting in a reckless manner, or keep a close eye on compensation as she wears her hat as a member of the compensation committee....

A Rapid Resignation


However, what happened next does suggest maybe the times they are "a-changing." On 13 February, 2010, per Business Week

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the most profitable securities firm in Wall Street history, said Ruth Simmons will leave its board after 10 years because of 'increasing time requirements' in her role as Brown University president.

This despite the small fortune that President Simmons had made learning to develop "economic savvy,"

According to a Feb. 5 filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Simmons owned 27,386 restricted stock units in Goldman Sachs, worth $4.2 million at yesterday’s closing share price of $153.93. According to the filing, the units convert to shares on the first trading day in the third quarter of the year following her retirement from the board.

Simmons also has 10,000 options that she can exercise on the date she ceases to be a director, according to the filing.

Felix Salmon then commented,

I said after Tuesday’s interview with Simmons was published that she seemed to think about her membership on Goldman’s board much more in terms of what it could do for her and her pet causes than in terms of being a shareholder representative tasked with overseeing senior management, and I called for a revamp of the board. Friday’s news is exactly the step in that direction that I was looking for: maybe Simmons took my comments to heart!

Summary

So in the end, the complex relationships among academic, and academic medical leaders and the finance industry are at least less anechoic.

The issue is likely not over at Brown. While the initial Brown Daily Herald interview focused on whether President Simmons' position on the Goldman Sachs board might have lead to a direct conflict of interest, he did not ask whether her position in the leadership of Goldman Sachs had any relevance to the prominence of financial leaders on the Brown Corporation.  In fact, the same day that the Brown Daily Herald published the interview, it published an article on the legal travails of a Brown Corporation who has become one of the richest hedge fund leaders in the world.  The 2008-09 Brown Corporation (webpage no longer works here, but cached here) included three other current or retired Goldman Sachs leaders, a former partner, head of merchant banking, and former leader with less specified responsibilties.  It also included numerous other leaders of various other finance companies. 

In the aftermath of the global economic collapse, and in an ongoing health care crisis, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that some of the problems of academia, and particularly the problems of medical academia, may have been at least enabled by leadership more used to working in an increasingly amoral marketplace than to upholding the academic mission.  I hope that Brown's latest travails will inspire more interest in who now leads academia, especially medical academia, how they got there, and what they have wrought.  Academic medical institutions and other not-for-profit health care organizations need leaders who value their missions more than the money they may bring in. 

Pfizer (in the Guise of Pharmacia) Pfound to Violate Pfraud Law, While Pfizer CEO Made Pfederal Reserve Advisor

It was only a month ago that Pfizer Inc, the world's largest pharmaceutical company, submitted to a gargantuan $2.3 billion settlement and yet another corporate integrity agreement. As we posted here, this was the company's fourth major settlement of charges of unethical marketing behavior since 2002.

Now Pfizer is in trouble again. As reported by the AP,

A judge on Tuesday imposed $4.5 million in forfeitures on prescription drug company Pharmacia Inc.[a Pfizer Inc subsidiary] for misrepresenting prices and defrauding Wisconsin's Medicaid system.

A jury in February found that Pharmacia violated the state's Medicaid fraud law 1.44 million times over a decade. State Justice Department attorneys had demanded about $212 million in forfeitures, but Dane County Circuit Judge Richard Niess said jurors grossly overcalculated the number of violations.

After reviewing the evidence, the judge found the actual tally was 4,578.

He elected to set the forfeiture level at $1,000 per violation. The judge said he was concerned that if he ordered the maximum $68.6 million Pharmacia would pass the expense to consumers and nothing showed any of the fraudulent $7 million went directly to Pharmacia's profits.

On the other hand, the judge said, a $100 per violation forfeiture totaling $457,800 would 'not register so much as blip on Pharmacia's multibillion-dollar annual fiscal radar screen' and a higher amount would draw attention to the need to reform pharmaceutical reimbursement scales.

I must say that I do not understand the reasoning the judge used to set the penalties. If he thought that Pfizer would merely pass along a large penalty to patients, why would the company not pass along a smaller penalty to them.

In any case, this is just the latest in a long string of cases in which a health care corporation was found to have committed unethical or illegal acts, but the only the corporation itself, but not the people who actually performed, directed or authorized the acts, paid a penalty. And when the penalty is paid by the corporation, its impact can be spread over all stock-holders, all employees, and all patients, clients, or customers, thus diluting its effect, and protecting those who authorized, directed, or performed the acts in question.

I submit again that only when the people in health care leadership who perform, direct or authorize bad behavior pay penalties will bad behavior be deterred.

Note that while Pfizer may be the world's largest pharmaceutical corporation, it seems to be the corporation most often cited for, convicted of, or having to make settlements for bad behavior (see some recent examples here). (Although in the current case, you would have to read the news report very carefully to realize that Pfizer was involved. The fact that Pharmacia is a Pfizer subsidiary was only mentioned in passing.)

Nonetheless, one would think Pfizer's leadership would be ashamed, and their reputation would suffer. But no. At about the same time this latest settlement was announced, this report from Reuters appeared:

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York said on Thursday that Pfizer (PFE.N) chief executive Jeffrey Kindler and Loews Corp (L.N) chief executive James Tisch will fill the two vacancies on its board of directors.

Kindler was elected to finish a three-year term ending Dec. 31, taking the seat PepsiCo (PEP.N) chief executive Indra Nooyi resigned from in February.

Regional Federal Reserve banks' boards of directors offer recommendations on Fed policy, but have no policy-making powers. They also provide anecdotal information about the business conditions that help inform the central bank.

Regional Fed banks have three classes of directors: Class A, elected by member banks to represent banks; Class B, elected by member banks but representing the public; and Class C, which represent the public but are chosen by the Board of Governors in Washington.

Kindler and Tisch join Jeffrey Immelt, chairman and chief executive of General Electric (GE.N) as Class B directors.

I suppose Kindler could offer quite a bit of "anecdotal information" about bad behavior in the pharmaceutical industry. But it seems rather comic to think about the CEO of the world's biggest, and lately baddest pharmaceutical company as "representing the public." Rather, and more seriously, this is just the latest example of how leaders of health care organizations have joined the superclass, and how the superclass protects its own.

A Board of Trustees, or a Social Club for the Superclass?

We just posted about the unlikely appointment of one Mr Robert K Steel as a trustee of the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York. Mr Steel appears to have no particular expertise or experience in health care, and no special affinity for its values. On the other hand, Mr Steel was briefly the CEO of Wachovia who presided over that company's demise, despite his avowed goal of keeping it independent. Previously, he served as an Under Secretary of the Treasury during Secretary Henry Paulson's controversial bail-out of financial institutions. He also was Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Duke University during the time of the lacrosse scandal, and pledged his full support to the actions of its President (whom he had a personal role in hiring), including those that seemingly put preserving the Duke brand ahead of protecting the rights of its students.

Why would such a person be appointed to the board of a prestigious teaching hospital?

Maybe he was seen as a good fit.

The hospital board has 42 members in addition to its CEO ex-officio. Of these, 13 are physicians, and 29 are "civilians." Of the latter 29, 23 by my count have major relationships, and frequently have current or past leadership roles in financial companies, some of which were recipients of recent Treasury Department bail-outs. Thus, a majority of all board members come from finance. In addition, 7 of the 13 physician board members have financial relationships with health care corporations that might be construed as conflicts of interest. The details are below:

Non-Physician Board Members

Atiim "Tiki" Barber (sports broadcaster)
James M Benson - retired chairman of John Hancock Life Insurance; retired Chairman, President and CEO of New England Financial and of GenAmerica Financial Corporation
Peter L Briger Jr - Principal and Co-Chairman, Fortress Investment Group
Michael C Brooks - Partner, Venrock
Charles P Coleman III - Tiger Global Management
Leslie Cornfeld (deputy US Attorney)
Cynthia Foster Curry (spouse of owner of Toyota dealer)
Barrie M Damson - President and Chair, Damson Financial Resources Inc
James G Dinan - Chairman and CEO, York Capital Management
Winfield P Jones (attorney)
Monica Keany - managing director, Morgan Stanely
David H Koch - executive vice president and member, board of directors, Koch Industries (a conglomerate that provides "commodity and financial trading services" among other products and services)
Lara R Lerner - spouse of Randolph Lerner, former CEO of MBNA, which he sold to Bank of America, now has family holdings (>$1 billion in 2008) of Bank of America stock
Marylin B Levitt - spouse of Arthur Levitt Jr, former chair of the SEC, now advisor to AIG and the Carlyle Group
Alan S MacDonald - chief client officer, Citigroup
David M Madden - founder and principal of Narrow River Management (investment management company that focuses on pharmaceutical companies)
Richard L Menschel - senior director, Goldman Sachs (in 2002)
Dean R O'Hare - retired CEO of Chubb Corporation, director of DFA Capital Management
Aldo Papone - retired chairman of American Express Travel Related Services
Gordon Pattee - President, MAP Capital Corp
Charlton Reynders Jr - Chairman and CEO, Reynders Gray Co
Susan W Rose (philanthropist)
William R Salomon - honorary chairman, Citigroup
Jonathan Sobel - Global Head of Risk Management, Investment Management Division, Goldman Sachs
Robert K Steel - retired CEO, Wachovia (see above)
Daniel G Tully - founding partner and managing director, Altaris (investment company focused on "healthcare industry")
Mrs Douglas A Warner III - spouse of former chairman of JP Morgan Chase, current director of General Electric (which has both health care and finance divisions)
Kendrick R Wilson III - former executive, Goldman Sachs
Ellen M Wright (occupation not clear)

Physician Board Members

Mathias P Bostrom MD - consultant for Smith & Nephew
Richard A Brand MD -
Charles N Cornell MD - royalties from Exactech
Melvin J Glimcher MD -
Steven R Goldring MD - member, board of directors, Telik
David L Helfet MD - member of advisory boards, OHK Medical Devices Inc, Healthpoint Capital, Orthobond Corp
Carl F Nathan MD -
Stephen A Paget MD - consultant to Medarex, Crescendo Bioscience
Scott Rodeo MD
Thomas P Sculco MD - royalties from Exactech
Russell F Warren MD - chairman of the board, Highlands Acquisition Corp, chairman of the scientific advisory board, chief scientific officer, principal member of the investment committee, Ivy Capital Partners, board of directors, Orthonet, royalties from Biomet, member of scientific advisory board, Cayenne Medical, member of scientific board of advisors, HealthPoint Capital, royalties from Smith & Nephew
Torsten N Wiesel MD -
Philip D Wilson Jr MD -

Summary

As we have written previously, boards of trustees of not-for-profit health care organizations are supposed to supervise the management of these organizations, making sure it is prudent, and upholds the organizations' missions. Boards have duties to exercise reasonable care, avoid conflicts of interest, and again, uphold their organizations' missions. Thus, ideally, boards should be composed of people most likely to fulfill these duties.

In the real world, current board members usually have sole authority to appoint new board members. Thus it may be all too tempting to make fit with the current board members the main criterion for appointment of new board members. We have posted about university and hospital boards which have pluralities or majorities of members from the finance sector. Such remarkable homogeneity suggests that they picked new board members because of their similarity to current board members. (For example, see posts about the boards of Dartmouth, Harvard, and Yeshiva Universities, and of Partners Healthcare.)

Thus, the boards of prestigious not-for-profit health care organizations may come to resemble social clubs for the superclass more than collections of passionate defenders of the progress of health care.

It is hard to imagine how boards packed with finance industry executives would be the best upholders of academic and health care values, especially after the shortcomings of many finance industry leaders became so obvious in the global financial meltdown/ great recession.

If health care is to become more affordable, more accessible, of greater quality, and less demoralizing for health care professionals, health care organizations need leaders known for their devotion to putting patients first rather than their devotion to socializing with their cronies.

A Trustee of What "Caliber" for the Hospital for Special Surgery

The Hospital for Special Surgery in New York, a prestigious institution focused on orthopedics and rheumatology, closely affiliated with Weill Cornell Medical College, just announced its newest trustee, whose qualifications for the position turn out to be just a wee bit curious. Here they are as described by the press release:

He is a former CEO of Wachovia

Hospital for Special Surgery announced today that Robert K. Steel, former President and Chief Executive Officer of Wachovia Corporation, has been named a member of the hospital's Board of Trustees.

Steel facilitated Wachovia's merger with Wells Fargo to create the second-largest retail brokerage in the country.

Before then, he served in the Treasury Department

Prior to running Wachovia, Steel served in the U.S. Treasury Department as Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, a Senate-confirmed position. In that role, he was the principal adviser to Secretary Henry Paulson on matters of domestic finance and led the department's activities regarding the domestic financial system, fiscal policy and operations, and governmental assets and liabilities.

Steel brings a wealth of experience to the Hospital for Special Surgery Board. He regularly testified before House and Senate Committees on matters such as reform at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, foreclosure prevention, and the rescue of Bear Stearns.

Before then, he was a leader at Goldman Sachs

Steel spent almost 30 years at Goldman Sachs, rising to vice chair of the firm.

He was also chairman of the board of Duke University

In 2009, Steel completed his term as chair of the board of Duke University.

The other members of the Hospital for Special Surgery board were delighted by Steel's qualifications:

'All on the Board of Trustees are delighted to have someone of the caliber of Robert Steel join us to help guide the future of our institution as a leader in orthopedics, rheumatology and their related disciplines,' said Aldo Papone, Co-Chair of the Board of Trustees at the Hospital for Special Surgery.

Hospital Board Co-Chair Dean R. O'Hare added, 'As patients continue to seek the Hospital for Special Surgery's world class services in record numbers, we are very pleased Robert Steel is here to support this institution and the superb team of people who work here.'

Setting aside the obvious issues that Mr Steel seems to have no particular knowledge of or training in medicine or health, and nothing in the press release suggests he has particular devotion to the values of health care, what do his cited qualifications really mean? Let's go through them in the order they were mentioned above.

Former CEO of Wachovia

In fact, Steel became CEO of Wachovia in July, 2008, only to soon preside over the company's failure and its hurried merger with Wells Fargo. As reported by the New York Times, by September, 2008, Steel had to give up any hopes of keeping Wachovia independent,

As concern spread Friday that more banks might run into trouble even with a $700 billion rescue for the financial system, Wachovia, one of those hardest hit by the housing crisis, became the latest to reach for a lifeline.

Weighed down by a huge portfolio of troubled mortgage loans, the nation’s fourth-largest bank by assets entered into preliminary deal talks with Citigroup, and extended feelers to Wells Fargo and Banco Santander of Spain....

In July, the bank hired Robert K. Steel, 56, a former vice chairman at Goldman Sachs, from the Treasury Department, where he worked with Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., trying to resolve the mortgage market crisis. Mr. Steel vowed to keep Wachovia independent and sought to raise $5 billion in capital over the next year by selling noncore assets.

The deal with Citigroup fell through, and Wachovia was taken over by Wells Fargo on January 1, 2009. So although Wachovia's portfolio of doubtful mortgages was not the fault of Robert K Steel, he did not succeed in his vow of independence proved to be hollow.

Furthermore, questions were raised about Mr Steel's overly optimistic predictions about Wachovia's financial conditions just before the company had to enter into merger talks. As reported by the New York Times on September 30, 2008:

'Jim, we have a great future as an independent company,' Robert K. Steel, Wachovia's chief executive, told James Cramer on CNBC's 'Mad Money.' 'We're also focused on very exciting prospects when we get things right going forward. I didn't have time today to talk about the good things going on at Wachovia.'

That interview wasn't last month or last year -- it took place, amazingly, two weeks ago. Wachovia's shares closed at $10.71 that day. On Monday, Citigroup bought the company for $1 a share.

What was Mr. Steel thinking? Did he think he could 'spin' his way to survival?

On Mr. Cramer's show Monday night, he spent an entire segment apologizing to his viewers about having Mr. Steel on the program and for his own bullish call on Wachovia's stock. 'I screwed up,' he said, referring at one point to Mr. Steel as a friend for 25 years. 'I believed in the guy. Did he take advantage of me? Perhaps yes.'

Early this year, the Wall Street Journal reported that these remarks lead to an investigation by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC):

The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating remarks that former Wachovia Corp. Chief Executive Robert K. Steel made about the future of the bank the day before it started talks about a potential merger....

Among the issues under scrutiny is whether Mr. Steel, 57 years old, misled investors when he appeared on CNBC's 'Mad Money' program on Monday, Sept. 15.

The next day, Sept. 16, Wachovia's board met by telephone to discuss strategic options for the company, including raising money, selling core businesses and merging with another company, according to an SEC filing.

On Sept. 17, Mr. Steel called Morgan Stanley CEO John Mack to discuss a potential merger, according to people familiar with the matter.

By the week of Sept. 22, under pressure from regulators and with customers starting to withdraw deposits, Mr. Steel was immersed in merger negotiations with Citigroup Inc. and Wells Fargo & Co. executives, according to regulatory filings and people familiar with the matter.

After initially agreeing to sell its banking operations to Citigroup, Wachovia on Oct. 3 agreed to sell the full company to Wells Fargo.

So although Mr Steel could not be blamed for the unfortunate financial position of Wachovia on the day he took over as CEO, he failed in his goal of keeping the company independent, and questions have been raised as to whether his overly optimistic comments just before merger negotiations began misled investors. Thus, his brief performance as leader of Wachovia does not seem something to boast about as a qualification to be a trustee of the Hospital for Special Surgery.

Under Secretary of the Treasury For Finance

Mr Steel was appointed to his post at the Treasury Department by Henry Paulson. Mr Steel seemed to have a major role in the Paulson Treasury Department's response to the global financial meltdown of 2008. Criticism of Paulson and his department's response to the crisis is so well-known that we need not repeat it here. In response to the discussion in the news release above about Steel's testimony before congress, it is worth quoting a New York Times article about a hearing that took place after the bail out of Bear Stearns, but before the crisis became full-blown.

'How do we guard against a future Bear Stearns,' asked Senator Charles E. Schumer. 'Was someone asleep at the switch?'

Later,

Did Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury secretary, mandate a rock-bottom price for Bear?

'What did you know and when did you know it,' [Senator Christopher] ... Dodd asked, his voice loud as he pressed Mr. Bernanke, Mr. Steel and Mr. Geithner for an answer.

Mr. Steel and Mr. Geithner were artful and vague in their responses....

And just a few days ago, a story emerged that Paulson's plans to force a merger of Wachovia and Goldman Sachs failed because of the multiple conflicts of interest involved, including those affecting Mr Steel (as per Bloomberg News):

Paulson, the CEO at Goldman Sachs until mid-2006, contacted current CEO Lloyd Blankfein and an unidentified Wachovia director, urging them to consider a combination, Sorkin reported. Goldman Sachs co-President Gary Cohn and Wachovia CEO Robert Steel -- a former vice chairman at the New York investment bank and an undersecretary to Paulson at Treasury -- thought they were near completion of a transaction after Fed Governor Kevin Warsh said the central bank would consider a merger, according to the excerpt.

Billionaire investor Warren Buffett, chairman of Omaha, Nebraska-based Berkshire Hathaway Inc., was contacted about investing in the combined companies, Sorkin reported. Buffett told a Goldman Sachs banker the merger would never happen because of the investment bank’s ties to officials at the Treasury and Wachovia, Sorkin reported.

So it is not obvious that Mr Steel's work at the Treasury Department covered him in glory, or constituted a particular qualification to lead the Hospital for Special Surgery.

Chairman of the Board of Duke University

Mr Steel's time in the leadership of Duke coincided with one of the major scandals to afflict higher education in the 21st century, usually called the Duke Lacrosse Scandal. Very briefly, several Duke University students who were also on the university's lacrosse team were charged with raping an exotic dancer. After they were charged, the university leadership seemed to judge that the players were guilty before the trial, and that the whole lacrosse team had to bear some sort of collective guilt. Eventually, the charges were dismissed for lack of evidence, and the prosecutor who pursued them so avidly was disgraced.

It turns out that Mr Steel had a role in this scandal too.

According to a New Yorker article, Mr Steel took a leadership role in the hiring of Due President Richard H Brodhead:

The man charged with bringing Brodhead to Duke was Robert K. Steel, a trustee and chairman of the search committee....

After the lacrosse players were accused of rape, a bizarre email led Brodhead to abandon a measured approach:

Brodhead, who had been trying to maintain a balance between avoiding prejudgment and satisfying the mounting pressure for action, was outraged. He said he found the message 'sickening and repulsive,' and he acted immediately. He suspended McFadyen [the student who wrote the email]. Coach Pressler was informed that he had until the end of the day to leave the campus, where he had coached for sixteen years. Brodhead also announced a series of committees that would investigate the team, the administration’s handling of the matter, and the Duke culture itself. In a letter to the Duke community, he wrote that the lacrosse episode 'has brought to glaring visibility underlying issues that have been of concern on this campus and in this town for some time.' The letter went on:

They include concerns of women about sexual coercion and assault. They include concerns about the culture of certain student groups that regularly abuse alcohol and the attitudes these groups promote. They include concerns about the survival of the legacy of racism, the most hateful feature American history has produced.
Compounding and intensifying these issues of race and gender, they include concerns about the deep structures of inequality in our society—inequalities of wealth, privilege, and opportunity (including educational opportunity), and the attitudes of superiority those inequalities breed. And they include concerns that, whether they intend to or not, universities like Duke participate in this inequality and supply a home for a culture of privilege.

This quote in retropsect is beyond ironic given that there was never good evidence to support the charges against the lacrosse players.

Brodhead cancelled the lacrosse team's season, but it turned out his reasoning, and that of Mr Steel who seemed to have a major role in the decision, was based mainly on the perceived need to preserve the "Duke brand":

When Brodhead cancelled the season, he had said that the moment was too serious to be playing games. What he meant, in part, was that Duke could not be seen to be playing games. From the start, Brodhead had been forced to navigate among several potentially hazardous interests—lacrosse parents who felt angry and abandoned by the school, dismayed alumni and donors, the agitated citizens of Durham, the clamoring press—while protecting what is known in the Allen Building as 'the Duke brand.' On that fitful weekend in late March when the TV satellite trucks hit campus, the lacrosse team could be seen practicing for the Georgetown game, a scene that became an endless video loop suggesting institutional indifference. 'We had to stop those pictures,' Bob Steel says. 'It doesn’t mean that it’s fair, but we had to stop it. It doesn’t necessarily mean I think it was right—it just had to be done.'

Clearly, according to Mr Steel and his protege, President Brodhead, preserving the Duke brand was more important than the fair treatment of its students.

In 2007, as per this Fox News report, the North Carolina Attorney General dispelled the accusations against the lacrosse players.

[Attorney General Roy] Cooper said Wednesday that not only was there insufficient evidence proving the three assaulted an exotic dancer at an off-campus lacrosse player in March 2006, but there was 'no credible evidence that an attack occurred at that house on that night.' He even proclaimed the players 'innocent.'

'The result of our review and investigation shows clearly that there is insufficient evidence to proceed on any of the charges,' Cooper said. 'Today we are filing notices of dismissal for all charges.'

He added: 'We believe these cases were a result of a tragic rush to accuse and failure to verify serious allegations. Based on these significant inconsistencies of evidence and the various accounts given by the accusing witness, we believe these three individuals are innocent of these charges.'

After their exoneration, Mr Steel sent out a message affirming his support of President Brodhead's decisions (presumably including suspending the lacrosse season to preserve the Duke brand, firing the lacrosse coach for no obvious reason, and launching an unwarranted witch-hunt against erroneous attitudes toward sexual assault, and race and gender.) Per the Durham-in-Wonderland blog (written by Prof KC Johnson, who also wrote the book about the Duke lacrosse scandal), here is what Steel wrote:

Throughout the past year President Richard Brodhead consulted regularly with the trustees and has had our continuing support. He made considered and thoughtful decisions in a volatile and uncertain situation. Each step of the way, the board agreed with the principles that he established and the actions he took.

Finally, Steel is now a defendent in a law-suit in the aftermath of of this case, per the AP:

Three unindicted Duke University lacrosse players have amended their civil lawsuit against the school and the city of Durham stemming from false rape accusations two years ago.

The Herald-Sun of Durham reported Wednesday the players allege that Duke trustees chairman Robert Steel controlled the school's response and that the school was most interested in protecting its image.

So Mr Steel's handling of the Duke lacrosse scandal during his time as chairman of the board of that university also did not exactly cover him in glory, or provide an obvious qualification for him to be a trustee of the Hospital for Special Surgery.

Summary

So Mr Steel
-as CEO of Wachovia failed to keep the company independent, and is under investigation of charges that he misled stock-holders;
- as Under Secretary of the Treasury was involved in what many believe was a bungled strategy to combat the global financial meltdown mainly by handing billions of dollars to the misguided Masters of the Universe who brought the meltdown upon us; and
- as Chairman of the Board of Duke University seemed to put an ultimately unsuccesful attempt to defend the Duke brand ahead of the rights of its students, and is now the defendent of at least one related lawsuit.

It is too soon to tell whether the SEC investigation of the lawsuit will be decided for or against Mr Steel. However, it seems utterly bizarre that the board of the Hospital for Special Surgery would regard Mr Steel's track record as indicative of the "caliber" needed to lead one of the country's premier hospitals.

How Mr Steel inspires such praise brings to mind some findings of pollster Frank Luntz that appeared in the Los Angeles Times:

Today, Americans are boiling mad, and the elites from Washington to Wall Street to West Hollywood don't get it. It can best be summarized by 12 short words bellowed by Howard Beale, the deranged TV anchor in the movie 'Network': 'I'm as mad as hell, and I'm not going to take this anymore.'

Americans in the unhappy majority are struggling to keep their jobs as million-dollar bonuses are being awarded at companies their tax dollars bailed out.

The core American complaint about politics is that wrongdoing isn't punished, other than at the next election. From scandalous personal behavior to bailouts of everyone and everything except the hardworking middle class, Washington is seen as the source for America's mistakes. Enforcing rules and letting failures fail would stop the excesses today and prevent the mistakes of tomorrow.

Such accountability in business would likewise prevent executives at imploding companies from walking away with millions while their employees get skunked.

For business and political elites, the message should be clear: Restore trust.

Mr Steel's unlikely career trajectory shows how once someone becomes a member of the superclass, the new power elite that spans business, government, and academics, that person is likely to continue to wield power no matter how poor his or her track-record, to the detriment of nearly everyone else.